7 years since shocking hate crime, civil rights suit over Nantucket public meeting surfaces racial tension

Nantucket African Meeting House, 1880
Nantucket Historical Association

A shocking hate crime of vandalism on storied Nantucket Island in 2018 has resulted in sour police-community relations, a free-speech civil-rights claim remanded to trial court just this August, and retention in September of a private firm for an independent review.

In March 2018, the historic 1827 African Meeting House on Nantucket Island was vandalized with hate speech in black spray paint, including the "n-word," as shown in the image below, at bottom, from the appendix to the August appellate court decision. (Sensitive readers be warned.)

To date, no one has been convicted of the vandalism. In a civil rights lawsuit by Nantucket residents Jim Barros and Rose Marie Samuels, the Superior Court in 2022 blamed a suspect, Dylan Ponce, who asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and whom a grand jury refused to indict.

Ponce's employer, Jeffrey Sayle, pleaded guilty to false statement to police and testified that Ponce confessed (The Inquirer and Mirror). The civil case against Ponce was Barros v. Ponce, Civil Action No. 2175CV00004 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 6, 2022) (paywalled at Mass. Lawyers Weekly).

Town Manager Elizabeth Gibson
Town & County of Nantucket

Sayle is the brother-in-law of Nantucket town manager Elizabeth Gibson, who herself is married to the deputy police chief of Nantucket. Given the close relationships of officials and the slow and ultimately unsuccessful police investigation, rumors picked up steam in the years after the 2018 crime that family members of Gibson and police were being protected.

In 2020, Barros and Samuels appeared at a meeting of the town board, as they had before, to demand accountability in the still ongoing investigation. Their remarks fueled continuing suspicion of a cover-up, which prompted the ire of Gibson and police chief William Pittman. 

Chief William Pittman
(captured from public meeting video)

Samuels's exchange with Gibson was especially heated. Angrily denying untruthfulness, Gibson interrupted Samuels and demanded that the chair stop her from speaking further. Samuels, who also accused police of failure to investigate a hit-and-run crash that injured her son in 2018 (more at Change.org), was cowed back to hear seat. She returned to the microphone after Gibson stormed out of the meeting.

Barros accused police of lying because he he had been told by a detective that a perpetrator was identified, but no charges resulted. Pittman, who carried a sidearm, spoke in defense of the police and accused Barros of fueling rumors of a cover-up while claiming to know the identity of perpetrators and refusing to tell police. Pittman retired in 2023.

The salient part of the public meeting is on YouTube, cued here at 27 minutes, and running for 13 minutes:

Barros and Samuels brought a civil rights action against the board, Gibson, and Pittman for violating their free speech rights under the federal and state constitutions, and for intimidation under state civil rights law. The Superior Court granted defendants summary judgment on both counts. In August, the Appeals Court voted 2-1 to to remand Samuels's statutory civil rights claim only to proceed.

The facts matter, in more detail than I've stated them here, because the pretrial disposition turns on whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the claims to a jury. Interested readers can find more detailed articulations of the facts in the judges' opinions.

In short, the court rejected the constitutional claims because neither Barros nor Samuels was actually stopped from speaking. Samuels was allowed to return to the microphone and continue after Gibson stormed out. Barros was allowed to say his piece despite the objections interjected by Pittman.

The civil rights claims were closer calls, though, because intimidation, threat, or coercion is actionable even if the plaintiffs were permitted to speak. The test is one of interference or attempted interference of a protected right, here to speak at the public meeting. 

For pretrial resolution on defense motion, the court views the facts most favorably for the plaintiffs, the non-moving parties. Yet even accepting as true that Barros "was impugned by Pittman, suffered embarrassment, and felt intimidated by Pittman's being armed," the court decided, the sum of Pittman's alleged interference was only impassioned disagreement or disapproval, not intimidation.

Rose Marie Samuels, 2020
(captured from public meeting video)

However, in the case of Samuels, Gibson expressly demanded that she be silenced, and Samuels evidenced intimidation in once returning to her seat. The court concluded, "Gibson's response to Samuels's comments, including Gibson's physically threatening departure from the meeting and hostile, intimate back-and-forth with Samuels, could be sufficient to establish a violation of the [state civil rights act] at trial."

The court's analysis of Samuels's civil rights claim raised an interesting point of "constitutional tort" law, that is, the way tort law is used to operationalize litigation over civil rights. Under state civil rights law, the court explained, "[i]n determining whether conduct constitutes threats, intimidation, or coercion, we apply an objective or 'reasonable person' standard."

Yet like in tort law, the "reasonable person" standard is not wholly objective, but is a test of the reasonable person under the same circumstances as the person being tested, or standing in the shoes of the person being tested. As the court put it, "'objectivity' does not foreclose consideration of the plaintiff's situation"; "we need not ignore who the plaintiff is."

That subjectivity made a big difference in light of Samuels's personal history with police. Considering the facts favorably to her, "she had experienced, and continued to experience, racism from the Nantucket police," the court reasoned. "She mistrusted Gibson, the town manager, who was married to the deputy police chief."

In that emotional context, the court recalled, "Samuels maintains that Gibson 'stormed' past her when leaving the meeting, 'in a physically threatening manner,' 'glar[ed] down' at Samuels from 'within a few feet,' and stopped to ask, twice, whether Samuels was calling her a liar. Samuels characterized Gibson's voice as 'loud and threatening,' and Samuels was frightened by this encounter."

Samuels therefore made a sufficient case to present her claim of intimidation for a jury to decide.

Justice Smyth

Justice Paul Hart Smyth wrote a spirited dissent favoring the plaintiffs on all three counts on which the court affirmed judgment for the defense. He would have sent all four claims, for both plaintiffs, to the jury. Be forewarned, I'm going to quote Justice Smyth at some length, because what he adds to the analysis on Nantucket social conditions I find eye opening.

Speaking to those very circumstances that made a difference in Samuels's statutory claim, Justice Smyth painted a different and bleaker picture of police-community relations on Nantucket.

The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs inhabited a different stratum in the town altogether, as they maintained no apparent political, economic, social, public order, or law enforcement influence over town affairs. First, he described Gibson's social and economic power.

Gibson first began working for the town of Nantucket in 1988, when she was twenty-two years old. She has held the position of town manager since 1995. As town manager, Gibson is a remarkably powerful and influential individual. She exercises direct supervision over almost every town department, including the police, fire, building, finance, health, marine and coastal resources, public works, board of appeals, conservation commission, planning board, council on aging, counsel for human services, historic district commission, parks and recreation, and the shellfish and harbor advisory board. As town manager, Gibson maintains appointment and disciplinary (including discharge) powers over the department chiefs and their employees.... Gibson is not subject to general election, but ... had been reappointed for consecutive terms since 1995.

.... As an acknowledgment of Gibson's influence, multiple town residents warned Barros that he might face adverse consequences to challenging Gibson by implicating her relatives as being involved in the African Meeting House crime. These individuals cautioned Barros, "You know, it's [Gibson's] son and nephew; so, be careful. Watch your back."

He then described the plaintiffs in contrast:

The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs inhabited a different stratum in the town altogether, as they maintained no apparent political, economic, social, public order, or law enforcement influence over town affairs. Samuels, of Jamaican descent, became a full-time resident of Nantucket in 1999; she resides on Nantucket with her son. Samuels has worked in the home healthcare field when her health permits.

James Barros, seventy-six years old [in 2020], worked as a part-time drywaller and plasterer. He has lived intermittently on Nantucket since he was eight years old. Barros, skeptical that the Nantucket police were committed to solving the African Meeting House crime, sought assurance that the police were dutifully investigating the matter .... As Barros stated: "That building is part of me. I'm an African. I have a right to ask who is doing damage to my house."

James Barros
(captured from public meeting video)

Justice Smyth also put additional facts on the table to suggest that the court majority gave Barros's claim short shrift, particularly insofar as circumstances may subjectify the "reasonable person" analysis.

The record supports a rational jury concluding that Pittman's words and conduct threatened Barros to the extent that Barros was terrified when he stood at the town meeting to respond. Barros's fear was based in part on his experience as a Black man who was distrustful and a vocal critic of the Nantucket police. As a consequence of Barros's continued pressure on the police to meaningfully pursue the hate crime investigation, the lead town investigator, Detective Klinger, responded with hostility toward Barros. In addition, numerous people advised Barros "to watch [his] back," and warned him that the Nantucket police were going to "set him up." .... 

The record demonstrates that Barros's fear of the Nantucket police was well grounded. Barros, while driving, was pulled over by the police on two separate occasions following the March 11 board meeting. One Sunday morning, a Nantucket officer pulled Barros over as Barros was headed home from Mass celebrated at St. Mary's Church. The officer approached Barros's truck with his hand on his gun. Although the officer stated that he stopped Barros due to a brake light malfunction, the record indicates Barros's lights were functioning properly and allows the inference of a retaliatory stop. 

In sum, Justice Smyth found sufficient evidence to show interference with civil rights of both plaintiffs, as a matter of fact, and of persons of "reasonable fortitude" in their circumstances, applying the objective test.

Frederick Douglass, center left, at abolitionist meeting, N.Y., 1850.
He first visited Nantucket for an anti-slavery conference in 1841.
Smithsonian Institute/Mr. & Mrs. Set Charles Momjian, via National Park Service

Justice Smyth offered a spirited conclusion that invoked Nantucket's abolitionist history and rallied the judiciary to the defense of speech critical of public officials:

Nearly one hundred and eighty years after Frederick Douglass sought refuge in Massachusetts and traveled to Nantucket to make his first public speech condemning slavery, a person desecrated a site sacred to the island's Black community with the words "Nigger leave." The act was more than an act of property vandalism, as it communicated a direct threat to the plaintiffs' safety and well-being as Black residents of Nantucket. While the United States Constitution, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and our laws will never eradicate the hatred and racism in the hearts of individuals who commit such acts, our legal framework guarantees people the right to speak out against such offenses, to petition local officials for answers, and to criticize local government and police officials for failing in their oaths to support our laws and Constitution and to seek justice for all.

Of course, it would be folly to take the force and endurance of these constitutional rights for granted, perhaps lulled by the longstanding welfare and security of our nation and by our courts' historical commitment to safeguarding free speech rights as fundamental to our representative democracy. We do not have that luxury because, even considering the relative strength of our democracy, these rights are subject to the whim of unchecked power that allows for tyrannical tendencies to suppress contrary viewpoints. Thus, the judiciary's vigilance to protect from government interference our people's right to speak to public issues is as critical today as it was when the First Amendment was ratified in 1791.

(Paragraph break added; citations omitted.)

Nantucket Harbor, 2021
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

I get Pittman's frustration at having failed to secure a prosecution for the vandalism, and, presumably with laudable motivations to avoid conflict of interest, in having ceded the investigation to the district attorney and state police. Nevertheless, he and Gibson, as public officials, have to have thicker skin, especially for justifiable outrage at a public meeting.

I share public outrage that such a hateful act defaced a historic place of contemporary cultural importance, and that no prosecution followed, upon whatever tragicomedy of errors. (I include the image below, from the court's appendix, despite the offensive epithet, to demonstrate the severity and offensiveness of the crime.) To be fair to Nantucketers, after the overnight vandalism in 2018, more than a dozen distraught local residents turned out to scrub the African Meeting House clean by 10 a.m. the next morning (Cape Cod Times). But bad eggs are still at large.

Estimates vary, but cost of living on Nantucket usually is said to exceed the national average by more than 100%, and housing costs run more than 300% over. You can bet that upper-crust property owners aren't doing much of the manual labor on the island to keep that economic engine running. Nantucket depends on a significant Jamaican population to work in the tourism industry. Yet the government on the island is worrisomely non-representative of the population by racial demographics.

Once addressing a crowd in Cork, Ireland, Frederick Douglass was shouted down with cries of, "That's a lie," "He shan’t speak," and "Down with the n—" (Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance, and Abolition). Justice Smyth must have been conscious of the eerie parallel to the meeting dispute and vandalism here. I do not mean to accuse Gibson and Pittman of the same culpability as slave-owners, nor of racism. Rather, I mean to suggest that Nantucket officials ought be cognizant that those same sentiments surfacing today, leveled against black residents, is not a good look.

At some point, the difference between official incompetence and insensitivity, on the one hand, and willful cover-up, on the other hand, becomes immaterial.

In September, a working group of the town board retained a Texas forensics firm, LCG Discovery Experts, to review the investigation into the African Meeting House vandalism—though not to re-investigate the crime. According to Nantucket Current News, the independent review was spurred by a citizen petition.

The case is Barros v. Select Board, No. 23-P-1058 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 19, 2025), available at the Social Law Library. Justice Rachel E. Hershfang wrote the court opinion for herself and Justice Vickie L. Henry, contra the dissent of Justice Smyth.

Court Appendix in Barros v. Select Board

Litigator loses case, writes musical comedy about it

Shangri-La-La poster at Arlington Drafthouse

When a lawyer loses a case, the lawyer moves on. The experience might be quickly forgotten as run of the mill, or memorably instructive. Either way, it's in the past.

Mike Meier lost a case and did something entirely different. He left practice and wrote a musical comedy about it.

Virginia attorney Meier represented the plaintiffs in Preiss v. Horn (9th Cir. 2013), filed in Nevada. Preiss, who served as physical therapist to Roy Horn, of the famous performing duo Siegfried & Roy, alleged that his services were terminated when he rebuffed Horn's sexual advances. He sued under civil rights law. Preiss's wife was a co-plaintiff, alleging infliction of emotional distress "after watching a videotape of events involving her husband after those events occurred."

The litigation failed. Preiss's claim got hung up on the question of whether he was actually employed by Horn, in the legal sense. The relationship was unclear and proved insufficient to support a civil rights claim.

Preiss's wife complained of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). NIED usually is not actionable in American jurisdictions, as I've explained before at The Savory Tort. Insofar as there are exceptions, the plaintiff watching a video well after the fact did not evidence the contemporaneous observation required by exceptions for liability to bystanders.

The outcome is not surprising, and one need not think it dispositive of what happened between Preiss and Horn. Tort cases without physical injury—such as civil rights claims, defamation and privacy, and infliction of emotional distress—always are a heavy lift for plaintiffs, because they bear the burden of mustering evidence usually in the possession of the defense. Failure to prove does not establish the truth or falsity of the allegations.

Against the odds, Meier fought hard for his clients, and maybe too hard. According to a disciplinary disposition in New York (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2018), the federal trial judge in Nevada found plaintiffs' claims in opposition to dismissal "not simply without merit but blatantly and undeniably so," insistence on the NIED claim "'absurd' and 'frivolous,'" and prosecution of Preiss's claim "needlessly, unreasonably, and vexatiously multipl[ying] the proceedings in bad faith."

The federal court ordered Meier to pay a sanction entered against the plaintiffs. His home bar of Virginia suspended him from practice for 30 days, and the New York court entered a censure.

The whole affair might have been a welcome excuse for Meier to pursue his passions quite outside the courtroom, in writing, stage, and music. His website Mike Meier Writes now boasts eight screenplays and three books, besides the present project. 

The description of the screenplay Where the Aliens Are exemplifies the sort of quirky narrative Meier favors: "In this science fiction comedy, an elderly professor, along with his neighbors, a lesbian couple and their son, set out to save the world from an impending alien invasion."

Arlington Drafthouse
marquee, July 2025
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

In July at the Arlington Drafthouse in northern Virginia, I was treated to one in just a three-performance run of Meier's comedy musical, Shangri-La-La, a.k.a. All That Glitters (trailer at YouTube). The show is a thinly disguised retelling of the facts alleged in Preiss v. Horn. Meier's website summarizes:

It is a comedy about Las Vegas show business and human nature, with a sprinkling of drama and #Metoo. Joshua from Germany fulfills his lifelong dream of moving to Las Vegas. He is thrilled to get a job as the assistant to the retired Siegfried & Roy, only to find out the hard way that not all that glitters is gold. Joshua’s quest for justice culminates in a court case. But Joshua does not know about the Las Vegas tradition of "Hometown Justice." After all, that Las Vegas tradition began with Bugsy Siegel, the New York criminal who built the first casino on the Las Vegas strip, The Flamingo.

Aptly, Meier himself played Joshua's lawyer. The show pulls no punches in telling Meier's side of the story, both as to the plaintiffs' facts and his own plight as their counselor. In Meier's telling of it, he was victimized by Las Vegas insiders, a legal system under Horn's influence, and punished for daring to challenge a monied icon and power player. 

Who knows. Vegas is no stranger to corrupt influences, and stranger things have happened there.

Of course, owing to Meier's penchant for the absurd and the fictionalization of the case, the stage telling is over the top and does not purport to be factual, wink-wink. It's an amusing romp at the expense of Siegfried and Roy, who are played as buffoons, if dangerous ones. Their comical, Hans-and-Franz-reminiscent accents put on plenty of comedy mileage. Meier himself grew up in Germany, and his speech bears just a trace of authentic accent, in contrast.

Siegfried and Roy are both dead now, since 2021. Even insofar as their estates have lingering legal interests in trademark or right of publicity, All That Glitters is plainly a parody from an outsider's perspective.

The play has a dense script and an original score. Both vacillate between clever and banal. Some droll dialog earns laughs, to be sure. There is also ample jejune chatter that sorely needs rewrite by an experienced comedic editor. The songs are catchy in places, and elsewhere blister with lackluster lyrics. The cast did a superb job with what they had to work with.

To be fair, such a mixed record is to be expected in a straight-to-stage vanity project. Meier deserves credit for his determination. Polished stagecraft is not really the point. 

Meier manages to put his creative stamp on a compelling story and somehow turns sexual harassment into legit comedy. At the same time, with Siegfried and Roy gone, Meier gets the last word in his case. And he clearly has a wicked good time doing it.

You can listen to five tunes from Shangri-La-La at Mike Meier Writes. I'm weirdly looking forward to Meier's forthcoming mockumentary, "So You Think You Can Trust the Media?"

It happens, incidentally, that a couple of weeks after I saw Shangri-La-La in Arlington, I visited the Flamingo in Las Vegas. I had a fabulous time at the Flamingo-resident show Piff the Magic Dragon, starring Piff, the lovely Jade Simone, and the world's only magic-performing chihuahua, Mr. Piffles, an act of America's Got Talent and Queer Eye fame. I got to scratch Mr. Piffles under the muzzle after the show. The trio is on tour now with All-Star Vegas, appearing in Cranston, Rhode Island, tomorrow, September 18.

Government used soccer tattoo, 'rock'n'roll salute' as evidence against Venezuelan deportee, lawyer asserts

According to his lawyer, a tattoo and a hand gesture are the sum of evidence against at least one Venezuelan man who was deported to the El Salvadoran gang prison among what the federal government has called "the worst of the worst."

Left: Real Madrid logo; right: artist conception.
Left: © Real Madrid CF, adapted in part by Coloring Pages for Toddlers;
here fair use. Right: Same crown with free clip art ball and Word lettering;
RJ Peltz-Steele CC0 with no claim to underlying works.

The face-off between the Trump administration and U.S. District Chief Judge James E. Boasberg over deportations has stoked strong suspicion that the enforcement action swept up men who pose no threat to the peace, have legitimate claims to refugee status, and now have been condemned wrongfully to imprisonment in El Salvador, a country foreign to them and their families.

The suspicion is not easily vindicated because the men are gone from the United States and inaccessible in El Salvador, and the evidence against them is secreted in the hands of the federal government. Yet one by one, stories are emerging that cast doubt on the official narrative. 

Immigration attorney Linette Tobin, a member of the D.C. Bar, has been making the media rounds to tell the story of one client, Jerce Reyes Barrios. Tobin told outlets, including NPR, that she has seen the evidence against Reyes Barrios (family photo via ABC News), and it comprises nothing other than a tattoo and social media images of a hand gesture, both with innocent explanations. 

Left: Horned hand. RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0
Right: ASL "I Love You." LiliCharlie via Wikimedia CC BY-SA 4.0

According to Tobin, Reyes Barrios is a 36-year-old professional soccer player and father of two who has a tattoo unrelated to any gang other than Spain's very legitimate and globally popular Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (RMCF). A variation on the RMCF logo, the tattoo pictures a crown atop a soccer ball and the word "Dios" (God), Tobin said.

The hand gesture pictured in social media, according to Tobin, is the "rock and roll salute." That gesture, known more widely as "the horned hand," became associated with heavy metal in the 1970s (more at Medium), then came into wider use in music culture. The gesture is sometimes interchanged, knowingly or unknowingly, with the ASL sign for "I love you" (literally, the letters I, L, and Y), which is similar but requires an extended thumb.

Tattoos imaged in 2024 Texas DPS presentation include these.
Public document; no indicated copyright notice.

Circulating online, a 2024 presentation by the Texas Department of Public Safety on the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua (more from NPR), to which the federal government alleges Reyes Barrios and other deportees belong, depicts tattoos borne by gang members. While some of the tattoos might be indicative of Tren de Aragua—images of trains, for example—most are not so specific, e.g., a rose, a clock, a star.  (More from NBC News.) Tren means "train," and Aragua is a Venezuelan state west of Caracas.

Also among the imaged tattoos are a crown, similar to the Real Madrid CF logo; the Nike "jumpman logo" with Michael Jordan's and LeBron James's number "23"; and the initials "HJ," said to abbreviate hijos (sons), under a crown ("king of kings"), meaning "sons of God." While gang members might bear such tattoos, they're hardly a way to determine gang affiliation.

In fact, of two of my own tattoos, one is a train—not because of criminal affiliation. Another is a variation on a cross that might suggest a football club or a historical war campaign, neither of which I'm championing. So I find this evidence against Reyes Barrios unsettling, especially insofar as it might be exemplary of the government's shallow scrutiny in countless other cases, too. 

I can only assume that when Tobin joined the D.C. Bar, she was admonished as strongly as I was never to lie. So I'm inclined to believe her, and thus to share Judge Boasberg's skepticism.

Update, Mar. 31, at 3 p.m.: Too late for Reyes Barrios and others, but I learned today that on Friday, the federal district court in Massachusetts granted a temporary restraining order against the removal of immigrants to unrelated third countries without due process, that is, notice and "meaningful" opportunity to raise safety concerns. The case is D.V.D. v. U.S. DHS (filed D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2025) (Court Listener).

In negligence claims over child welfare, bus fight, Mass. high court opines on qualified, sovereign immunity

Two immunity cases ended with different outcomes for public officials in the Massachusetts high court on two successive Fridays, and the cases illustrate different theories of immunity.

In a case decided on March 21, social workers with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF) asserted qualified immunity in the death and severe injury of two children, each about two years old. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) considered the immunity analysis but decided ultimately that, immunity notwithstanding, the workers had not legally caused the harm the children suffered.

In a case decided March 14, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) asserted sovereign immunity in the serious injury of a passenger who was beaten by a bus driver with known anger management issues. The SJC decided that the state agency was not entitled to sovereign immunity as codified by a provision protecting the state from liability for the acts of third parties.

Mass. DCF Worcester West Area Office
From Mass. DCF, purported © 2025
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, asserted fair use.

Qualified Immunity 

However much the state defendants prevailed in the first case, the court's recitation of the facts reveals a deeply disturbing record of irresponsibility on the part of DCF. A woman with four foster children was correctly suspected of having a live-in boyfriend with a record of an open armed robbery charge, three assault and battery charges, and multiple restraining orders. That would be prohibitive of foster placements were the facts confirmed, so DCF planned to monitor the home closely. For unknown reasons, officials dropped the ball, and inspections were too few and too infrequent.

The horrifying 2015 accident that took the life of one child and severely injured another occurred overnight when one of the children reached for "and adjusted the thermostat on an electric heater, which was on the wall above the crib, causing the children's room to overheat," the court wrote. Another child in the room died, and the child who manipulated the thermostat "was found to be in critical condition, suffering from respiratory failure, seizures, hyperthermia (a high temperature), and hypotension (low blood pressure)." The foster parent called 911, and the critically injured child was taken to the hospital. She survived but remains impaired, and her representatives were the plaintiffs in the instant case.

In a civil rights action under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, DCF officials claimed qualified immunity. The court coherently explained how the doctrine works generally and in this context:

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims for damages if "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known...." Littles v. Commissioner of Correction [Mass. 2005]. The determination of qualified immunity follows a two-part test:

"The first prong asks whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; the second prong asks whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged violation. [T]he second step, in turn, has two aspects. One aspect of the analysis focuses on the clarity of the law .... The other aspect focuses more concretely on the facts of the particular case and whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights" .... Penate v. Sullivan ... (1st Cir. 2023)....

Under the first prong, "'substantive due process' prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the conscience'" .... United States v. Salerno [U.S. 1987]. In the foster care context, courts apply one of two standards to determine whether government conduct is conscience-shocking. The first ... is the "deliberate indifference" standard.... Under this standard, a plaintiff must show that a government actor "exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty." ....

Alternatively, under the second standard, ... a plaintiff must show that a State actor's professional decision constitutes such a "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards" that the decision was not actually based on such judgment.

The court did not resolve the difference between the two standards, however, because the case was resolved on a different basis. Notwithstanding qualified immunity, a plaintiff in a civil rights case, just like in a state tort case, must prove proximate, or legal causation, and the plaintiffs here could not.

DCF misconduct might have been a scientific cause of the accident. However, the reason DCF was investigating the foster care home was the suspected presence of man, a co-caretaker, with a problematic criminal record. Scientific causation might be proved if the plaintiff could prove that proper DCF investigation would have resulted in the removal of the man from the home. But that flub did not legally cause the accident, the court opined, because the accessibility of the thermostat to the crib and the child's consequent tampering with it had nothing to do with the presence of the man in the home.

The conclusion is sound, though it leaves one to wonder whether there yet has been any reckoning at DCF, or among public officials and legislators if under-resourcing is to blame.

It would not have made any difference here, but, collaterally, it's worth noting that the very existence of qualified immunity as a defense to civil rights actions has been an issue in play in recent years. I explained in 2 Tortz: A Study of American Tort Law (Lulu 2024 rev. ed.):

Of unlikely constitutional compulsion, qualified immunity has come into question in recent years, especially amid high-profile incidents of police violence. Some states and localities have adopted statutes and ordinances limiting or eliminating qualified immunity for police. At the federal level, U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Sonia Sotomayor both have criticized qualified immunity. Justice Thomas criticized qualified immunity as unsupported by the text of the Constitution or statute, and Justice Sotomayor criticized the doctrine for failing to punish official misconduct. See N.S. v. Kansas City (U.S. 2023) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Hoggard v. Rhodes (U.S. 2021) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari); James v. Bartelt (U.S. 2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Baxter v. Bracey (U.S. 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Nevertheless, thus far, the Court has upheld the doctrine. Since the murder of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis in 2020, U.S. Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-Mass.) and U.S. Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) have persistently but unsuccessfully championed bills to abolish qualified immunity in § 1983 actions.

The first case is Gotay v. Creen (Mass. Mar. 21, 2025) (FindLaw). Justice Serge Georges, Jr. authored the unanimous opinion of six justices.

MBTA bus
Mass. Office of Travel & Tourism via Flickr CC BY-ND 2.0

Sovereign Immunity

A different theory of immunity, state sovereign immunity, animated the case decided a week earlier.

At issue in this second case was the puzzling and unique section 10(j) of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), which attracts more than its fair share of MTCA appellate litigation in the commonwealth. The case arose from an assault on a passenger by an MBTA bus driver with anger management issues.

Relying on facts as favorable to the plaintiff, the court retold the story of the part-time driver who "sometimes engaged in unsafe driving and, on occasion, interacted with the public and his supervisors in a hostile or insubordinate manner," yet after three years was promoted to full time. The court recounted subsequent altercations with a passenger described as "unruly" and then with a police officer in a disagreement over road obstruction.

The instant case arose when a passenger pursued the bus, rapping on doors, trying to get information about routes. Further recounting the plaintiff's facts, the court wrote:

Lost, cold, and frustrated at the prospect of being stranded, [plaintiff] first questioned why the bus driver had not stopped sooner. The driver responded by yelling at [plaintiff] and leaving his driver's seat to confront [plaintiff] at the door. The driver kicked snow from the bottom of the bus at [plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] uttered a profanity. This further triggered the bus driver's anger; as the driver subsequently described it, he just "lost it." Enraged, the driver lunged at [plaintiff], escalating the encounter. For his part, [plaintiff] retreated, but the driver gave chase. When the driver caught up, the driver commenced punching and kicking [plaintiff]. The beating was so severe that [plaintiff] suffered a traumatic brain injury that has left him "permanently and totally disabled from his usual employment."

The plaintiff sued the MBTA for negligence in hiring, promotion, retention, and supervision. The defendant asserted sovereign immunity as codified in the MTCA.

MTCA section 10(j) is Massachusetts's effort to find the fine line between a tort claim that properly blames public officials for tortious misbehavior and a failure-to-protect claim, when public officials are not responsible for the actions of private third parties. Finding this line is a well known problem in tort claims, federal and state. The Massachusetts test has its own peculiar language, which, the abundance of case law suggests, is not necessarily clarifying. The court here quoted its own earlier assessment that the provision "presents an interpretive quagmire."

Section 10(j) holds public officials immune from "any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer."

The test is especially hairy in cases such as this one, when the alleged negligence is on the part of the state as employer, thus one step removed from the misconduct of a state employee. When does negligence on the part of the state employer constitute the "affirmative act" required to circumnavigate 10(j)?

Here, the court decided:

The claims at issue here are based on the MBTA's own failure to exercise reasonable care in its supervision of the bus driver; as we have explained, "where the supervisory officials allegedly had, or should have had, knowledge of a public employee's assaultive behavior, it is the supervisors' conduct, rather than the employee's intentional conduct, that is the true focus of the case." Dobos v. Driscoll ... [Mass. 1989] (affirming judgment against Commonwealth for negligent supervision and training of officer who assaulted civilian)[; s]ee Doe v. Blandford ... [Mass. 1988] (MTCA permitted claims regarding public employer's negligent conduct in hiring, retaining, and supervising guidance counselor who assaulted student independent of alleged vicarious liability for intentional tort of public employee)....

In sum, [section] 10 (j) does not provide immunity to a public employer for its misfeasance in placing an employee with known but untreated anger management issues that manifest in violent and hostile behaviors in a public-facing position. The record on summary judgment here would support a fact finder's reasonable conclusion that the MBTA's affirmative act—its own decision, through its public employees responsible for supervising the bus driver, to schedule the driver to operate the bus route in Lynn, [Mass.,] without training him to manage his anger—originally caused [plaintiff]'s harm.

The decision feels right as measured against the legislature's determination to distinguish truly third-party causes, that is, risks initiated outside the scope of state responsibility, from causes inextricably tied to state responsibility, such as a state employer's responsibility in direct negligence for its agent's misconduct. And I do think this concept of scope of responsibility, or common duty in the parlance of multiple liabilities, can be used to delineate a workable understanding of "not originally caused."

At the same time, I am not persuaded by the court's reasoning that 10(j) jurisprudence has yet drawn a line much more clear than "I know it when I see it."

The second case is Theisz v. MBTA (Mass. Mar. 14, 2025) (Justia). New Orleans-born Justice Dalila Argaez Wendlandt authored the unanimous opinion of four justices, affirming the Appeals Court.

Court's pass on Wynn bid to revisit 'actual malice' makes sense, but standard still fuels misinformation

Wynn operates the Encore Casino in Everett, Mass.,
since a dust-up with authorities over ownership.
Holiday Point via Flickr CC BY 2.0

The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear casino mogul Steve Wynn's bid to overturn the New York Times v. Sullivan "actual malice" standard, despite the known appetite of some justices to revisit the 1964 precedent.

The outcome is not a surprise and probably for the best, because Wynn had lousy facts to support his argument. Unfortunately, Sullivan's complicity in our present misinformation crisis remains real and ever more problematic. Cases such as Wynn's undermine legitimate recognition of the dysfunction Sullivan has wrought.

I've written and spoken before, and will not here belabor, my ardent opposition to the Sullivan standard, which requires public figures to demonstrate, even prove—usually upon filing a complaint, with no access to evidence in the possession of the defense—that the defendant subjectively knew of the falsity of the publication, or at least that there's a smoking gun disproving the defendant's denial.

Sullivan came about with good intentions. In a nutshell, the Supreme Court was determined to enforce Brown v. Board (U.S. 1954) and bring about the civil rights order required by the Reconstruction Amendments, specifically in Sullivan by heading off southern officials' weaponization of tort law. But the wide berth that the Court cut for freedom of speech vis-à-vis the competing values of personal reputation and human dignity was cemented in constitutional law, and now we face the consequences of an irremediable imbalance.

Steve Wynn
Sarah Gerke via Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

In Wynn's case, defendant Associated Press surfaced two complaints of sexual assault filed with police against Wynn in the 1970s. The reporting occurred in the context of contemporary allegations of a pattern of misconduct, which Wynn roundly denies. The AP report probably falls within the common law "fair report" privilege, which shields from liability the re-publisher of allegations in official documents. The advanced age of the reports raises a thin question on the "fair" prong of the analysis, and the degree to which the privilege has been constitutionalized is debatable. But those issues are neither here nor there, for the courts in the Nevada lawsuit never got that far.

Wynn's suit was dismissed under the Nevada anti-SLAPP law because, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, Wynn failed to demonstrate sufficient proof of actual malice in his pleading. Wynn offered little more in the way of allegation than that the police complaints were "implausible," so should have been disbelieved—hardly that they were contradicted by evidence in the defendant's possession. There was an allegation that the AP reporter regarded a complainant against Wynn as "'crazy'"—but, again, that hardly equates to "lying." Anyway, were the fair report privilege eventually implicated, the salient fact would be the truthful rendition of the reports, not the truth of their underlying contents.

Besides bemoaning Sullivan, I have lamented at length on the ill wisdom of anti-SLAPP laws, such as they have been adopted throughout the United States, another song of woe I won't here reiterate. I also have acknowledged consistently that anti-SLAPP works well when it works well (and could work better). Wynn's case proves both points. He didn't get his day in court, nor hardly a hearing. But I suspect his ability to prosecute all the way to Washington has more to do with his wealth than with the merits of his claim.

Wynn's appeal strategy was principally to attack Sullivan head on. Wynn knows, or his lawyers know, that near immunity for false, even ludicrous, allegations against public figures has everything to do with the vigor of misinformation circulating in the American marketplace of ideas. But Wynn was ill able to illustrate an injustice against a meritorious cause, the kind of fertile soil one needs to nurture willingness to overturn a 60-year-old, civil rights-era precedent.

For some further context of judicial dissatisfaction with Sullivan, here's an excerpt from my 2 Tortz: A Study of American Tort Law (Lulu 2024 rev. ed.), on "Reconsidering Sullivan."

Doubts about sacrosanct Sullivan were once uttered at one’s own risk in legal academic circles. But U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas legitimized debate with a concurrence in denial of certiorari in McKee v. Cosby (U.S. 2019). An actress, McKee, in 2014, publicly accused actor-comedian Bill Cosby of rape 40 years earlier. A letter from Cosby’s attorney to mass media attacked McKee’s credibility, but did not specifically deny the asserted facts of the encounter. McKee alleged defamation, and the courts concluded that the letter stated only unverifiable opinion.

Media advocates certainly hoped that Thomas’s commentary was a one-off. It was not. Two years later, Justices Thomas and Neil Gorsuch dissented from denial of certiorari in Berisha v. Lawson (U.S. 2021).... Earlier the same year, highly regarded U.S. Circuit Judge Laurence Silberman had joined Thomas’s call, dissenting in Tah v. Global Witness Publishing (D.C. Cir. 2021) (involving accusation of bribery against international human rights organization). A likeminded concurrence by Florida appellate Judge Bradford L. Thomas followed in Mastandrea v. Snow (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022) (involving accusation city official was “on the take” in development matter). And that same year, the Journal of Free Speech Law published Professor David McGowan’s A Bipartisan Case Against New York Times v. Sullivan (2022). Justice Thomas reiterated his “view that we should reconsider the actual-malice standard,” Blankenship v. NBCUniversal, LLC (U.S. 2023) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari), thrice more in 2022 and 2023.

Mass-media misinformation during the Donald J. Trump Presidency, contributing to the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, shook the confidence in Sullivan even of some devoted liberal stalwarts in the academy. On the one hand, President Trump had used defamation, among other legal tools, to attack critics. He was accused of weaponizing transaction costs, but Sullivan remained an important substantive bulwark. On the other hand, Trump evaded “Me Too” accountability not only with denials, like Cosby, but with ruthless accusations of lying, which loyal political supporters embraced and amplified.

The busy federal court for the Southern District of New York has seen its share of politically charged defamation litigation. That’s where writer E. Jeanne Carroll, availing of a New York look-back statute, brought two suits against President Trump, alleging sexual battery in the 1990s and defamation for calling her claims “a complete con job,” “a hoax” and “a lie.” Juries awarded Carroll in excess of $80 million for sexual battery and defamation, despite the actual malice standard. Trump appealed. Do the verdicts show that Sullivan works? In 2022, Sarah Palin lost a defamation claim in S.D.N.Y. against The New York Times over a staff editorial that blamed her in part for the mass shooting that wounded U.S. Rep. Gabby Giffords. Exceptionally against the usual no-actual-malice motion to dismiss, Palin had won discovery. And discovery revealed some ethically problematic sloppiness behind the scenes at the Times. Nevertheless, bad journalism is not actual malice, and the court and jury so concluded. Palin’s appeal from the Second Circuit was seen widely as a contender to draw Sullivan reconsideration, but the Court passed.

Whether a function of social media, declining civility, or partisan extremism, data show that defamation litigation is up. And courts are not as quick as they once were to dismiss for a plaintiff’s inability to prove actual malice. Still, the public-plaintiff win remains a rarity, especially for the public official or public figure who doesn’t have the resources to go to the mat.

The case is Wynn v. Associated Press, No. 24-829 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2025).

Book details knotty business of higher ed counsel

By attorney Louis H. Guard and academic Joyce P. Jacobsen, All the Campus Lawyers (2024) is a compelling recent read for anyone interested in the law of higher education—whether as a counselor, as a client, or as a victim of higher ed machinations. I've been all three.

Guard and Jacobsen both are affiliated with Hobart and William Smith Colleges—a beautiful double campus I visited just last summer, perched atop Seneca Lake in Geneva, New York, in the Finger Lakes region. Guard is a general counsel there, and Jacobsen a past president and economics professor.

All the Campus Lawyers thoroughly covers the many facets of higher ed practice nowadays, from civil rights and labor, to intellectual property, contracting, and cybersecurity. It is a lot to see it all in one place. At an overarching level of abstraction, the book—which is subtitled, "Litigation, Regulation, and the New Era of Higher Education"—ponders how and why law has become pervasive, and sometimes paralyzing, of higher ed. 

To my reading, Guard and Jacobsen are careful to avoid a normative agenda, and rather strive to be descriptive, instructive, and sometimes even inspiring. But I came away with an uneasy feeling in the belly that law, at least in practice, has a stranglehold on the free-wheeling nature of academic inquiry that classical-liberal society associates with the "quintessential marketplace of ideas." 

If higher ed is just a business—and maybe it always was—law, from the perspective of university counsel, seems to be part of the problem: supporting the business framing with defensive practice and risk aversion, and prizing the institution over the people who constitute it and whom it serves. No doubt my perception is colored by experience.

I stop by the Geneva, N.Y., Welcome Center in July 2024.
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

Another impression I had of the book was that it is siloed, tending to view the mission creep of law in the higher ed sector to the exclusion of the same phenomenon across American life. Indeed, what business, what person does not need a lawyer to navigate the world today, even if ordinary people have to manage without, usually to their detriment. I'm not sure the problem of law in higher ed can be examined exclusively of "the legalization of American society" (meaning ubiquity of law, not blessing of lawfulness).

Furthermore, there is, to my mind and at one level, a rather simple explanation for law's infiltration of higher ed. With a hat tip to Lincoln Steffens and Clark Mollenhoff: Follow the money. The relevant question might not be why law has become pervasive in higher ed, but why higher ed has become big business rather than collective good or philanthropy. Guard and Jacobsen are too ready to take that twist of mission for granted.

Despite my nitpicks, Campus Lawyers is a worthwhile read for a fuller understanding of the relationship between law and higher ed, and especially for insight into the modus operandi of university counsel.

Here is the publisher's description:

Not so long ago, colleges and universities had little interaction with the law. In the 1970s, only a few well-heeled universities even employed in-house legal counsel. But now we live in the age of tenure-denial lawsuits, free speech battles, and campus sexual assault investigations. Even athletics rules violations have become a serious legal matter. The pressures of regulation, litigation, and legislation, Louis Guard and Joyce Jacobsen write, have fostered a new era in higher education, and institutions must know how to respond.

For many higher education observers and participants, including most administrators and faculty, the maze of legal mandates and potential risks can seem bewildering. Guard, a general counsel with years of higher education law experience, and Jacobsen, a former college president, map this unfamiliar terrain. All the Campus Lawyers provides a vital, up-to-date assessment of the impact of legal concerns on higher education and helps readers make sense of the most pressing trends and issues, including civil rights; free speech and expression; student life and wellness; admissions, advancement, and community relations; governance and oversight; the higher education business model; and on-campus crises, from cyberattacks to pandemics.

As well as informing about the latest legal and regulatory developments affecting higher education, Guard and Jacobsen offer practical guidance to those in positions of campus authority. There has never been a more crucial time for college and university boards, presidents, inside and outside counsel, and other higher education leaders to know the law and prepare for legal challenges.

Of course, it remains to be seen what remains of higher ed after the Trump Administration. Guard and Jacobsen might have accomplished the equivalent of a book about the flu on the eve of the pandemic, in which case, we'll need a revised edition sooner rather than later.

Amos, King: love one another; defend the oppressed; plead the cause of the innocent, the powerless

David Erickson CC BY 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons

On this Martin Luther King, Jr. weekend, I was blessed with the opportunity to stand in the pulpit of the historic North Scituate Baptist Church, Rhode Island, affording a rest for beloved Pastor Kim Nelson there.

I spoke to the Book of Amos, chapter 5, verses 21 to 24 (NIV), often cited by Dr. King. In the "I Have a Dream" speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in August 1963 (photo), Dr. King quoted Amos 5:24: “[L]et judgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream" (KJV).

In the history of the church, Amos at times has been controversial for its ominous depiction of God. But Amos contains a call for social justice that is as important and relevant today as it was in America during the Civil Rights Movement and in Israel in the 8th century B.C.

My wife and I are deeply grateful to the people at North Scituate for their warm hospitality.

Florida A&M moves to fire Latina law prof who spoke on public concern; Hispanic law students resist

You may review and sign on to a letter of the FAMU Hispanic American Law Student Association opposing Reyes's termination here. 

Prof. Maritza Reyes

My colleague Professor Maritza Reyes, who is tenured at the Florida A&M (FAMU) College of Law, is fighting alongside students and other allies to save her job and to preserve academic freedom.

Reyes has been notified of the school's intent to dismiss her for doing her job in faculty governance. Reyes commented, professionally and appropriately, in a community email discussion of the abrupt, contentious, and institutionally embarrassing resignation of the law dean at FAMU in February.

FAMU apparently did not like what Reyes had to say. In a plain violation of academic freedom, the school proferred the email discussion as the reason to terminate a tenured professor.

I have written many times, since 2011, about the failure of universities to recognize academic freedom in spaces "penumbral" to published research and classroom teaching, namely faculty governance. In the same vein, Professor Keith Whittington wrote recently about the importance of protecting "extramural" academic speech.

Reyes is an accomplished and highly respected law teacher—thus, just the sort who attract condemnation in the academic culture—who is treasured by generations of students and has especially made a difference for persons of color in law schools and legal practice. She is FAMU's first and only tenured Latina law professor. In 2022, she founded the Graciela Olivárez Latinas in the Legal Academy ("GO LILA") Workshop, which she discussed in 2023 for AALS Women in Legal Education.

Students and alumni are leading the resistance to Reyes's termination. Please review and consider signing on to the following letter.  You can share the letter further with this link: https://forms.gle/VUnYPKiMwyWtMDJx8, or via The Savory Tort.

(This post revised and updated on Mar. 19, at 5:40 p.m.)

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Dear President Larry Robinson and Provost Allyson Watson:

We, the undersigned members of the Florida Agriculture and Mechanical University (FAMU) Hispanic American Law Student Association (HALSA), joined by fellow students, alumni, allies, and friends, respectfully request that you rescind your intent to dismiss College of Law Professor Maritza Reyes (Professor Reyes) from her tenured position. For the past fifteen (15) years, Professor Reyes has been a caring professor and has made excellent contributions to the school, especially its students. Professor Reyes has also served as HALSA's faculty advisor for many years.

Professor Reyes is an accomplished teacher, scholar, and member of the legal academy and community. She began her employment in the FAMU College of Law as a tenure-track assistant professor of law in 2009, earned tenure in 2015, and is now a tenured, full professor of law (the highest faculty rank). FAMU has evaluated Professor Reyes's record during many formal evaluative processes, including applications for promotion to associate professor, for tenure, and promotion to full professor; annual reviews; and, most recently, post-tenure review. Professor Reyes has demonstrated consistent excellence and productivity in scholarship, teaching, and service. She has too many accomplishments to list here, including being recognized in the U.S. Congressional Record for her service to our community. You are well-aware of her many accomplishments including through all of the above listed evaluations.

We were heartbroken and outraged to learn that Provost Allyson Watson (Provost Watson), by letter dated February 16, 2024 (the "Notice"), informed Professor Reyes of the University's intent to dismiss her from her tenured position. According to FAMU Regulation 10.120(2)(c), the "Contents of Notice" must include the following information: "A list of documents or written explanation on which the charges are based; and a statement that documents shall be available to the employee upon request." The documents Professor Reyes received consisted of emails that were sent to the entire College of Law Community during the period of February 1, 2024 to February 5, 2024. The entire College of Law Community (faculty, staff, and students) received the emails after then College of Law Dean Deidré Keller (Dean Keller) opened this email forum on February 1, 2024 to provide notice of her resignation effective immediately. Several professors, including Professor Reyes, and three students participated in these communications and sent emails to the entire College of Law Community. The use of email forums/listservs to the entire College of Law Community was not prohibited. Professor Reyes's emails were informative, professional, and timely. They helped bring transparency and accountability regarding Dean Keller's resignation, a matter of institutional and public importance. The Tallahassee Democrat initially reported about Dean Keller's resignation on February 2, 2024. Subsequently, Dean Keller provided her letter of resignation to this newspaper, which published it in a second article on February 6, 2024. These materials were readily available online via the newspaper's website.

In response to Professor Reyes's contributions via emails about Dean Keller's resignation, Provost Watson issued a Notice of intent to dismiss Professor Reyes from her tenured position. It seems to us that Provost Watson targeted Professor Reyes for the content of her speech and sought to silence her voice and future contributions in the FAMU College of Law. In a matter of days, Provost Watson charged Professor Reyes for dismissal without allowing her an opportunity to respond to a formal complaint, go through an investigation, receive meaningful due process, and get a report. To us as law students, the way Provost Watson has handled this situation screams of injustice and lack of due process.

Many students and alumni describe Professor Reyes as an exceptional educator who made a lasting and meaningful impact on their law school experiences and legal careers. She always set high standards and would provide the guidance and skills necessary to reach them. She also inspired students to achieve their individual levels of excellence. Some of us made it through difficult situations during law school thanks to her unwavering support. Professor Reyes has also been an advocate for student organizations. Therefore, if your intent to dismiss Professor Reyes comes to pass, you will harm past, current, and future FAMU College of Law students by taking away an excellent professor who has been our teacher, mentor, advocate, ally, supporter, and friend. You will also harm the law school, including with negative publicity. You have already disrupted the high-caliber teaching law students expected to receive when they registered for Professor Reyes's courses. You abruptly replaced her with less-credentialed and less-experienced instructors who had never taught in a law school before. Many of us will be further traumatized by Professor Reyes's dismissal. We cannot remain silent in the face of such injustice.

There are currently twenty (20) tenured professors (associate and full) in the College of Law. Professor Reyes was the first and thus far only Hispanic professor hired in the tenure track and subsequently tenured in the FAMU College of Law. She has served as HALSA's dedicated, supportive, and highly competent faculty advisor. According to the FAMU College of Law American Bar Association 2023 Standard 509 Required Disclosures, Hispanic students make up 25% of the total law student body. It is important that Hispanic students be appropriately represented in the law school. While this letter is spearheaded by HALSA's Board, we are being supported in our efforts by students and alumni of diverse backgrounds who appreciate and respect Professor Reyes's teaching, mentoring, and support.

There is a strong sense among the student body that an injustice is happening in view of all of us. On February 27, 2024, students met with FAMU College of Law Interim Dean Cecil Howard and protested the intended dismissal of Professor Reyes. Interim Dean Howard responded that the decision was made by Tallahassee Administrators to whom students should voice their protests. This is what we are doing via this open letter. We have distributed this letter widely for signatures by students, alumni, allies, friends, and supporters of justice everywhere. Please hear us when we tell you that the intended dismissal of Professor Reyes is a grave injustice. You have the power to stop this intended wrong. Please do so!

We respectfully demand that you keep Professor Maritza Reyes in the tenured faculty position she earned. She has done nothing warranting dismissal. We also demand that you grant Professor Reyes's request for a public meeting regarding her intended dismissal.

[Sign.]