Chapter 93A is important in Massachusetts tort law because it is drawn much more broadly than the usual state consumer protection statute. In a Massachusetts tort case, chapter 93A often provides a parallel avenue for relief and can afford a plaintiff double or treble damages, as well as fee shifting. That makes it a powerful accountability tool in areas such as product liability, well beyond the usual consumer protection fare in trade practices.
The SJC, per Justice Cypher, published a sound primer on statutes of limitation and repose:
Statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are different kinds of limitations on actions. A statute of limitations specifies the time limit for commencing an action after the cause of action has accrued, but a statute of repose is an absolute limitation which prevents a cause of action from accruing after a certain period which begins to run upon occurrence of a specified event.... A statute of repose eliminates a cause of action at a specified time, regardless of whether an injury has occurred or a cause of action has accrued as of that date.... Statutes of limitations have been described as a "procedural defense" to a legal claim, whereas statutes of repose have been described as providing a "substantive right to be free from liability after a given period of time has elapsed from a defined event." Bain, Determining the Preemptive Effect of Federal Law on State Statutes of Repose, 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 119, 125 (2014). The statutes are independent of one another and they do not affect each other directly as they are triggered by entirely distinct events. [Citations omitted.]
Chapter 93A is covered by a four-year statute of limitations. A six-year statute of repose covers tort actions arising from deficiencies in improvements to real property: "after the earlier of the dates of: (1) the opening of the improvement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner."
In the instant case, the plaintiff sought relief for damage resulting from a fire 15 years ago. The plaintiff attributed the fire to multiple deficiencies in electrical work completed by defendant contractors. Arguing that the electrical work was not done in compliance with the state code, the plaintiff characterized 93A as "neither wholly tortious nor wholly contractual in nature." The court, however, found the plaintiff's claim "indistinguishable from a claim of negligence," so barred by the statute.
Three justices dissented. Chief Justice Gants in dissent pointed out that the general statute of repose does not mention chapter 93A, while the general limitations provision does. And yet another statute, stating terms of both limitation and repose, purports to govern both contract and tort malpractice actions against doctors. So the legislature knew how to write what it meant. The general statute of repose, the chief observed, predated chapter 93A, so could not have anticipated it. Moreover, statutes of limitation and repose have distinct policy objectives:
In short, as is alleged in this case, the property owner may be barred by the statute of repose from bringing a claim before he or she knows, or reasonably should know, that he or she even has a claim -- even where the defendant has fraudulently concealed the claim from the plaintiff. Consequently, a statute of repose reflects a legislative decision that it is more important to protect certain defendants from old claims than it is to protect the right of plaintiffs to enforce otherwise valid and timely claims.
Thus a statute of repose should not be construed to cover 93A absent plain legislative direction. The chief concluded: "[T]his is a usurpation of a distinctly legislative prerogative."
The case is Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Construction, Inc., No. SJC-12352 (Mass. Aug. 29, 2018) (PDF opinion; oral argument via Suffolk Law School).