7 years since shocking hate crime, civil rights suit over Nantucket public meeting surfaces racial tension

Nantucket African Meeting House, 1880
Nantucket Historical Association

A shocking hate crime of vandalism on storied Nantucket Island in 2018 has resulted in sour police-community relations, a free-speech civil-rights claim remanded to trial court just this August, and retention in September of a private firm for an independent review.

In March 2018, the historic 1827 African Meeting House on Nantucket Island was vandalized with hate speech in black spray paint, including the "n-word," as shown in the image below, at bottom, from the appendix to the August appellate court decision. (Sensitive readers be warned.)

To date, no one has been convicted of the graffiti. A civil rights lawsuit by Nantucket residents Jim Barros and Rose Marie Samuels, the Superior Court in 2022 blamed a suspect, Dylan Ponce, who asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in that lawsuit, and whom a grand jury refused to indict.

Ponce's employer, Jeffrey Sayle, pleaded guilty to false statement to police and testified that Ponce confessed (The Inquirer and Mirror). The civil case against Ponce was Barros v. Ponce, Civil Action No. 2175CV00004 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 6, 2022) (paywalled at Mass. Lawyers Weekly).

Town Manager Elizabeth Gibson
Town & County of Nantucket

Sayle was the brother-in-law of Nantucket town manager Elizabeth Gibson, who herself is married to the deputy police chief of Nantucket. Given the close relationships of officials and the slow and ultimately unsuccessful police investigation, rumors picked up steam in the years after the 2018 crime that family members of Gibson and police were being protected.

In 2020, Barros and Samuels appeared at a meeting of the town board, as they had before, to demand accountability in the still ongoing investigation. Their remarks fueled continuing suspicion of a cover-up, which prompted the ire of Gibson and police chief William Pittman. 

Chief William Pittman
(captured from public meeting video)

Samuels's exchange with Gibson was especially heated. Angrily denying untruthfulness, Gibson interrupted Samuels and demanded that the chair stop her from speaking further. Samuels, who also accused police of failure to investigate a hit-and-run crash that injured her son in 2018 (more at Change.org), was cowed back to hear seat. She returned to the microphone after Gibson stormed out of the meeting.

Barros accused police of lying because he he had been told by a detective that a perpetrator was identified, but no charges resulted. Pittman, who carried a sidearm, spoke in defense of the police and accused Barros of fueling rumors of a cover-up while claiming to know the identity of perpetrators and refusing to tell police. Pittman retired in 2023.

The salient part of the public meeting is on YouTube, cued here at 27 minutes, and running for 13 minutes:

Barros and Samuels brought a civil rights action against the board, Gibson, and Pittman for violating their free speech rights under the federal and state constitutions, and for intimidation under state civil rights law. The Superior Court granted defendants summary judgment on both counts. In August, the Appeals Court voted 2-1 to to remand Samuels's statutory civil rights claim only to proceed.

The facts matter, in more detail than I've stated them here, because the pretrial disposition turns on whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the claims to a jury. Interested readers can find more detailed articulations of the facts in the judges' opinions.

In short, the court rejected the constitutional claims because neither Barros nor Samuels was actually stopped from speaking. Samuels was allowed to return to the microphone and continue after Gibson stormed out. Barros was allowed to say his piece despite the objections interjected by Pittman.

The civil rights claims were closer calls, though, because intimidation, threat, or coercion is actionable even if the plaintiffs were permitted to speak. The test is one of interference or attempted interference of a protected right, here to speak at the public meeting. 

For pretrial resolution on defense motion, the court views the facts most favorably for the plaintiffs, the non-moving parties. Yet even accepting as true that Barros "was impugned by Pittman, suffered embarrassment, and felt intimidated by Pittman's being armed," the court decided, the sum of Pittman's alleged interference was only impassioned disagreement or disapproval, not intimidation.

Rose Marie Samuels, 2020
(captured from public meeting video)

However, in the case of Samuels, Gibson expressly demanded that she be silenced, and Samuels evidenced intimidation in once returning to her seat. The court concluded, "Gibson's response to Samuels's comments, including Gibson's physically threatening departure from the meeting and hostile, intimate back-and-forth with Samuels, could be sufficient to establish a violation of the [state civil rights act] at trial."

The court's analysis of Samuels's civil rights claim raised an interesting point of "constitutional tort" law. Under state civil rights law, the court explained, "[i]n determining whether conduct constitutes threats, intimidation, or coercion, we apply an objective or 'reasonable person' standard."

Yet like in tort law, the "reasonable person" standard is not wholly objective, but is a test of the reasonable person under the same circumstances as the person being tested, or standing in the shoes of the person being tested. As the court put it, "'objectivity' does not foreclose consideration of the plaintiff's situation"; "we need not ignore who the plaintiff is."

That subjectivity made a big difference in light of Samuels's personal history with police. Considering the facts favorably to her, "she had experienced, and continued to experience, racism from the Nantucket police," the court reasoned. "She mistrusted Gibson, the town manager, who was married to the deputy police chief."

In that emotional context, the court recalled, "Samuels maintains that Gibson 'stormed' past her when leaving the meeting, 'in a physically threatening manner,' 'glar[ed] down' at Samuels from 'within a few feet,' and stopped to ask, twice, whether Samuels was calling her a liar. Samuels characterized Gibson's voice as 'loud and threatening,' and Samuels was frightened by this encounter."

Samuels therefore made a sufficient case to present her claim of intimidation for a jury to decide.

Justice Smyth

Justice Paul Hart Smyth wrote a spirited dissent favoring the plaintiffs on all three counts on which the court affirmed judgment for the defense. He would have sent all four claims, for both plaintiffs, to the jury. Be forewarned, I'm going to quote Justice Smyth at some length, because what he adds to the analysis on Nantucket social conditions I find eye opening.

Speaking to those very circumstances that made a difference in Samuels's statutory claim, Justice Smyth painted a different and bleaker picture of police-community relations on Nantucket.

The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs inhabited a different stratum in the town altogether, as they maintained no apparent political, economic, social, public order, or law enforcement influence over town affairs. First, he described Gibson's social and economic power.

Gibson first began working for the town of Nantucket in 1988, when she was twenty-two years old. She has held the position of town manager since 1995. As town manager, Gibson is a remarkably powerful and influential individual. She exercises direct supervision over almost every town department, including the police, fire, building, finance, health, marine and coastal resources, public works, board of appeals, conservation commission, planning board, council on aging, counsel for human services, historic district commission, parks and recreation, and the shellfish and harbor advisory board. As town manager, Gibson maintains appointment and disciplinary (including discharge) powers over the department chiefs and their employees.... Gibson is not subject to general election, but ... had been reappointed for consecutive terms since 1995.

.... As an acknowledgment of Gibson's influence, multiple town residents warned Barros that he might face adverse consequences to challenging Gibson by implicating her relatives as being involved in the African Meeting House crime. These individuals cautioned Barros, "You know, it's [Gibson's] son and nephew; so, be careful. Watch your back."

He then described the plaintiffs in contrast:

The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs inhabited a different stratum in the town altogether, as they maintained no apparent political, economic, social, public order, or law enforcement influence over town affairs. Samuels, of Jamaican descent, became a full-time resident of Nantucket in 1999; she resides on Nantucket with her son. Samuels has worked in the home healthcare field when her health permits.

James Barros, seventy-six years old [in 2020], worked as a part-time drywaller and plasterer. He has lived intermittently on Nantucket since he was eight years old. Barros, skeptical that the Nantucket police were committed to solving the African Meeting House crime, sought assurance that the police were dutifully investigating the matter .... As Barros stated: "That building is part of me. I'm an African. I have a right to ask who is doing damage to my house."

James Barros
(captured from public meeting video)

Justice Smyth also put additional facts on the table to suggest that the court majority gave Barros's claim short shrift.

The record supports a rational jury concluding that Pittman's words and conduct threatened Barros to the extent that Barros was terrified when he stood at the town meeting to respond. Barros's fear was based in part on his experience as a Black man who was distrustful and a vocal critic of the Nantucket police. As a consequence of Barros's continued pressure on the police to meaningfully pursue the hate crime investigation, the lead town investigator, Detective Klinger, responded with hostility toward Barros. In addition, numerous people advised Barros "to watch [his] back," and warned him that the Nantucket police were going to "set him up." .... 

The record demonstrates that Barros's fear of the Nantucket police was well grounded. Barros, while driving, was pulled over by the police on two separate occasions following the March 11 board meeting. One Sunday morning, a Nantucket officer pulled Barros over as Barros was headed home from Mass celebrated at St. Mary's Church. The officer approached Barros's truck with his hand on his gun. Although the officer stated that he stopped Barros due to a brake light malfunction, the record indicates Barros's lights were functioning properly and allows the inference of a retaliatory stop. 

In sum, Justice Smyth found sufficient evidence to show interference with civil rights of both plaintiffs, as a matter of fact, and of persons of "reasonable fortitude" in their circumstances, applying the objective test.

Frederick Douglass, center left, at abolitionist meeting, N.Y., 1850.
He first visited Nantucket for an anti-slavery conference in 1841.
Smithsonian Institute/Mr. & Mrs. Set Charles Momjian, via National Park Service

Justice Smyth offered a spirited conclusion that invoked Nantucket's abolitionist history and rallied the judiciary to the defense of speech critical of public officials:

Nearly one hundred and eighty years after Frederick Douglass sought refuge in Massachusetts and traveled to Nantucket to make his first public speech condemning slavery, a person desecrated a site sacred to the island's Black community with the words "Nigger leave." The act was more than an act of property vandalism, as it communicated a direct threat to the plaintiffs' safety and well-being as Black residents of Nantucket. While the United States Constitution, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and our laws will never eradicate the hatred and racism in the hearts of individuals who commit such acts, our legal framework guarantees people the right to speak out against such offenses, to petition local officials for answers, and to criticize local government and police officials for failing in their oaths to support our laws and Constitution and to seek justice for all.

Of course, it would be folly to take the force and endurance of these constitutional rights for granted, perhaps lulled by the longstanding welfare and security of our nation and by our courts' historical commitment to safeguarding free speech rights as fundamental to our representative democracy. We do not have that luxury because, even considering the relative strength of our democracy, these rights are subject to the whim of unchecked power that allows for tyrannical tendencies to suppress contrary viewpoints. Thus, the judiciary's vigilance to protect from government interference our people's right to speak to public issues is as critical today as it was when the First Amendment was ratified in 1791.

(Paragraph break added; citations omitted.)

Nantucket Harbor, 2021
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

I get Pittman's frustration at having failed to secure a prosecution for the vandalism, and, presumably with laudable motivations to avoid conflict of interest, in having ceded the investigation to the district attorney and state police. Nevertheless, he and Gibson, as public officials, have to have thicker skin, especially for justifiable outrage at a public meeting.

I share public outrage that such a hateful act defaced a historic place of contemporary cultural importance, and that no prosecution followed, upon whatever tragicomedy of errors. (I include the image below, from the court's appendix, despite the offensive epithet, to demonstrate the severity and offensiveness of the crime.) To be fair to Nantucketers, after the overnight vandalism in 2018, more than a dozen distraught local residents turned out to scrub the African Meeting House clean by 10 a.m. the next morning (Cape Cod Times). But bad eggs are still at large.

Estimates vary, but cost of living on Nantucket usually is said to exceed the national average by more than 100%, and housing costs run more than 300% over. You can bet that upper-crust property owners aren't doing much of the manual labor on the island to keep that economic engine running. Nantucket depends on a significant Jamaican population to work in the tourism industry. Yet the government on the island is worrisomely non-representative of the population by racial demographics.

Once addressing a crowd in Cork, Ireland, Frederick Douglass was shouted down with cries of, "That's a lie," "He shan’t speak," and "Down with the n—" (Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance, and Abolition). Justice Smyth must have been conscious of the eerie parallel to the meeting dispute and vandalism here. I do not mean to accuse Gibson and Pittman of the same culpability as slave-owners, nor of racism. Rather, I mean to suggest that Nantucket officials ought be cognizant that those same sentiments surfacing today, leveled against black residents, is not a good look.

At some point, the difference between official incompetence and insensitivity, on the one hand, and willful cover-up, on the other hand, becomes immaterial.

In September, a working group of the town board retained a Texas forensics firm, LCG Discovery Experts, to review the investigation into the African Meeting House vandalism—though not to re-investigate the crime. According to Nantucket Current News, the independent review was spurred by a citizen petition.

The case is Barros v. Select Board, No. 23-P-1058 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 19, 2025), available at the Social Law Library. Justice Rachel E. Hershfang wrote the court opinion for herself and Justice Vickie L. Henry, contra the dissent of Justice Smyth.

Court Appendix in Barros v. Select Board

Overheard recently in a Vermont diner ...

A patron told his dining companion that he was happy that his work gives him a way to help people truly in need. Then, 

Background: Autumn, Oct. 2025, in Saint-Alexandre, Quebec, Canada, by RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 

'Liberal Playmaker' goes Substack; Boston awaits FIFA

"The Liberal Playmaker," a.k.a. Jose Benavides, is now on Substack.

Benavides, a Texas attorney, past co-author, and excellent former student, has been producing informative and compelling content about soccer (football) and politics since launching a year ago (featured at The Savory Tort in March 2025).

Benavides has a passion for the beautiful game, and it is contagious through his writing. His narrative pieces recall great players and great games and also comment on the current business and art of the sport. 

Here are recent titles:

• The Ghost of Old Trafford: Fernando Redondo's Masterclass
• The Triangle That Endured: Croatia’s Lesson in Collective Control 
• Finding Young Del Piero (and What Modern Football Forgot)
• Totti The Thief
• The Misunderstood Final: Milan vs Juventus, 2003

The Liberal Playmaker will be a content maker to watch as we near World Cup 2026. Boston has deployed a massive publicity campaign to gin up interest, e.g., Boston's South Station, below, in July (RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0), though the relevant venue is Gillette Stadium in Foxborough, Massachusetts, home to the MLS New England Revolution and NFL Patriots.

 

 

Court ruling against union furthers 'labor peace' fantasy

The union-management duopoly holds the 
American worker captive.

Google Gemini image CC0

The Massachusetts Appeals Court decided a First Amendment case against a labor union yesterday, and—hold on to your hat—I'm with the union and think the case wrongly decided.

The case involved a school employees' union in Andover, Massachusetts (different school, same Andover, which has curious recent resonance, but that's another story). According to the court's recounting, the education union and Andover school committee discussed a one-time $800 payment to instructional assistants in negotiation, but the payment did not make into the contract.

After the contract was concluded, the union went to the Andover town meeting with a warrant article, a way for citizens to put items on the meeting agenda, and asked for the town's endorsement of the $800 payment. The town approved the measure, and the union then sought to enforce it with the school committee.

The school committee accused the union of bargaining in bad faith by, from the committee's perspective, going behind their backs to the town meeting to secure a term that had failed to make it through the negotiation. The union defended on the merits under state law requiring employers and unions to negotiate in good faith, and also defended on First Amendment grounds for its right to petition the town meeting.

The court ruled for the committee on both issues. The union had conducted itself in bad faith, and the First Amendment did not preclude application of the good faith requirement in state law.

I think both conclusions are wrong. And if they're not wrong as a matter of regulatory requirement and constitutional constraints, then, at minimum, the outcome is bad policy.

First, the court concluded, in agreement with the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board, that the union acted in bad faith. The court relied on prior examples in case law of "double crosses," accepting the premise that the union went behind the back of the school committee. The court used the word "bypass" three times, describing the union conduct as having "bypassed" negotiation with the committee. That's one way to look at it. 

Another way to look at it is that the union "bypassed" nothing. The union negotiated in good faith and the bargain was concluded. Thereafter, the union used a different means to reach a desired end.

The warrant article was an extant feature of local government. Bargaining never took the warrant article off the table. If the school committee wanted to extract from the union a pledge not to seek the $800 payment through any alternative channel, or not to pursue warrant articles at all, then the committee could have put that ask on the table. Maybe the two would have settled on $400 instead of $800. We'll never know.

The union engaged in no deception. The union violated no term of the agreed upon contract. The union availed itself of a lawful process. Town voters were free to say to the union, "If you wanted that $800, you should have bargained for it in the contract." The town meeting was free to say no. Apparently, meeting voters rather agreed with the union that the negotiated contract needed an $800 enhancement. The school committee might ought search its soul to determine why the town meeting, another and more democratic part of the same local government, thought ill of the concluded terms.

Second, the court concluded that the "good faith" argument survived First Amendment strict scrutiny as applied. Following the example of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Appeals Court applied strict scrutiny prophylactically, as the former Court has not made clear whether the appropriate standard is strict scrutiny or something less. 

The Appeals Court reasoned that labor peace is a compelling governmental interest under strict scrutiny, and that the good faith requirement, applied in this context, narrowly furthers the governmental interest in labor speaking with one voice in furtherance of an exclusive bargaining prerogative.

I can illustrate the problem with this reasoning with reference to my own workplace, where the university faculty is unionized. 

Savory Tort readers will know that I am no fan of the union, and I am not a member. In 2020, amid the pandemic, the union that purported to represent me and all faculty colluded with the university to cut faculty pay. Over my objection, the union asked for progressive cuts that hit the higher compensation packages in the law school especially hard—for me, to the tune of 12%—while sparing others across the campus. That did not strike me as fair and equal representation of the members of the bargaining unit. So I sued.

Kudos to the Liberty Justice Center, which carried on the lawsuit magnificently. No fault of theirs, we lost. I expected that outcome in the heavily pro-union First Circuit. I always knew that the cause likely would be an uphill slog to the U.S. Supreme Court. And unsurprisingly, after having unsettled the waters in other respects in recent years, SCOTUS by the time we got there seemed to have lost its appetite for further forays into labor law. The Court passed on our appeal. 

I'm content that I had the chance to get my story out there. And lo and behold, to their credit, the university later repaid the covid cuts to faculty. Did my lawsuit have anything to do with that? Did the university have to put its money where its mouth was on its declarations to the courts that alleged losses of aggrieved faculty were overblown? Well, .... 

You're welcome, faculty and union. Though my thank-you card might have been lost in the mail—?

Like the Appeals Court in the instant case, the First Circuit demonstrated either ignorance or indifference to the reality on the ground. The analysis adopts the fiction that an exclusive bargainer represents the interests simultaneously of each and every worker, whose individual needs are uniform and fungible. Never would nor could the union act contrary to the interests of any minority class within the bargaining unit. 

Fantasy.

There are plenty of faculty in my law school who, after seeing how the union treated us when the going got rough, are ready to vote ourselves out and into our own separate bargaining unit. The problem is that non-tenured faculty are afraid that the university will give us a raw deal as punishment for separating.

One might think that management would be delighted to see a union broken. Far from it. The exclusive bargaining prerogative of a unitary union preserves the status quo, keeping those in power in power, on both the union side and the management side. Multiple bargaining units would challenge the duopoly. One bargaining unit might gain an advantage over the other, and the other might try to leverage that advantage against management. 

There's a term for that dynamic, by the way: "the free market."

In the law school, we might be able to form our own bargaining unit, to further our interests, if we could speak to the university and reach agreement that current contractual protections are a baseline, to which either party may retreat if going-forward negotiations fail on the first round.

However, the good faith standard binds management, as well as the union. The duopoly union-university, which does not want the hassle of a separate bargaining unit anyway, will claim that the good faith standard prohibits management from even speaking to minority interests. (I would disagree.)

The status quo is thus preserved indefinitely. And the consequence is that the union remains in power indefinitely, long past even the lives of its founding members, and despite its work at cross-purposes with the the legal obligation to serve the workers. The institution of the union becomes a thing apart from the workforce and hellbent on self-preservation.

I grant that the application of strict scrutiny, as in the instant case, is something of an "eye of the beholder" problem. If one thinks that "labor peace" as a compelling governmental interest means a power duopoly that binds workers to terms that are not in their best interests, then yes, I can see my way to preservation of exclusive voice as a means to that end. 

I rather challenge the initial premise. "Labor peace" to me means a functional system in which workers and management have a meaningful opportunity to negotiate terms of employment. If that is the compelling governmental interest, and I contend that that is Congress's express purpose, then a rule applied so as to disarm both union and management from lawful means to advance their causes is hardly narrowly tailored to any legitimate end.

Yesterday's Appeals Court decision commits workers to imprisonment on the union-management hamster wheel. The loser is not so much the union, but the worker.

The case is Andover Education Association v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board, No. AC 24-P-465 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 9, 2025). Justice Joseph M. Ditkoff authored the unanimous opinion of the panel, which also comprised Justices Desmond and Englander.

Appeal in slip'n'fall points to deeper mysteries of historical 'open and obvious' danger doctrine

Google Gemini CC0

Rejecting the phrase "open and obvious" as magical incantation, the Massachusetts Appeals Court Friday affirmed a slip-and-fall jury award for an apartment dweller against her landlord.

The plaintiff injured her ankle when she left her apartment because, she alleged and the jury agreed, the landlord had removed a platform that usually stood outside the door, thus increasing the height of the step.

The defendant argued that the absence of the platform was an "open and obvious" condition, thus negating the duty a landlord usually owes to a renter. Maybe so, the court opined, but the proposition only raises a question of fact appropriate for resolution by the jury. And the jury here decided that the defendant should have foreseen the plaintiff's unawareness of the platform's absence.

"Open and obvious" is a term oft used in the law in different contexts, with seemingly magical effect, so it's important to specify first that the term arises here in the context of landowner negligence. Its use even in this vein is historically and persistently ambiguous.

The ambiguity arises in part from the fact that "landowner negligence" is often described in terms of the duty that a landowner owes to one who comes onto the land. But functionally, the rules of landowner negligence operate as rules of breach of the standard of conduct, or defendant's "negligence." The distinction is theoretical and often functionally insignificant. But it can be procedurally important, because the existence of a duty is—not exclusively, but let's gloss that over—a question of law for the court to decide, while breach presents a question of fact for the jury to decide.

The rules that American common law has evolved for landowner negligence sensibly require some degree of plaintiff's unawareness of the danger. Depending on the plaintiff-defendant relationship, the plaintiff's unawareness might be tested according to the defendant's reasonable anticipation, the plaintiff's reasonable anticipation, or the plaintiff's subjective knowledge. Whatever the test, bearing the burden of proof, the plaintiff alleges that unawareness. The defendant may declare in response that the danger was "open and obvious," thus making clear that the plaintiff's allegation cannot be believed.

What has not been clear in common law, historically, is the procedural impact of the declaration. Was the "open and obvious" declaration an affirmative defense, for which the burden of proof shifted to the defendant, or merely a refutation of the plaintiff's proof of unawareness? Was the "open and obvious" declaration equivalent to a "no duty" argument that the court must resolve expeditiously as a matter of law, or is the declaration a factual description that must be placed in the hands of the jury? Courts answered these questions variably, creating confusion.

In helping law students to understand the contemporary import of "open and obvious" in the multistate norms of American common law landowner negligence, my preference is to impress upon them that the term usually is not, or ought not be, a magical incantation. It's alliteration is alluring but deceptive. In contemporary doctrine, the declaration of "open and obvious" should be understood merely as a defense allegation of fact, and a refutation of the plaintiff's proof. The burden of proof does not shift, though it must be acknowledged that a credible declaration might obviate the need for a jury trial.

If the danger indeed is so open and obvious that ordinary minds could not differ on the question of plaintiff's unawareness, then the usual operation of civil procedure allows the court to decide the question of fact as a matter of law, in which case the court may do so pretrial and under the banner of duty or breach. If the answer is not so obvious as the defendant contends, then a motion to dismiss as a matter of law is properly denied, and the question is advanced to the jury as one of fact.

That's the approach that seems to have evolved in Massachusetts, though the appellate court has not always been clear about the mechanisms under the hood. In the instant case, the court wrote that the "open and obvious" declaration presented a question of fact that was properly referred to the jury for resolution. The court also described the "open and obvious" allegation as seeking to negate the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. That's not wrong, but it might be confusing, because the jury usually is charged with examining elements of breach, not duty. 

In an earlier case, Ward v. Schnurr (Mass. App. Ct. 2023) (The Savory Tort (Sept. 28, 2023)), the court affirmed dismissal of a negligence claim in favor of a landowner in part upon the defendant's allegation of "open and obvious," also referencing the duty owed, but without a jury ever having been impaneled. In that case, the plaintiff had been hired by the defendant specially to remediate the dangerous condition, so the plaintiff's assertion that it was unaware of the danger ran into trouble on the sniff test. The "open and obvious" allegation was therefore properly decided as a matter of law, even though it was a question of fact. The court did not, however, go out of its way to make that clear. 

In neither case did the court indicate that any burden shifting had occurred. I don't think it did. But there again, it would have been helpful if the court had said that.

Doctrinal confusion over "open and obvious" thus persists, in Massachusetts and elsewhere. It only makes matters worse that what I describe here as my understanding of Massachusetts law, as well as what I sell to students as multistate norms, is not the law everywhere in all circumstances. 

There is a deeper theoretical truth at work here, almost a philosophical question, one that I encourage first-year students in Torts to embrace and play with before the remainder of the "hands-on," widget-making law school curriculum beats out of them any appreciation for law as a worthwhile intellectual pursuit. The truth is that duty and breach are not really distinct things, rather, are more like two sides of the same coin. Thus, the tort scholar William Prosser once said, "Circumlocution is inevitable."

For now, to quote the scholar of popular culture Trevor Noah, "ain't nobody got time for that."

What I'd like to know more about, meanwhile, are the family dynamics behind the instant case. The defendant landowner was, the court revealed, the plaintiff renter's mom. I hope the case was motivated by access to insurance and not bad blood, though neither scenario speaks well of American civil dispute resolution.

The case is Varley v. Walther, No. 24-P-511 (Mass. App. Ct. May 16, 2025). Justice Gregory I. Massing wrote the opinion of the unanimous panel that also comprised Justices Hershfang and Tan.

Commencement speakers envision new beginnings

Commencement at UMass Law yesterday featured a couple of great speeches. And I'm not an easy critic.

Both speakers implicitly recognized the nature of a "commencement" as a new beginning.

Giving the student address, graduate Jack Lovely, now JD, an accomplished alumnus of my Comparative Law class, spoke eloquently to inspire his class on the road, and opportunities, that lie ahead in their professional careers. 

I especially liked Lovely's use of a quote from Jon Stewart: "[T]he unfortunate and truly exciting thing about your life is there is no core curriculum. The entire place is an elective." The quote often is, as here, taken a bit out of context—Stewart was speaking more to how young people mature at university than after—but the extrapolation is fair, and the spirit fits.

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Serge Georges Jr. impressed on graduates that they have the opportunity, and should endeavor, to shape the law, not just use it, and certainly not just reap benefits without giving back. He admonished, "The law is not a monument. It's a living promise."

Justice Georges similarly advised, "Don't confuse having a good life with living a good life." To wit, he memorably urged graduates to distinguish superficial interaction on social media, such as food posts, from human connections that really matter: "No one cares about the calamari."

A few of my now-former students were among award winners, including: brilliant researcher and top Torts students Christopher J. Sanacore, Academic Achievement for Part-Time Student; dedicated Veterans Law Association President Timothy Trocchio, External Legal Education Award (CLEA); and Comparative Law distinguished alumna Naydin Natasha Zepeda, Thurgood Marshall Social Justice Award. My congratulations to them and all of the class of 2025.

Awards recognize law students Girouard, Riley

A moment to celebrate two of my ace former students, Kaitlyn Girouard and Jack Riley, who took home awards from the UMass Law Student Bar Association this spring.

Girouard earned the Excellence in Leadership Award, and Riley won the Outstanding Part-Time Student Award.

Girouard created this chart to help students navigate multiple liabilities.
© Used with permission. Contact RJ Peltz-Steele for licensing.

Girouard just finished out a spectacular year of service as my teaching assistant in Torts I and Torts II. I had to create a new virtual folder to keep track of student accolades for her mentoring. I asked Girouard to serve in this capacity not only because she excelled academically, but because she took a lead as a cheerful supporter of her own class in the first year. On her own initiative, for her study group, she created some terrific visuals to accompany my texts, a welcome complement to the pedagogy and indication of her talent for understanding learning styles.

Girouard is a Public Interest Law Fellow and leader in a range of student activities: president of the Criminal Law Society, president of the First Generation Law Students Association, and secretary of the Environmental Law Club. She came to law school with highest academic honors at Middlebury College, where she graduated summa cum laude in economics and environmental policy and served as an economic statistics tutor and faculty research assistant.

For all the workplaces that would relish having her, public service is on Girouard's heart. Already before law school, she worked summers in her native Concord, Vermont, for the Agency of Natural Resources, Sheriff's Department, and State's Attorney Office. Last summer, she worked a prestigious internship with the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office in New Bedford. She's headed back to Vermont to work in public service again this summer, this time supported by a prestigious Michael S. Dukakis Public Service Internship Award. Next academic year, Girouard will serve as a teaching assistant in Constitutional Law, further deepening her remarkable mastery of American legal fundamentals.

While Girouard was the star of her 1L Torts day section, Riley was the star of his night section, when I taught both in 2023-24. Riley is one of those exceptional people—an elite group that would not have included me—who manage to thrive in the workplace and in law school at the same time, all while maintaining a mentally healthy home life. He is a long-time manager and executive with 15 years' experience in finance, presently working for HarborOne Bank in Massachusetts. Riley is rightly lauded by professional and academic peers for his leadership skills and commitment to community service. In the law school, he also serves as a peer mentor.

There's a lot to complain about teaching in higher ed today, and I am not reticent to voice it. At the same time, even the most frustrated of us keep coming back to the classroom every fall, and no wonder, for the opportunity to meet, to learn from, and to be inspired by people such as Girouard and Riley.

Tree falling on house invites court to parse 'discretion' in ruling city vulnerable to tort liability

Google Gemini CC0

A straightforward case in the Massachusetts Appeals Court last week helps to clarify the meaning and purpose of discretionary function immunity from tort liability for both state and federal governments.

A tree fell on the plaintiff's house. The tree was on city property and under the care of the tree warden, yes that's a thing, of the city of Chicopee, Massachusetts. The plaintiff alleged that the warden, and thereby the city, was negligent for failing to remove the tree or otherwise abate the threat to property. The plaintiff proffered evidence to show that the city had reason to know the tree was not healthy.

Discretionary function immunity, provided for by both the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), draws a fine line between ordinary accidents which the legislatures sought to compel the governments to answer for in the courts, and matters of policy. 

The plaintiff-pedestrian struck by a car driven by a government worker may sue. But the voter disgruntled over climate policy should seek a remedy at the ballot box, not in the courts. In this way, discretionary function immunity polices the very boundary between distributive justice and corrective justice, that is, the provinces of the political branches and of the judiciary, respectively.

The courts under both statutes have developed similar two-part tests. A federal court must ask, first, whether the government action involved an element of choice, or judgment, and second, critically, whether that judgment implicates public policy, that is, social, economic, or political considerations. The Massachusetts courts, under MTCA section 10(b), make the same inquiry with slightly different language, asking whether the government action involved "policy making or planning."

A perennial problem with discretionary function immunity is the name of the thing. It sounds like the exercise of discretion should trigger the immunity. But that's an oversimplification. It's really about the exercise of policy discretion. The government driver who runs a red light might be said to have exercised discretion when she put her foot on the gas. But it's unlikely that that exercise implicated public policy. Now had government officials decided not to install a traffic light at that intersection at all, having weighed the costs and benefits of injury and infrastructure, that would be a policy choice, immune from challenge in tort law.

The meaning of "discretionary" was precisely the hang up in the present case. Complicating matters, a Chicopee city ordinance expressly dedicated tree removal to "[t]he discretion and sound judgment of the Tree Warden alone" (my emphasis). The Appeals Court correctly reasoned that the discretion of the ordinance was the broader sort; the MTCA refers specifically to a "subset" of discretion involving "policy making or planning." In other words, the tree warden was driving the car, not planning the traffic lights.

The case is Citation Insurance Co. v. Chicopee, No. 24-P-309 (Apr. 9, 2025) (Justia). Justice John C. Englander wrote the unanimous opinion of the panel, which also comprised Justices Henry and Desmond.

In negligence claims over child welfare, bus fight, Mass. high court opines on qualified, sovereign immunity

Two immunity cases ended with different outcomes for public officials in the Massachusetts high court on two successive Fridays, and the cases illustrate different theories of immunity.

In a case decided on March 21, social workers with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF) asserted qualified immunity in the death and severe injury of two children, each about two years old. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) considered the immunity analysis but decided ultimately that, immunity notwithstanding, the workers had not legally caused the harm the children suffered.

In a case decided March 14, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) asserted sovereign immunity in the serious injury of a passenger who was beaten by a bus driver with known anger management issues. The SJC decided that the state agency was not entitled to sovereign immunity as codified by a provision protecting the state from liability for the acts of third parties.

Mass. DCF Worcester West Area Office
From Mass. DCF, purported © 2025
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, asserted fair use.

Qualified Immunity 

However much the state defendants prevailed in the first case, the court's recitation of the facts reveals a deeply disturbing record of irresponsibility on the part of DCF. A woman with four foster children was correctly suspected of having a live-in boyfriend with a record of an open armed robbery charge, three assault and battery charges, and multiple restraining orders. That would be prohibitive of foster placements were the facts confirmed, so DCF planned to monitor the home closely. For unknown reasons, officials dropped the ball, and inspections were too few and too infrequent.

The horrifying 2015 accident that took the life of one child and severely injured another occurred overnight when one of the children reached for "and adjusted the thermostat on an electric heater, which was on the wall above the crib, causing the children's room to overheat," the court wrote. Another child in the room died, and the child who manipulated the thermostat "was found to be in critical condition, suffering from respiratory failure, seizures, hyperthermia (a high temperature), and hypotension (low blood pressure)." The foster parent called 911, and the critically injured child was taken to the hospital. She survived but remains impaired, and her representatives were the plaintiffs in the instant case.

In a civil rights action under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, DCF officials claimed qualified immunity. The court coherently explained how the doctrine works generally and in this context:

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims for damages if "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known...." Littles v. Commissioner of Correction [Mass. 2005]. The determination of qualified immunity follows a two-part test:

"The first prong asks whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; the second prong asks whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged violation. [T]he second step, in turn, has two aspects. One aspect of the analysis focuses on the clarity of the law .... The other aspect focuses more concretely on the facts of the particular case and whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights" .... Penate v. Sullivan ... (1st Cir. 2023)....

Under the first prong, "'substantive due process' prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the conscience'" .... United States v. Salerno [U.S. 1987]. In the foster care context, courts apply one of two standards to determine whether government conduct is conscience-shocking. The first ... is the "deliberate indifference" standard.... Under this standard, a plaintiff must show that a government actor "exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty." ....

Alternatively, under the second standard, ... a plaintiff must show that a State actor's professional decision constitutes such a "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards" that the decision was not actually based on such judgment.

The court did not resolve the difference between the two standards, however, because the case was resolved on a different basis. Notwithstanding qualified immunity, a plaintiff in a civil rights case, just like in a state tort case, must prove proximate, or legal causation, and the plaintiffs here could not.

DCF misconduct might have been a scientific cause of the accident. However, the reason DCF was investigating the foster care home was the suspected presence of man, a co-caretaker, with a problematic criminal record. Scientific causation might be proved if the plaintiff could prove that proper DCF investigation would have resulted in the removal of the man from the home. But that flub did not legally cause the accident, the court opined, because the accessibility of the thermostat to the crib and the child's consequent tampering with it had nothing to do with the presence of the man in the home.

The conclusion is sound, though it leaves one to wonder whether there yet has been any reckoning at DCF, or among public officials and legislators if under-resourcing is to blame.

It would not have made any difference here, but, collaterally, it's worth noting that the very existence of qualified immunity as a defense to civil rights actions has been an issue in play in recent years. I explained in 2 Tortz: A Study of American Tort Law (Lulu 2024 rev. ed.):

Of unlikely constitutional compulsion, qualified immunity has come into question in recent years, especially amid high-profile incidents of police violence. Some states and localities have adopted statutes and ordinances limiting or eliminating qualified immunity for police. At the federal level, U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Sonia Sotomayor both have criticized qualified immunity. Justice Thomas criticized qualified immunity as unsupported by the text of the Constitution or statute, and Justice Sotomayor criticized the doctrine for failing to punish official misconduct. See N.S. v. Kansas City (U.S. 2023) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Hoggard v. Rhodes (U.S. 2021) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari); James v. Bartelt (U.S. 2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Baxter v. Bracey (U.S. 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Nevertheless, thus far, the Court has upheld the doctrine. Since the murder of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis in 2020, U.S. Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-Mass.) and U.S. Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) have persistently but unsuccessfully championed bills to abolish qualified immunity in § 1983 actions.

The first case is Gotay v. Creen (Mass. Mar. 21, 2025) (FindLaw). Justice Serge Georges, Jr. authored the unanimous opinion of six justices.

MBTA bus
Mass. Office of Travel & Tourism via Flickr CC BY-ND 2.0

Sovereign Immunity

A different theory of immunity, state sovereign immunity, animated the case decided a week earlier.

At issue in this second case was the puzzling and unique section 10(j) of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), which attracts more than its fair share of MTCA appellate litigation in the commonwealth. The case arose from an assault on a passenger by an MBTA bus driver with anger management issues.

Relying on facts as favorable to the plaintiff, the court retold the story of the part-time driver who "sometimes engaged in unsafe driving and, on occasion, interacted with the public and his supervisors in a hostile or insubordinate manner," yet after three years was promoted to full time. The court recounted subsequent altercations with a passenger described as "unruly" and then with a police officer in a disagreement over road obstruction.

The instant case arose when a passenger pursued the bus, rapping on doors, trying to get information about routes. Further recounting the plaintiff's facts, the court wrote:

Lost, cold, and frustrated at the prospect of being stranded, [plaintiff] first questioned why the bus driver had not stopped sooner. The driver responded by yelling at [plaintiff] and leaving his driver's seat to confront [plaintiff] at the door. The driver kicked snow from the bottom of the bus at [plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] uttered a profanity. This further triggered the bus driver's anger; as the driver subsequently described it, he just "lost it." Enraged, the driver lunged at [plaintiff], escalating the encounter. For his part, [plaintiff] retreated, but the driver gave chase. When the driver caught up, the driver commenced punching and kicking [plaintiff]. The beating was so severe that [plaintiff] suffered a traumatic brain injury that has left him "permanently and totally disabled from his usual employment."

The plaintiff sued the MBTA for negligence in hiring, promotion, retention, and supervision. The defendant asserted sovereign immunity as codified in the MTCA.

MTCA section 10(j) is Massachusetts's effort to find the fine line between a tort claim that properly blames public officials for tortious misbehavior and a failure-to-protect claim, when public officials are not responsible for the actions of private third parties. Finding this line is a well known problem in tort claims, federal and state. The Massachusetts test has its own peculiar language, which, the abundance of case law suggests, is not necessarily clarifying. The court here quoted its own earlier assessment that the provision "presents an interpretive quagmire."

Section 10(j) holds public officials immune from "any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer."

The test is especially hairy in cases such as this one, when the alleged negligence is on the part of the state as employer, thus one step removed from the misconduct of a state employee. When does negligence on the part of the state employer constitute the "affirmative act" required to circumnavigate 10(j)?

Here, the court decided:

The claims at issue here are based on the MBTA's own failure to exercise reasonable care in its supervision of the bus driver; as we have explained, "where the supervisory officials allegedly had, or should have had, knowledge of a public employee's assaultive behavior, it is the supervisors' conduct, rather than the employee's intentional conduct, that is the true focus of the case." Dobos v. Driscoll ... [Mass. 1989] (affirming judgment against Commonwealth for negligent supervision and training of officer who assaulted civilian)[; s]ee Doe v. Blandford ... [Mass. 1988] (MTCA permitted claims regarding public employer's negligent conduct in hiring, retaining, and supervising guidance counselor who assaulted student independent of alleged vicarious liability for intentional tort of public employee)....

In sum, [section] 10 (j) does not provide immunity to a public employer for its misfeasance in placing an employee with known but untreated anger management issues that manifest in violent and hostile behaviors in a public-facing position. The record on summary judgment here would support a fact finder's reasonable conclusion that the MBTA's affirmative act—its own decision, through its public employees responsible for supervising the bus driver, to schedule the driver to operate the bus route in Lynn, [Mass.,] without training him to manage his anger—originally caused [plaintiff]'s harm.

The decision feels right as measured against the legislature's determination to distinguish truly third-party causes, that is, risks initiated outside the scope of state responsibility, from causes inextricably tied to state responsibility, such as a state employer's responsibility in direct negligence for its agent's misconduct. And I do think this concept of scope of responsibility, or common duty in the parlance of multiple liabilities, can be used to delineate a workable understanding of "not originally caused."

At the same time, I am not persuaded by the court's reasoning that 10(j) jurisprudence has yet drawn a line much more clear than "I know it when I see it."

The second case is Theisz v. MBTA (Mass. Mar. 14, 2025) (Justia). New Orleans-born Justice Dalila Argaez Wendlandt authored the unanimous opinion of four justices, affirming the Appeals Court.

'American Dream' is still achievable in hot-dog form

My Thanksgiving featured craft beer with some ace Polish law students.

Last week I had the privilege to teach American tort law to a class of Polish law students at Jagiellonian University in Kraków, for the American Law Program of the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic University of America, as I have for many years. Catholic and JU have a summer program in Poland for American law students, too. 

Thursday night I took the students to my favorite craft beer pub in Kraków, Multi Qlti Tap Bar. The beers always are top notch. I had a fruited gose, as well as a hazy IPA called "tank killer," or something like that that seemed appropriate to the times in central Europe.

Multi Qlti has good food, too, hot dogs and fries, with different preparations named after different places. For this Thanksgiving, I thought I'd share the description of the Massachusetts dog, subtitled "American Dream": "Cheese & Bacon Burger in the form of a dog? This is how we broaden our horizons: smoked frankfurter from the grill, crispy bacon, cheddar, honey, cucumber, lettuce, red onion, and BBQ and hamburger sauce."😋

Now that's a positive American food influence. Walking in Kraków, I saw the dark side of American food influence, too. A place called "Mr. Pancake" advertised the "American Pie-Cake." 🤢

Don't worry Poland; I'm sure appetite-suppressing injections are on their way next.

Images: "Massachusetts" from Restaurant Guru, translation by Google; "American Pie-Cake" by RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, no claim to underlying works.

Hospital's radiology contractor must answer negligence claim over patient death, per third-party doctrine

Saint Vincent Hospital, Worcester, Mass.
Terageorge~commonswiki via Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0

A hospital's radiology contractor may be on the hook for failure to provide emergency medical treatment to a patient who died, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled last week.

The decision offers a solid analysis of third-party beneficiary doctrine in tort law. Under the doctrine, a duty in common law tort can arise from a contract that benefits a third party. So if B and C contract for the protection of A, an injured A may sue C for for its failure under the contract, even though C had no contract with A and would not otherwise have owed any common law duty to A.

In the instant case, Saint Vincent Hospital (SVH) in Worcester, Massachusetts, had contracted with Saint Vincent Radiological Associates, Inc., (SVRA) for radiology services for SVH patients. The plaintiff-decedent was an SVH patient suffering from an acute gallbladder infection requiring an emergency procedure. SVH did not have staff to do the procedure and transferred the patient to another hospital. The patient died before the procedure could be completed. 

The plaintiff-representative discovered later that an SRVA physician on call for SVH was able to do the procedure. The representative sued SVH and SVRA. The representative settled with SVH, but the representative's negligence claim against SVRA was dismissed for want of duty.

The trial court erred, the Appeals Court decided. Ordinarily, an SVRA doctor might have owed no duty to an SVH patient, any more than any doctor who was a stranger to the patient. However, SVRA had contracted with SVH for the benefit of third parties, namely, patients, such as the decedent. The plaintiff therefore could pursue a negligence claim against SVRA, the Appeals Court agreed, remanding and reinstating the claim.

There remains a question of fact in the case, which might have confused the issue in the trial court, over whether the SVH-SVRA contract provided for SVRA doctors to do emergency procedures, if needed, more than mere radiology consultations. If the scope of the contract was so limited, then there is no basis in the contract for the duty to perform the procedure that could have saved the patient's life. The parties had settled contract claims in the case below, so the courts never had occasion to opine on the scope of the contract.

Another question that will have to be resolved on remand, if the case is tried, is whether the defendant was negligent, that is, breached the standard of care. Even breach of contractual obligation, if that were the case, is not negligence per se under the third-party beneficiary doctrine.

In working out its conclusion, the Appeals Court noted an important additional feature of the doctrine, which is that a contract can only support a duty familiar to common law, assuming there were a social-contractual link between A and C. If a contract imposes some exotic obligation, then the only remedy for breach arises between the contracting parties, B and C, in contract law. Here, though, this requirement is not an impediment. C is a doctor, and A is a patient. The duty relationship is easily recognizable once the contract bridges the social gap.

The case is Brown v. Saint Vincent Radiological Associates, Inc., No. 23-P-771 (Oct. 24, 2024). Justice Gregory I. Massing wrote the opinion of the unanimous panel, which also comprised Justices Shin and D'Angelo.

Hospitals may track patients online and sell their data without violating state wiretap law, high court rules

Mike MacKenzie (via Flickr) CC BY 2.0

State wiretap law does not prevent hospitals from tracking patients on the web and selling their data, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled last week.

The plaintiff is a patient at two hospitals in the Beth Israel Lahey Health network. As the court explained the facts, the plaintiff "reviewed information available to the public on the hospitals' websites regarding doctors (including their credentials and backgrounds) and medical symptoms, conditions, and procedures." Without her consent, the hospitals shared the plaintiff's browsing data with third parties to generate revenue from targeted advertising.

The plaintiff sued under state wiretap law and got some traction in the lower courts, where the theory has bubbled up in other cases, too. The high court ended the trend, though, ruling that the state wiretap law, which threatens criminal penalties such as imprisonment, while reaching interpersonal communications such as telephone calls and email and text exchanges, was not intended to reach persons' interactions with websites.

The 47-page majority opinion by Justice Scott L. Kafker, drew a vigorous and almost as lengthy dissent from Justice Dalila Argaez Wendlandt, who accused the hospitals of lying to patients in their pledges of confidentiality and argued that the alleged misconduct falls squarely within legislative intent in prohibiting the interception of electronic communication.

I won't belabor the back and forth, as ample commentary already has been published about the case (e.g., JD Supra, Commonwealth Beacon, Bloomberg, National Law Review, Law360 (subscription), Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly (subscription)), and there is plenty more to come. Rather, I will comment only that the decision reflects the sorry state of privacy law in the United States.

The majority and dissent both make defensible arguments. I come down with the dissent on the technical merits of what the wiretap law was designed to prevent, i.e. "the spirit of the law," regardless of whether the legislature could have foreseen web surveillance. At the same time, the majority is right that the legislature likely would not have wanted to imprison every actor engaging in the kind of web surveillance that has become pervasive in our online society.

The missing link between the two positions is the meaningful data protection law that the United States still doesn't have, and which Americans want and expect, while almost three decades have passed since the European Union Data Protection Directive. The later General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been in force for six years.

Wiretap law was once the stuff of political intrigue, à la Watergate. The Massachusetts statute characteristically dates to the 1960s. Just as the advent of the internet made media law again hotly relevant to society, so wiretap law found new life in the electronic era. Courts had little difficulty transposing the law of wired telephone surveillance to wireless cell phones and electronic communication media such as email and texts. Even the U.S. Supreme Court got in on the action.

That's why I think Wendlandt has the better argument on the technical merits, by the way. The majority's distinction of interaction with a person or a website, when there are persons receiving surveillance data from the website, seems meaninglessly formalistic.

With electronic communication burgeoning in the internet era and electronic interception easier to accomplish without the need for specialized hardware, wiretap laws have been repurposed to do more work than they were designed for, becoming a key tool in the personal privacy arsenal.

The problem in tort law, to oversimplify modestly, always has been what Professor Daniel Solove termed "the secrecy paradigm." The common law of privacy torts, which also emerged largely in the 1960s, was not designed to handle the nuances of an online world. Rather, tort law, like the Fourth Amendment right against search and seizure, focused on secrets kept. A person might resort to the law to protect an intimate secret shared with a spouse. But the person who discloses financial information to a bank has forfeit legal privacy. 

Intimate space is not the theory of privacy that animates data protection in Europe and most of the rest of the world. In the theory abroad, the human right of privacy flows forward with personal data as they are handed off from person to person and corporation to corporation. In the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provides a modicum of privacy protection in this vein, but the circumstances in which it pertains are extremely narrow—web activity is not protected health information, and a web host is not a healthcare provider—and it authorizes no private right of action for violation.

In the absence of a legal model of downstream privacy preservation in the United States—notwithstanding a perplexing emerging plethora of competing state laws, if usually limited to commercial contexts; Massachusetts has been working on joining the pack, but has not yet—wiretap law has been unexpectedly instrumental to protect personal privacy in a narrow class of cases, because wiretap law focuses on the misconduct of clandestine surveillance rather than on the purportedly private nature of the intercepted content.

To be fair to the Massachusetts majority, though, such use of anachronistic wiretap law takes us down a road of ever more speculative application as the electronic avatar increasingly becomes an embodiment of personal identity. Electronic tools such as Google Analytics watch our every word. And we don't necessarily want to stop that wholesale. The other day, I watched a dated TV movie that Amazon thought I would like, and it was right. Time travel, Ireland, and Jane Seymour? Drop everything.

Notwithstanding which side in the instant case has the better argument in statutory interpretation, the legal response to the problem presented, that is, surveillance of web usage for the relatively innocuous if mercantile purpose of advertising, would arise better from business regulation than from common law or statutory torts.

Alas, if I had the magic potion that would make our broken Congress favor consumer protection over corporate profits, I would be running for President.

The case is Vita v. New England Baptist Hospital, No. SJC-13542 (Mass. Oct. 24, 2024).