Appeal in slip'n'fall points to deeper mysteries of historical 'open and obvious' danger doctrine

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Rejecting the phrase "open and obvious" as magical incantation, the Massachusetts Appeals Court Friday affirmed a slip-and-fall jury award for an apartment dweller against her landlord.

The plaintiff injured her ankle when she left her apartment because, she alleged and the jury agreed, the landlord had removed a platform that usually stood outside the door, thus increasing the height of the step.

The defendant argued that the absence of the platform was an "open and obvious" condition, thus negating the duty a landlord usually owes to a renter. Maybe so, the court opined, but the proposition only raises a question of fact appropriate for resolution by the jury. And the jury here decided that the defendant should have foreseen the plaintiff's unawareness of the platform's absence.

"Open and obvious" is a term oft used in the law in different contexts, with seemingly magical effect, so it's important to specify first that the term arises here in the context of landowner negligence. Its use even in this vein is historically and persistently ambiguous.

The ambiguity arises in part from the fact that "landowner negligence" is often described in terms of the duty that a landowner owes to one who comes onto the land. But functionally, the rules of landowner negligence operate as rules of breach of the standard of conduct, or defendant's "negligence." The distinction is theoretical and often functionally insignificant. But it can be procedurally important, because the existence of a duty is—not exclusively, but let's gloss that over—a question of law for the court to decide, while breach presents a question of fact for the jury to decide.

The rules that American common law has evolved for landowner negligence sensibly require some degree of plaintiff's unawareness of the danger. Depending on the plaintiff-defendant relationship, the plaintiff's unawareness might be tested according to the defendant's reasonable anticipation, the plaintiff's reasonable anticipation, or the plaintiff's subjective knowledge. Whatever the test, bearing the burden of proof, the plaintiff alleges that unawareness. The defendant may declare in response that the danger was "open and obvious," thus making clear that the plaintiff's allegation cannot be believed.

What has not been clear in common law, historically, is the procedural impact of the declaration. Was the "open and obvious" declaration an affirmative defense, for which the burden of proof shifted to the defendant, or merely a refutation of the plaintiff's proof of unawareness? Was the "open and obvious" declaration equivalent to a "no duty" argument that the court must resolve expeditiously as a matter of law, or is the declaration a factual description that must be placed in the hands of the jury? Courts answered these questions variably, creating confusion.

In helping law students to understand the contemporary import of "open and obvious" in the multistate norms of American common law landowner negligence, my preference is to impress upon them that the term usually is not, or ought not be, a magical incantation. It's alliteration is alluring but deceptive. In contemporary doctrine, the declaration of "open and obvious" should be understood merely as a defense allegation of fact, and a refutation of the plaintiff's proof. The burden of proof does not shift, though it must be acknowledged that a credible declaration might obviate the need for a jury trial.

If the danger indeed is so open and obvious that ordinary minds could not differ on the question of plaintiff's unawareness, then the usual operation of civil procedure allows the court to decide the question of fact as a matter of law, in which case the court may do so pretrial and under the banner of duty or breach. If the answer is not so obvious as the defendant contends, then a motion to dismiss as a matter of law is properly denied, and the question is advanced to the jury as one of fact.

That's the approach that seems to have evolved in Massachusetts, though the appellate court has not always been clear about the mechanisms under the hood. In the instant case, the court wrote that the "open and obvious" declaration presented a question of fact that was properly referred to the jury for resolution. The court also described the "open and obvious" allegation as seeking to negate the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. That's not wrong, but it might be confusing, because the jury usually is charged with examining elements of breach, not duty. 

In an earlier case, Ward v. Schnurr (Mass. App. Ct. 2023) (The Savory Tort (Sept. 28, 2023)), the court affirmed dismissal of a negligence claim in favor of a landowner in part upon the defendant's allegation of "open and obvious," also referencing the duty owed, but without a jury ever having been impaneled. In that case, the plaintiff had been hired by the defendant specially to remediate the dangerous condition, so the plaintiff's assertion that it was unaware of the danger ran into trouble on the sniff test. The "open and obvious" allegation was therefore properly decided as a matter of law, even though it was a question of fact. The court did not, however, go out of its way to make that clear. 

In neither case did the court indicate that any burden shifting had occurred. I don't think it did. But there again, it would have been helpful if the court had said that.

Doctrinal confusion over "open and obvious" thus persists, in Massachusetts and elsewhere. It only makes matters worse that what I describe here as my understanding of Massachusetts law, as well as what I sell to students as multistate norms, is not the law everywhere in all circumstances. 

There is a deeper theoretical truth at work here, almost a philosophical question, one that I encourage first-year students in Torts to embrace and play with before the remainder of the "hands-on," widget-making law school curriculum beats out of them any appreciation for law as a worthwhile intellectual pursuit. The truth is that duty and breach are not really distinct things, rather, are more like two sides of the same coin. Thus, the tort scholar William Prosser once said, "Circumlocution is inevitable."

For now, to quote the scholar of popular culture Trevor Noah, "ain't nobody got time for that."

What I'd like to know more about, meanwhile, are the family dynamics behind the instant case. The defendant landowner was, the court revealed, the plaintiff renter's mom. I hope the case was motivated by access to insurance and not bad blood, though neither scenario speaks well of American civil dispute resolution.

The case is Varley v. Walther, No. 24-P-511 (Mass. App. Ct. May 16, 2025). Justice Gregory I. Massing wrote the opinion of the unanimous panel that also comprised Justices Hershfang and Tan.

Tree falling on house invites court to parse 'discretion' in ruling city vulnerable to tort liability

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A straightforward case in the Massachusetts Appeals Court last week helps to clarify the meaning and purpose of discretionary function immunity from tort liability for both state and federal governments.

A tree fell on the plaintiff's house. The tree was on city property and under the care of the tree warden, yes that's a thing, of the city of Chicopee, Massachusetts. The plaintiff alleged that the warden, and thereby the city, was negligent for failing to remove the tree or otherwise abate the threat to property. The plaintiff proffered evidence to show that the city had reason to know the tree was not healthy.

Discretionary function immunity, provided for by both the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), draws a fine line between ordinary accidents which the legislatures sought to compel the governments to answer for in the courts, and matters of policy. 

The plaintiff-pedestrian struck by a car driven by a government worker may sue. But the voter disgruntled over climate policy should seek a remedy at the ballot box, not in the courts. In this way, discretionary function immunity polices the very boundary between distributive justice and corrective justice, that is, the provinces of the political branches and of the judiciary, respectively.

The courts under both statutes have developed similar two-part tests. A federal court must ask, first, whether the government action involved an element of choice, or judgment, and second, critically, whether that judgment implicates public policy, that is, social, economic, or political considerations. The Massachusetts courts, under MTCA section 10(b), make the same inquiry with slightly different language, asking whether the government action involved "policy making or planning."

A perennial problem with discretionary function immunity is the name of the thing. It sounds like the exercise of discretion should trigger the immunity. But that's an oversimplification. It's really about the exercise of policy discretion. The government driver who runs a red light might be said to have exercised discretion when she put her foot on the gas. But it's unlikely that that exercise implicated public policy. Now had government officials decided not to install a traffic light at that intersection at all, having weighed the costs and benefits of injury and infrastructure, that would be a policy choice, immune from challenge in tort law.

The meaning of "discretionary" was precisely the hang up in the present case. Complicating matters, a Chicopee city ordinance expressly dedicated tree removal to "[t]he discretion and sound judgment of the Tree Warden alone" (my emphasis). The Appeals Court correctly reasoned that the discretion of the ordinance was the broader sort; the MTCA refers specifically to a "subset" of discretion involving "policy making or planning." In other words, the tree warden was driving the car, not planning the traffic lights.

The case is Citation Insurance Co. v. Chicopee, No. 24-P-309 (Apr. 9, 2025) (Justia). Justice John C. Englander wrote the unanimous opinion of the panel, which also comprised Justices Henry and Desmond.

In negligence claims over child welfare, bus fight, Mass. high court opines on qualified, sovereign immunity

Two immunity cases ended with different outcomes for public officials in the Massachusetts high court on two successive Fridays, and the cases illustrate different theories of immunity.

In a case decided on March 21, social workers with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF) asserted qualified immunity in the death and severe injury of two children, each about two years old. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) considered the immunity analysis but decided ultimately that, immunity notwithstanding, the workers had not legally caused the harm the children suffered.

In a case decided March 14, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) asserted sovereign immunity in the serious injury of a passenger who was beaten by a bus driver with known anger management issues. The SJC decided that the state agency was not entitled to sovereign immunity as codified by a provision protecting the state from liability for the acts of third parties.

Mass. DCF Worcester West Area Office
From Mass. DCF, purported © 2025
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, asserted fair use.

Qualified Immunity 

However much the state defendants prevailed in the first case, the court's recitation of the facts reveals a deeply disturbing record of irresponsibility on the part of DCF. A woman with four foster children was correctly suspected of having a live-in boyfriend with a record of an open armed robbery charge, three assault and battery charges, and multiple restraining orders. That would be prohibitive of foster placements were the facts confirmed, so DCF planned to monitor the home closely. For unknown reasons, officials dropped the ball, and inspections were too few and too infrequent.

The horrifying 2015 accident that took the life of one child and severely injured another occurred overnight when one of the children reached for "and adjusted the thermostat on an electric heater, which was on the wall above the crib, causing the children's room to overheat," the court wrote. Another child in the room died, and the child who manipulated the thermostat "was found to be in critical condition, suffering from respiratory failure, seizures, hyperthermia (a high temperature), and hypotension (low blood pressure)." The foster parent called 911, and the critically injured child was taken to the hospital. She survived but remains impaired, and her representatives were the plaintiffs in the instant case.

In a civil rights action under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, DCF officials claimed qualified immunity. The court coherently explained how the doctrine works generally and in this context:

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims for damages if "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known...." Littles v. Commissioner of Correction [Mass. 2005]. The determination of qualified immunity follows a two-part test:

"The first prong asks whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; the second prong asks whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged violation. [T]he second step, in turn, has two aspects. One aspect of the analysis focuses on the clarity of the law .... The other aspect focuses more concretely on the facts of the particular case and whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights" .... Penate v. Sullivan ... (1st Cir. 2023)....

Under the first prong, "'substantive due process' prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the conscience'" .... United States v. Salerno [U.S. 1987]. In the foster care context, courts apply one of two standards to determine whether government conduct is conscience-shocking. The first ... is the "deliberate indifference" standard.... Under this standard, a plaintiff must show that a government actor "exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty." ....

Alternatively, under the second standard, ... a plaintiff must show that a State actor's professional decision constitutes such a "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards" that the decision was not actually based on such judgment.

The court did not resolve the difference between the two standards, however, because the case was resolved on a different basis. Notwithstanding qualified immunity, a plaintiff in a civil rights case, just like in a state tort case, must prove proximate, or legal causation, and the plaintiffs here could not.

DCF misconduct might have been a scientific cause of the accident. However, the reason DCF was investigating the foster care home was the suspected presence of man, a co-caretaker, with a problematic criminal record. Scientific causation might be proved if the plaintiff could prove that proper DCF investigation would have resulted in the removal of the man from the home. But that flub did not legally cause the accident, the court opined, because the accessibility of the thermostat to the crib and the child's consequent tampering with it had nothing to do with the presence of the man in the home.

The conclusion is sound, though it leaves one to wonder whether there yet has been any reckoning at DCF, or among public officials and legislators if under-resourcing is to blame.

It would not have made any difference here, but, collaterally, it's worth noting that the very existence of qualified immunity as a defense to civil rights actions has been an issue in play in recent years. I explained in 2 Tortz: A Study of American Tort Law (Lulu 2024 rev. ed.):

Of unlikely constitutional compulsion, qualified immunity has come into question in recent years, especially amid high-profile incidents of police violence. Some states and localities have adopted statutes and ordinances limiting or eliminating qualified immunity for police. At the federal level, U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Sonia Sotomayor both have criticized qualified immunity. Justice Thomas criticized qualified immunity as unsupported by the text of the Constitution or statute, and Justice Sotomayor criticized the doctrine for failing to punish official misconduct. See N.S. v. Kansas City (U.S. 2023) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Hoggard v. Rhodes (U.S. 2021) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari); James v. Bartelt (U.S. 2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Baxter v. Bracey (U.S. 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Nevertheless, thus far, the Court has upheld the doctrine. Since the murder of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis in 2020, U.S. Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-Mass.) and U.S. Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) have persistently but unsuccessfully championed bills to abolish qualified immunity in § 1983 actions.

The first case is Gotay v. Creen (Mass. Mar. 21, 2025) (FindLaw). Justice Serge Georges, Jr. authored the unanimous opinion of six justices.

MBTA bus
Mass. Office of Travel & Tourism via Flickr CC BY-ND 2.0

Sovereign Immunity

A different theory of immunity, state sovereign immunity, animated the case decided a week earlier.

At issue in this second case was the puzzling and unique section 10(j) of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), which attracts more than its fair share of MTCA appellate litigation in the commonwealth. The case arose from an assault on a passenger by an MBTA bus driver with anger management issues.

Relying on facts as favorable to the plaintiff, the court retold the story of the part-time driver who "sometimes engaged in unsafe driving and, on occasion, interacted with the public and his supervisors in a hostile or insubordinate manner," yet after three years was promoted to full time. The court recounted subsequent altercations with a passenger described as "unruly" and then with a police officer in a disagreement over road obstruction.

The instant case arose when a passenger pursued the bus, rapping on doors, trying to get information about routes. Further recounting the plaintiff's facts, the court wrote:

Lost, cold, and frustrated at the prospect of being stranded, [plaintiff] first questioned why the bus driver had not stopped sooner. The driver responded by yelling at [plaintiff] and leaving his driver's seat to confront [plaintiff] at the door. The driver kicked snow from the bottom of the bus at [plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] uttered a profanity. This further triggered the bus driver's anger; as the driver subsequently described it, he just "lost it." Enraged, the driver lunged at [plaintiff], escalating the encounter. For his part, [plaintiff] retreated, but the driver gave chase. When the driver caught up, the driver commenced punching and kicking [plaintiff]. The beating was so severe that [plaintiff] suffered a traumatic brain injury that has left him "permanently and totally disabled from his usual employment."

The plaintiff sued the MBTA for negligence in hiring, promotion, retention, and supervision. The defendant asserted sovereign immunity as codified in the MTCA.

MTCA section 10(j) is Massachusetts's effort to find the fine line between a tort claim that properly blames public officials for tortious misbehavior and a failure-to-protect claim, when public officials are not responsible for the actions of private third parties. Finding this line is a well known problem in tort claims, federal and state. The Massachusetts test has its own peculiar language, which, the abundance of case law suggests, is not necessarily clarifying. The court here quoted its own earlier assessment that the provision "presents an interpretive quagmire."

Section 10(j) holds public officials immune from "any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer."

The test is especially hairy in cases such as this one, when the alleged negligence is on the part of the state as employer, thus one step removed from the misconduct of a state employee. When does negligence on the part of the state employer constitute the "affirmative act" required to circumnavigate 10(j)?

Here, the court decided:

The claims at issue here are based on the MBTA's own failure to exercise reasonable care in its supervision of the bus driver; as we have explained, "where the supervisory officials allegedly had, or should have had, knowledge of a public employee's assaultive behavior, it is the supervisors' conduct, rather than the employee's intentional conduct, that is the true focus of the case." Dobos v. Driscoll ... [Mass. 1989] (affirming judgment against Commonwealth for negligent supervision and training of officer who assaulted civilian)[; s]ee Doe v. Blandford ... [Mass. 1988] (MTCA permitted claims regarding public employer's negligent conduct in hiring, retaining, and supervising guidance counselor who assaulted student independent of alleged vicarious liability for intentional tort of public employee)....

In sum, [section] 10 (j) does not provide immunity to a public employer for its misfeasance in placing an employee with known but untreated anger management issues that manifest in violent and hostile behaviors in a public-facing position. The record on summary judgment here would support a fact finder's reasonable conclusion that the MBTA's affirmative act—its own decision, through its public employees responsible for supervising the bus driver, to schedule the driver to operate the bus route in Lynn, [Mass.,] without training him to manage his anger—originally caused [plaintiff]'s harm.

The decision feels right as measured against the legislature's determination to distinguish truly third-party causes, that is, risks initiated outside the scope of state responsibility, from causes inextricably tied to state responsibility, such as a state employer's responsibility in direct negligence for its agent's misconduct. And I do think this concept of scope of responsibility, or common duty in the parlance of multiple liabilities, can be used to delineate a workable understanding of "not originally caused."

At the same time, I am not persuaded by the court's reasoning that 10(j) jurisprudence has yet drawn a line much more clear than "I know it when I see it."

The second case is Theisz v. MBTA (Mass. Mar. 14, 2025) (Justia). New Orleans-born Justice Dalila Argaez Wendlandt authored the unanimous opinion of four justices, affirming the Appeals Court.

Suits over DCA disaster will struggle to overcome discretionary function exception to sovereign immunity

View on my approach to DCA on a 2020 Southwest flight.
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

Media coverage of the air disaster at Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) is moving on to prospective litigation, and abundant news outlets are warning aptly that the road to compensation for victims' families will not be smooth.

Potential defendants include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which employs air traffic controllers; the U.S. military, which owned and crewed the Black Hawk helicopter in the crash, and American Airlines, which bears responsibility for the regional jet in the crash.

As the facts have shaken out thus far, with black-box content yet to be reported at the time of this writing, it's hard to see any fault on the part of American Airlines or its commercial operator. The plane had banked to change runways per traffic control instructions and was on a lesser used but still ordinary approach when it collided with the Black Hawk. There's likely nothing the pilots could have done to avoid the collision, if they even saw it coming.

Responsibility on the part of air traffic control has focused on the fact that one controller was managing both helicopter and plane traffic, while sometimes there are two. Thus far, though, one- or two-person staffing of the two traffic streams seems to be a choice of practice, based on the volume of traffic, rather than a violation of any rule.

Early armchair analysis points to responsibility on the part of the military. The helicopter seems to have been above 300 feet, for reasons unknown, when it was required to be at or below 200 feet. The pilot said he saw the plane and would avoid it, though it's not clear he saw the right plane. 

My cousin is a military pilot and has flown in this dense D.C. thicket, inset from SkyVector (DCA). He told me that avoiding flight paths entirely would be prohibitive, but that following the 200' rule should have averted collision even if the pilot mistook the approach of the plane.

With government defendants in the sights of plaintiff lawyers, frantic analysis is no doubt underway in an attempt to circumnavigate federal sovereign immunity.  Within the statutory framework of sovereign immunity, the concept of "discretionary function immunity" looms large in this case. Some time back, I recorded a video for SCOTUSbrief about a case in which discretionary function immunity figured, if collateral to a problem of a federal agency that doesn't have it. Here, the defendants do.

The instant case, such as it is as yet, is reminiscent of United States v. Varig Airlines (U.S. 1984), in which, in 1973, a fire on board a trans-Atlantic Boeing 707 flight killed 123. The plaintiffs blamed in part the FAA, alleging negligence in the issuance of a safety certificate.  The Supreme Court held unanimously that the FAA was shielded by discretionary function immunity.

The purpose of discretionary function immunity—which is really an exception to waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act—is to preclude the courts from second-guessing policy determinations by the political branches of government. The government is willing to concede liability when it negligently deviates from obligatory practices, the logic goes, but claimants ought not be able to challenge policy choices just because they turned out to be bad ones, that is, resulted in injury.

The DCA crash reminded me of an excellent article from seven years ago on sovereign immunity and discretionary function, discussing Varig, in Advocate magazine, by L.A. attorney Steven B. Stevens. He parsed the doctrine.

If the use of only one air traffic controller is indeed customary and not contrary to any rule, then probably that's a staffing decision shielded against liability as discretionary function. The military might be vulnerable, though, on the issue of the Black Hawk's altitude. The 200' limit is an FAA rule for the Potomac-DCA corridor, CNN reported, and my cousin confirmed.

Even upon circumvention of immunity, plaintiffs will have to prove the usual negligence elements of unreasonable carelessness and causation with the crash. Black-box data will help, and plaintiffs might as well avail of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. "RIL" can afford plaintiffs a favorable inference when evidence, such as the pilot's motive, is unascertainable, and plane crashes, historically, have been fertile ground for invocation of the rule.

All that said, litigation against the government might never reach an immunity determination. Reuters reported on the history of limited government settlements in such cases.

As a frequent traveler to DCA, I hope that the airport can be made safer while preserving convenient access to the capital.

Hospital's radiology contractor must answer negligence claim over patient death, per third-party doctrine

Saint Vincent Hospital, Worcester, Mass.
Terageorge~commonswiki via Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0

A hospital's radiology contractor may be on the hook for failure to provide emergency medical treatment to a patient who died, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled last week.

The decision offers a solid analysis of third-party beneficiary doctrine in tort law. Under the doctrine, a duty in common law tort can arise from a contract that benefits a third party. So if B and C contract for the protection of A, an injured A may sue C for for its failure under the contract, even though C had no contract with A and would not otherwise have owed any common law duty to A.

In the instant case, Saint Vincent Hospital (SVH) in Worcester, Massachusetts, had contracted with Saint Vincent Radiological Associates, Inc., (SVRA) for radiology services for SVH patients. The plaintiff-decedent was an SVH patient suffering from an acute gallbladder infection requiring an emergency procedure. SVH did not have staff to do the procedure and transferred the patient to another hospital. The patient died before the procedure could be completed. 

The plaintiff-representative discovered later that an SRVA physician on call for SVH was able to do the procedure. The representative sued SVH and SVRA. The representative settled with SVH, but the representative's negligence claim against SVRA was dismissed for want of duty.

The trial court erred, the Appeals Court decided. Ordinarily, an SVRA doctor might have owed no duty to an SVH patient, any more than any doctor who was a stranger to the patient. However, SVRA had contracted with SVH for the benefit of third parties, namely, patients, such as the decedent. The plaintiff therefore could pursue a negligence claim against SVRA, the Appeals Court agreed, remanding and reinstating the claim.

There remains a question of fact in the case, which might have confused the issue in the trial court, over whether the SVH-SVRA contract provided for SVRA doctors to do emergency procedures, if needed, more than mere radiology consultations. If the scope of the contract was so limited, then there is no basis in the contract for the duty to perform the procedure that could have saved the patient's life. The parties had settled contract claims in the case below, so the courts never had occasion to opine on the scope of the contract.

Another question that will have to be resolved on remand, if the case is tried, is whether the defendant was negligent, that is, breached the standard of care. Even breach of contractual obligation, if that were the case, is not negligence per se under the third-party beneficiary doctrine.

In working out its conclusion, the Appeals Court noted an important additional feature of the doctrine, which is that a contract can only support a duty familiar to common law, assuming there were a social-contractual link between A and C. If a contract imposes some exotic obligation, then the only remedy for breach arises between the contracting parties, B and C, in contract law. Here, though, this requirement is not an impediment. C is a doctor, and A is a patient. The duty relationship is easily recognizable once the contract bridges the social gap.

The case is Brown v. Saint Vincent Radiological Associates, Inc., No. 23-P-771 (Oct. 24, 2024). Justice Gregory I. Massing wrote the opinion of the unanimous panel, which also comprised Justices Shin and D'Angelo.

Spoliation risk shows ill wisdom of state awarding contract to defendant in lawsuit over same project

The eastbound span of the Washington Bridge remains functional.
Jef Nickerson via Flickr CC BY-SA 2.0

The state of Rhode Island has found itself in an awkward spot trying to prevent the spoliation of evidence in civil litigation.

In my recent screed against, inter alia, corruption in contracting, I mentioned that Rhode Island had awarded the nearly $50 million contract for a major bridge demolition to a company that also is among the 13 defendants Rhode Island has sued for failing to diagnose the defective bridge in the first place.

I suggested, and maintain, that the state's simultaneously friendly and adversarial relationship with Aetna Bridge Co. is symptomatic of problematically cozy ties between government and contractors. These relationships cost taxpayers in Rhode Island and elsewhere tens of millions of dollars in overpriced projects, I believe, effecting a form of what I call "lawful corruption."

In a schadenfreude-inducing twist in the case, demolition of the I-195 Washington Bridge in Providence was halted this week for fear that evidence in the state's civil suit would be lost. "[R.I. Attorney General (AG) Peter] Neronha told WPRO radio he had spent two days working to safeguard bridge evidence from the wrecking ball and jackhammer," The Providence Journal reported Tuesday (subscription).

Spoliation of evidence occurs in a civil action or potential civil action when (1) an actor has a legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence relative to the civil action; (2) the spoliation defendant negligently or intentionally fails to preserve evidence in accordance with the duty; (3) absence of the evidence significantly impairs the complaining party's ability to prove the civil action; and (4) the complaining party accordingly suffers damages for inability to prove the civil action (1 Tortz 335 (2024 ed.)). Though a wrongful act, most states, including Rhode Island to date, regard spoliation as a doctrine of evidence, subject to procedural remediation within the four corners of a case, rather than a separate liability theory in tort law.

The instant case puts Aetna Bridge Co. and its partners in the bizarre position of being contractually bound to destroy parts of the Washington Bridge and to dispose of the debris in accordance with state law, while also being vulnerable to state accusations of spoliation if contract performance results in the destruction of evidence. The contradiction is yet more reason that the contract award was improper.

I'm doubtful that the state on its own even realized the problem. It was Wednesday last week that the Journal asked the AG's office whether parts of the bridge would remain available as evidence in the litigation. An AG spokesman had no "comment on ongoing litigation" on Thursday, and demolition stopped abruptly this week on Tuesday, after what Neronha described as "two days" of efforts.

Free torts textbook ready for academic year 2024-25

TORTZ: A Study of American Tort Law is complete and revised for the coming academic year 2024-25.

The two-volume textbook is posted for free download from SSRN (vol. 1, vol. 2), and available in hardcopy from Lulu.com at cost, about $30 per volume plus shipping.

• SSRN volume 1
• SSRN volume 2
• Lulu.com hardcopies

This final iteration of the book now, for the first time, includes its final three chapters: (16) interference and business torts, (17) government liability and civil rights, and (18) tort alternatives.

---

TORTZ TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

A. Welcome
B. The Fundamental Problem
C. Parameters
D. Etymology and Vocabulary
E. “The Pound Progression”
F. Alternatives
G. Review

Chapter 2: Intentional Torts

A. Introduction
B. Assault

1. History
2. The Restatement of Torts
3. Subjective and Objective Testing
4. Modern Rule
5. Transferred Intent
6. Statutory Torts and Harassment

C. Battery

1. Modern Rule
2. The Eggshell Plaintiff
3. Knowledge of a Substantially Certain Result
4. Common Law Evolution and Battered Woman Syndrome

D. False Imprisonment

1. Modern Rule
2. Problems

E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

1. Dynamic Intent
2. Modern Rule
3. The “Heart Balm” Torts

F. Fraud

1. Fraud in Context
2. Modern Rule
3. Pleading Fraud
4. Exercise

G. The “Process” Torts

1. Innate Imprecision
2. Modern Rule
3. Majority Rejection of Malicious Civil Prosecution

H. “Prima Facie Tort”

1. Origin of Intentional Tort
2. Modern Rule

Chapter 3: Defenses to Intentional Torts 

A. Introduction
B. Defenses of Self, Other, and Property
C. The Spring Gun Case
D. Arrest Privilege and Merchant’s Privilege
E. Consent

1. Modern Rule
2. Scope of Consent
3. Medical Malpractice
4. Limits of Consent

F. Consent in Sport, or Recklessness

1. The Problem of Sport
2. Recklessness

Chapter 4: Negligence

A. Introduction
B. Modern Rule
C. Paradigmatic Cases
D. Historical and Theoretical Approaches to Negligence

1. Origin
2. Foreseeability
3. Custom
4. Augmented Standards
5. Economics

a. Introduction
b. “The Hand Formula”
c. Coase Theorem, Normativity, and Transaction Costs

6. Aristotelian Justice
7. Insurance and Loss-Spreading

E. Landowner Negligence, or Premises Liability

1. Theory of Duty and Standards of Breach
2. Common Law Tripartite Approach
3. Variations from the Unitary Approach in the Third Restatement
4. Applying the Framework, and Who Decides

F. Responsibility for Third-Party Conduct

1. Attenuated Causation, or “the Frances T.  Problem”: Negligence Liability in Creating Opportunity for a Criminal or Tortious Actor
2. Vicarious Liability and Attenuated Causation in the Employment Context: Respondeat Superior and “Direct” Negligence Theories

G. Statutory Torts and Negligence Per Se

1. Statutory Torts
2. Negligence Per Se

a. Introduction
b. Threshold Test
c. Three Mile Island

H. Medical Negligence
I. Spoliation of Evidence

1. Introduction
2. Minority Rule
3. Recognition or Non-Recognition of the Tort Approach
4. Majority Approach

J. Beyond Negligence

Chapter 5: Defenses to Negligence

A. Express Assumption of Risk (EAOR)
B. EAOR in Medical Negligence, and the Informed Consent Tort

1. Development of the Doctrine
2. The “Reasonable Patient” Standard
3. Modern Rule of Informed Consent
4. Causation in Informed Consent
5. Experimental Medicine

C. “Implied Assumption of Risk” (IAOR)

1. Everyday Life
2. Twentieth-Century Rule
3. Play and Sport
4. Work

D. Contributory Negligence

1. Twentieth-Century Rule
2. Complete Defense
3. Vitiation by “Last Clear Chance”

E. Comparative Fault
F. IAOR in the Age of Comparative Fault

1. The Demise of “IAOR”
2. Whither “Secondary Reasonable IAOR”?
3. Revisiting Mrs. Pursley at Gulfway General Hospital

G. Statutes of Limitations
H. Imputation of Negligence

Chapter 6: Subjective Standards

A. Introduction
B. Gender

1. The Reasonable Family
2. When Gender Matters

C. Youth

1. When Youth Matters
2. Attractive Nuisance
3. When Youth Doesn’t Matter

D. Mental Limitations

1. General Approach
2. Disputed Policy

Chapter 7: Strict Liability

A. Categorical Approach
B. Non-Natural Use of Land
C. Abnormally Dangerous Activities

1. Defining the Class
2. Modern Industry

D. Product Liability

1. Adoption of Strict Liability
2. Modern Norms
3. “Big Tobacco”
4. Frontiers of Product Liability

Chapter 8: Necessity

A. The Malleable Concept of Necessity
B. Necessity in Tort Law
C. Making Sense of Vincent
D. Necessity, the Liability Theory

Chapter 9: Damages

A. Introduction
B. Vocabulary of Damages
C. Theory of Damages
D. Calculation of Damages
E. Valuation of Intangibles
F. Remittitur
G. Wrongful Death and Survival Claims

1. Historical Common Law
2. Modern Statutory Framework

a. Lord Campbell’s Act and Wrongful Death
b. Survival of Action After Death of a Party

3. Problems of Application

H. “Wrongful Birth” and “Wrongful Life”
I. Punitive Damages

1. Introduction
2. Modern Rule
3. Pinpointing the Standard

J. Rethinking Death Compensation

Volume 2

Chapter 10: Res Ipsa Loquitur

A. Basic Rules of Proof
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur (RIL)

1. Modern Rule
2. Paradigmatic Fact Patterns

Chapter 11: Multiple Liabilities

A. Introduction
B. Alternative Liability
C. Joint and Ancillary Liability
D. Market-Share Liability Theory
E. Indemnification, Contribution, and Apportionment

1. Active-Passive Indemnity
2. Contribution and Apportionment
3. Apportionment and the Effect of Settlement

F. Rules and Evolving Models in Liability and Enforcement
G. Review and Application of Models

Chapter 12: Attenuated Duty and Causation

A. Introduction
B. Negligence Per Se Redux

1. The Problem in Duty
2. The Problem in Causation
3. The Problem in Public Policy

C. Duty Relationships and Causation Timelines

1. Introduction
2. Frances T. Redux, or Intervening Criminal Acts
3. Mental Illness and Tarasoff Liability
4. Dram Shop and Social Host Liability
5. Rescue Doctrine and “the Fire Fighter Rule”

a. Inverse Rules of Duty
b. Application and Limits

6. Palsgraf: The Orbit and the Stream

a. The Classic Case
b. A Deeper Dig

D. Principles of Duty and Causation

1. Duty
2. Causation

a. The Story of Causation
b. Proximate Cause in the Second Restatement
c. Scope of Liability in the Third Restatement
d. Proximate Cause in the Third Restatement, and Holdover Rules
e. A Study of Transition: Doull v. Foster

E. The Outer Bounds of Tort Law

1. Balancing the Fundamental Elements
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED)

a. Rule of No Liability
b. Bystanders and Borderline NIED

3. Economic Loss Rule

a. The Injury Requirement
b. Outer Limits of Tort Law
c. Loss in Product Liability and the Single Integrated Product Rule

Chapter 13: Affirmative Duty

A. Social Policy
B. The American Rule
C. Comparative Perspectives
D. Bystander Effect, or “Kitty Genovese Syndrome”

Chapter 14: Nuisance and Property Torts

A. Trespass and Conversion
B. Private Nuisance
C. Public Nuisance and the Distinction Between Private and Public
D. “Super Tort”

Chapter 15: Communication and Media Torts

A. Origin of “Media Torts”
B. Defamation

1. Framework and Rules
2. Defamation of Private Figures

a. Defamation Proof
b. Defamation Defense

3. Anti-SLAPP Defense
4. Section 230 Defense
5. Constitutional Defamation

a. Sea Change: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
b. Extending Sullivan
c. Reconsidering Sullivan

C. Invasion of Privacy

1. Framework and Rules

a. Disclosure
b. Intrusion
c. False Light
d. Right of Publicity
e. Data Protection

2. Constitutional Privacy and False Light
3. Demonstrative Cases

a. Disclosure and Intrusion
b. Right of Publicity
c. Bollea v. Gawker Media

4. Data Protection, Common Law, and Evolving Recognition of Dignitary Harms

Chapter 16: Interference and Business Torts

A. Business Torts in General

1. Tort Taxonomy
2. The Broad Landscape
3. Civil RICO

B. Wrongful Termination
C. Tortious Interference

Chapter 17: Government Liability and Civil Rights

A. Sovereign Immunity

1. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
2. Text and History of the FTCA
3. Discretionary Function Immunity

B. Civil Rights

1. “Constitutional Tort”
2. Core Framework
3. Official Immunities
4. Climate Change

C. Qui Tam
D. Human Rights

1. Alien Tort Statute
2. Anti-Terrorism Laws

Chapter 18: Tort Alternatives

A. Worker Compensation

1. Introduction and History
2. Elements and Causation
3. Efficacy and Reform

B. Ad Hoc Compensation Funds

Criminal verdict in Mich. school shooting suggests parent vulnerability to civil negligence claims

2018 National School Walkout
Public domain via Rawpixel

The criminal conviction of gun-owning parent Jennifer Crumbley yesterday in the 2021 school shooting in Oxford, Mich., (e.g., USA Today via Courier Journal) got me thinking about parents' exposure to civil liability.

There's no question that parents of a minor-age school shooter can be held liable indirectly for injuries and deaths upon a theory such as negligent storage or entrustment of a firearm. There have been many civil lawsuits arising from school shootings upon analogous negligence theories leveled against school officials, police, gun sellers, and gun manufacturers.

What I do not know is whether there ever has been a civil verdict against a parent. A civil liability theory follows naturally upon a criminal conviction. But criminal prosecution of parents in these cases has been exceedingly rare, Crumbley's being the first such conviction.

Without the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard having been proved already in a criminal case, the civil negligence case presents daunting hurdles in duty and proximate causation. It's never easy to hold an earlier-in-time actor liable in negligence for the intentional criminal conduct of a later actor, whom judge and jury are likely to regard as a superseding cause. Such claims are not infrequent, though, and plaintiffs keep bringing them, because intentional criminal actors tend to lack assets that would make a plaintiff whole.

Brendan Pierson for Reuters reported a rundown in 2022 of civil actions in major school shootings: Uvalde, Texas; Columbine, Colo.; Red Lake, Minn.; Blacksburg, Va.; Newtown, Conn.; Parkland, Fla.; and Santa Fe, Texas. Claims that have been resolved so far have ended with settlements or defense verdicts.

Among those cases, Pierson mentioned claims against parents only in the report on the 2018 shooting in Santa Fe, Texas. In 2023, plaintiffs in the Santa Fe case settled with ammunition retailer Luckygunner (AP). The latest report I can find on the case against the parents, from the Daily News of Galveston County, Texas, said in December 2023 that the negligence case against the parents of Dimitrios Pagourtzis remains on the trial court docket.

Please comment here if you know of a civil verdict or settlement against parents in a school shooting case. I would be curious to know also whether homeowner insurers have covered or not covered in such cases.

Law immunizes school social worker in teen's suicide

PickPik

A public school social worker is immune from liability in the suicide of a 16-year-old boy, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled in the fall in a case at the border of the common law "suicide rule" and the law of sovereign immunity.

A student at Acton-Boxborough Regional High School, the troubled teen committed suicide at his home while on summer break in 2018. The teen had been under the care of a licensed clinical social worker on contract with the school district.

Six weeks before the teen's death, his girlfriend, another student at the high school, had told the social worker that the boy was drinking and weeping, exhibiting suicidal behavior, and in crisis. According to the plaintiff's allegations, the social worker assured the girlfriend that the teen would get the care he needed and that the social worker would inform the boy's parents.

The social worker met with the boy subsequently, but did not contact his parents. The girlfriend alleged that she would have contacted the parents had she not been assured that the social worker would, and that the social worker's failure appropriately to respond legally caused the teen to take his own life.

The "suicide rule."  It is sometimes said that American common law has a "suicide rule," which is expressed variably as a rule of duty, causation, or scope of liability. Under the rule, a person does not have a legal duty to prevent the suicide of another. In causal terms, an actor's failure to prevent the suicide of another cannot be deemed the legal cause of the suicide, because the intentional, in some jurisdictions criminal, suicidal act is a superseding proximate cause.

It is widely understood, however, that the suicide rule is not really a rule. That is, it's not an absolute. Rather the rule simply recognizes that non-liability is the result that courts most often reach in analyses of duty, causation, or scope of liability on the fact pattern of a decedent's family claiming wrongful death against someone who knew of the decedent's suicidal potential and failed to prevent the death. (Read more in Death case against Robinhood tests common law disfavor for liability upon negligence leading to suicide (Feb. 9, 2021).)

Massachusetts courts have demonstrated especial receptivity to liability arguments contrary to the suicide rule. In 2018, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ruled "no duty" in a student-suicide case against MIT, but proffered an analysis that signaled leniency to the plaintiff's theory. Then in 2019, the SJC let a student-suicide case proceed against Harvard University. Reading the map of this forking road, the Appeals Court rejected liability for an innkeeper in the suicide of a guest in 2022.

Massachusetts also was home to the infamous case of Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy, which was never litigated in its civil dimension. Roy's family alleged that Carter actively encouraged Roy to commit suicide. The case demonstrates that the line between failure to prevent a suicide and assistance in committing suicide is sometimes uncomfortably fine.

Sovereign immunity.  The three cases from 2018, 2019, and 2022 all bore on the instant matter from Acton. But the Acton case also added a new wrinkle: the peculiar causation rule of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

Sovereign immunity usually protects a governmental defendant, such as a public school, from liability in a case that otherwise would test the suicide rule. State and federal tort claims acts waive sovereign immunity in many personal injury lawsuits. But the waiver comes with big exceptions.

Suicide cases typically fail for either one of two exceptions. First, tort claims acts, including the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), disallow liability predicated on an affirmative duty, that is, a failure to act affirmatively, rather than on an allegedly tortious action. Wrongful death complainants in suicide cases often allege the defendant's failure to intervene, and that allegation doesn't make the cut. FTCA liability can arise from an unreasonable "omission" of action. The line between such an omission and a failure to act affirmatively is fine and not material here, so I will conflate the two as immunized inaction.

Second, sovereign immunity waivers, including the FTCA, disallow liability for officials insofar as they exercise the discretion that it is their job to exercise. This exception for "discretionary function immunity" can be challenging to navigate, but is critical to prevent every governmental decision from collapsing into a tort case. If a government official makes a poor policy choice, the remedy should be in civil service accountability or at the ballot box, not in the courtroom. The tort system should be reserved for actions that effect injury by contravening social and legal norms. (Learn more with Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority, SCOTUSbrief (Jan. 13, 2019).)

These exceptions ordinarily would preclude liability on the facts of the Acton case, insofar as the plaintiffs claimed that the social worker failed to prevent the teen's suicide or committed a kind of malpractice in the the provision of counseling, leading to the suicide. The former theory would fail as inaction, and the latter theory would fail as disagreement over the social worker's discretionary choices.

However, Massachusetts statutes are rarely ordinary, and the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) is not co-extensive with the FTCA.

Under its section 10(b), The MTCA provides for discretionary function immunity similarly to the FTCA. Another section, 10(j), provides a potent state immunity not found in the FTCA and characterized as a rule of causation. (Read more in Court denies police immunity under state tort claims act in death of intoxicated man in protective custody (July 22, 2022).) The court in the Acton case did not reach the section 10(b) issue and dismissed the claims against the social-worker defendant under section 10(j).

Section 10(j) on its face recognizes the possibility of a claim "based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person" (my emphasis). But the section disclaims liability when the third-party conduct "is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer."

The magic happens in the phrase "originally caused." And if you're expecting that that phrase has a well honed technical meaning, prepare to be disappointed.

Historically, common law courts sometimes tried to distinguish mere (pre-)"conditions" from "causes." The famous tort scholar William Prosser wrote in the 20th century on the futility of that semantic wrangling. He opined, and American common law tort in the 20th century recognized, that the salient distinction the courts had been chasing is between scientific causes and legal causes. Even if we can determine scientifically that a butterfly flapping its wings caused a tsunami, we do not necessarily conclude that the butterfly is responsible for the tsunami to a degree that would satisfy legal standards. (Read more in State supreme court upends causation in tort law, promising plenty post-pandemic work for lawyers (Feb. 28, 2021).)

Not every actor who exerts causal force along the chain of events that ends with personal injury is thereby legally responsible for that injury. Tort law employs the term "proximate cause" in an effort to parse the timeline and trace back legal responsibility only so far. Of course, once we acknowledge that ours is a problem of degree, we always will have to wrestle with "how much is too much?"

Like common law courts historically, the legislators who drafted MTCA section 10(j) likely were after this same distinction, even if they might have drawn the line in a different place from the courts. And it's likely they would have drawn the line closer to the injury, that is, more stringently against plaintiff claims. So in a suicide case, a Massachusetts court is likelier than otherwise to find the suicide rule alive and well when the intentional violent act of taking one's own life intervenes between state actor and death.

Thus was the outcome in the Acton case. And fairly so. Whatever the social worker failed to do when the decedent teen was still in school, it strains credulity to assert an intact causal chain leading from her response to the girlfriend's alarm all the way to the boy's suicide on summer break six weeks later. It's plausible that the social worker's response was a cause, and that the suicide might have been averted in a counterfactual world in which the social worker reacted more aggressively. But the social worker's response looks like a small sail on the sea of complex causal forces that resulted in the tragedy of a suicide.

Accordingly, the court concluded that, legally, for the purpose of section 10(j), "[the boy's] suicide was the result of his own state of mind and not the failures of [the social worker]."

In its own text, section 10(j) enumerates some exceptions, but the court held that none applied. The plaintiff argued for the applicability of an exception when a state defendant makes "explicit and specific assurances of safety or assistance, beyond general representations that investigation or assistance will be or has been undertaken, ... to the direct victim or a member of his family or household." Regardless of whether the social worker's assurances to the decedent's girlfriend qualified as sufficiently specific, the girlfriend was not a member of the boy's family or household, the court observed.

The plaintiff argued also for the applicability of an exception "for negligent medical or other therapeutic treatment received by the patient [decedent] from [the state defendant]." Regardless whether the counseling relationship qualified the boy as a "patient" under this provision, the court opined that the plaintiff's theory comprised wholly a claim of failure to inform the parents, and not, as the plaintiff expressly alleged, a theory of negligent medical treatment that would qualify for the 10(j) exception.

To my mind, the court might have gotten it wrong on this latter score. In the final pages of the decision, the court dealt separately with the plaintiff's claim of negligent treatment. Briefly discussing the MIT and innkeeper cases, the court recognized that the plaintiff's argument for a duty relationship between social worker and student that would contravene the suicide rule "has some force." Then, summarily, the court declined to resolve the issue, finding the negligent treatment claim subsumed by the 10(j) analysis.

The court could have reached the same conclusion by finding an insufficient factual basis for the plaintiff's claim of negligent treatment. Or by blocking the negligent treatment claim with discretionary function immunity under section 10(b). Or the court could have allowed the plaintiff to attempt to develop the factual record to support the complaint on the negligence theory. It's likely the plaintiff could not and would have succumbed to a later defense motion for summary judgment.

In applying section 10(j), the court wrote that "the amended complaint does not allege that [the social worker] was negligent in ... 'treatment.'" Yet in discussing the negligence claim just two paragraphs later, the court wrote that the plaintiff "contends that '[the social worker's] negligence, carelessness and/or unskillful interactions with and/or failure to provide [the boy] with the degree of care of the average qualified practitioner ... were direct and proximate causes of ... death.'"

Then the court referred back to its 10(j) analysis to reject the latter contention. I have not read the pleadings or arguments in the case, so I might be missing something. The plaintiff's clumsy use of "and/or" legal-ese doesn't scream expert drafting. But in the court's opinion, the logic looks circular and iffy.

The case is Paradis v. Frost (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 22, 2023). Justice Maureen E. Walsh wrote the unanimous opinion of the panel that also comprised Justices Blake and Hershfang.

Postscript. Regarding the death in this case and the family's decision to litigate in wrongful death: The family wrote on GoFundMe in 2018 that their life insurance would not cover their funerary costs, I suspect because the policy excluded coverage for suicide. The fundraising yielded $15,450 for the family.

The case raised awareness and spurred discussion of teen suicide and suicide prevention (e.g., Boston Globe (Dec. 16, 2018) (subscription), NPR Morning Edition (Dec. 15, 2019)). At the same time, sadly, the alarm raised by the decedent's girlfriend, then a high school sophomore, was informed already by the experience of four prior student deaths by suicide in the preceding two years at the same school, WGBH reported. 

Advice on teen suicide warning signs and prevention can be found at, inter alia, Johns Hopkins Medicine, Northwestern Medicine, and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention.

TORTZ volume 2 unpacks duty, causation, damages, introduces nuisance, defamation, privacy

Tortz volume 2 is now available for affordable purchase from Lulu.com and for free PDF download from SSRN.

Tortz volume 2 follows up volume 1 (Lulu, SSRN, The Savory Tort), published in 2023 and pending update this year. I am using Tortz volumes 1 and 2 with students in my American tort law classes in the United States and in Poland this academic year.

The two-volume Tortz textbook represents a survey study of American tort law suitable to American 1L students and foreign law students. In volume 1, the first eight chapters cover the fundamentals of the culpability spectrum from intentional torts to negligence to strict liability.

Volume 2 comprises chapters 9 to 15: (9) damages, (10) res ipsa loquitur, (11) multiple liabilities, (12) attenuated duty and causation, (13) affirmative duty, (14) nuisance and property torts, and (15) communication and media torts. 

Contemporary content in Tortz volume 2 includes exercises in pure several liability; treatment of opioid litigation in public nuisance law; recent criticism of New York Times v. Sullivan in defamation law; and exposure to common law developments in privacy law, such as the extension of fiduciary obligations to protect personal information.

Three final chapters will be added to Tortz volume 2 for a revised edition later in 2024: (16) interference and business torts, (17) government claims and liabilities, “constitutional tort,” and statutory tort, and (18) worker compensation and tort alternatives. Any teacher who would like to have copies of draft materials for these chapters in the spring is welcome to contact me.

Tortz is inspired by the teachings of Professor Marshall Shapo, a mentor to whom I am deeply indebted. Marshall passed away in November 2023.

My thanks to Professor Christopher Robinette, Southwestern Law School, who kindly noted the publication of Tortz volume 2 on TortsProf Blog even before I got to it here.

'Sudden emergency' doesn't spare driver from jury trial

Rawpixel CC0

A medical emergency did not necessarily let a driver off the hook for an injury-accident, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled yesterday, in a rare appellate appearance of "the sudden emergency doctrine."

The sudden emergency, or "inevitable accident," doctrine is less doctrine and more self-evident application of negligence law. The simple rule is that if a driver has a medical emergency and thus unavoidably causes an accident, that's not negligence. The doctrine requires that the medical emergency be confirmed by expert testimony.

You can get to that conclusion readily enough through the usual negligence analysis. A reasonable person having a heart attack could not have averted the same accident, so there was no negligence. "Sudden emergency" is just a shortcut that sanctions the conclusion and perhaps enhances a judge's confidence in awarding the defense summary judgment without a jury trial.

By the same token, however, the usual rules of negligence still apply. Saliently, the doctrine relieves the defendant of liability only insofar as the emergency is alleged to have been the proximate cause of the accident. If the plaintiff points somewhere else on the timeline, to a different alleged misconduct as proximate cause, then the defendant is not necessarily off the hook.

That's where the lower court erred in the instant cases, according to the Appeals Court. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant should have known of the risk of his medical condition and should not have been driving. That's a negligence allegation, and driving despite risk is not an emergency.

The medical evidence, even if weakly contested, supported the defendant's theory that he lost consciousness because of undiagnosed sleep apnea. As a result, his truck ran into the back of the unmoving bus ahead, which the plaintiff was driving. The loss of consciousness was a proximate cause of the accident. But not necessarily the only proximate cause.

The plaintiff's experts proffered evidence that sleep apnea is not something that attacks acutely out of the blue. Though the defendant denied chronic drowsiness, he had a medical history of difficulty sleeping at night and heavy snoring. He also suffered from comorbid conditions, such as obesity.

A reasonable person in the plaintiff's circumstances would have been on notice of the risk of driving, the plaintiff argued. And the evidence was sufficiently in dispute that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on the question, the court agreed.

The court also reversed and remanded the summary judgment for the defendant's employer, as the employer would be vicariously liable for its employee's on-the-job conduct. But the court affirmed summary judgment for the employer on the direct negligence theories the plaintiff had leveled against it.

The evidence developed pretrial did not bear out plaintiff's allegations that the employer had any knowledge of a medical condition that could have impaired driving. So the jury may not hear theories of negligent hiring or supervision.

The case is Cottrell v. Laidley, No. 21-P-740 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 18, 2023). Justice Joseph M. Ditkoff wrote the opinion of the unanimous panel, which also comprised Chief Justice Green and Justice Hodgens.

TORTZ volume 1 now available to print on demand

I'm pleased to announce the publication of TORTZ: A Study of American Tort Law, volume 1 of 2.

Hard copies can be printed at Lulu.com for just $30 plus shipping. A free PDF can be downloaded from SSRN.

Eight chapters cover the fundamentals of the culpability spectrum from intentional torts to negligence to strict liability. After two pilot deployments of content, in 2021 and 2022, this book will be my 1L students' Torts I textbook in fall 2023.

I anticipate publication of volume 2 in 2024.