Comparative law students explore world with guests, online cohort, and enrich field with new research

Boasting about the accomplishments of my students is a rich indulgence I selfishly embrace. The Savory Tort hosts collections of student abstracts from past courses in Comparative Law and Freedom of Information Law.

This winter, I am happy to share abstracts from students who completed papers in Comparative Law in fall 2025. These might be the most scholarly capable set of papers I've yet seen in a seminar. Their work was a pleasure to read, and I am grateful for all that these students taught me.

Besides their research projects, these students participated vitally in the Global Law Classroom (GLC). They were leaders in their groups and exchanged knowledge and experiences with students from 13 countries over eight weeks of class sessions with contributing faculty.

The students also served as a gracious and inquisitive audience for several guests in the fall semester. I thank my colleagues who gave of their time and expertise to enrich our class:

• Anna Conley, Cliff Edwards Professor of Excellence in Trial Advocacy at the Alexander Blewett III School of Law, University of Montana, and also a member of the GLC faculty, joined us via Zoom to explore customary law and the rights of indigenous peoples.
• Bernard Freamon, professor of law at Roger Williams University Law School, and co-chair of the Bristol (R.I.) Middle Passage Port Marker Project, treated us to a thorough and thought-provoking introduction to Islamic law.
• Dan Greenberg, Cato Institute, shared with us a special screening of the documentary film he produced and directed, American Libel (2025), in relation to the disparate "actual malice" and "public interest" defenses to defamation in U.S. and UK law.
• Wojciech Jarosiński, founding partner of Peak Legal in Poland, and Stefanie Chiba, a corporate attorney and data privacy expert in Austria, led us via Zoom in exploration of differences between civil law and common law practice.
• Ferhat Pekin, attorney with Pekin Bayar Mizraha, and adjunct professor at UMass Law, led us in a study of Turkish law and exercises in the cross-cultural competence required for transnational law practice.
• A friend and colleague working in the international aid sector joined us via Zoom to talk about the challenges of delivering aid from western sources to conflict areas amid political and cultural challenges on the ground. His identity is not published here to protect his security while deployed in Asia.

Here are the fall's compelling student projects:

Jake Fruchter, Civil Rights in Extra-Ordinary Prosecutions: a Comparative Analysis of Ireland and the United States Trial Rights in Terrorism Prosecutions. The United States is witnessing a growth in domestic terrorism charges. As these cases make their way through state and federal courts, questions arise over what rights and procedures apply. One country with a well established history of prosecuting domestic terrorism is the Republic of Ireland. This history led the Republic to establish a Special Criminal Court with unique rules and procedures for terrorism and organized crime cases. This paper, using a comparative method, compares the Republic’s Special Criminal Court with procedures in the United States at the state and federal level. In particular, the rights this paper analyzes pertain to the right to silence as, protected by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the right to a trial by jury and to face your accuser, as protected by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Kyle LaMont, Belonging by Blood or Soil?: A Functionalist-Historical Comparison of Italian and American Citizenship Traditions. This paper examines how Italy and the United States have developed their jus sanguinis and jus soli citizenship traditions, respectively, over time. Using a functionalist and historical approach, it compares and analyzes the legal frameworks and the different legal consequences of citizenship for each country. Culturally, Italy has had a long-standing tradition of focusing on citizenship through lineage, which was a core part of Italy’s unification since 1861 and further reinforced with Law No. 91/1992. In stark contrast, the United States primarily uses jus soli and the territory approach of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. These different approaches to citizenship show how historical, cultural, and economic factors have molded the traditions that each country has embraced. By comparing these different systems, this paper reveals differing understandings of belonging and how both traditions survive in each country today. 

Kennis Levano, Language, Law, and Identity: A Functionalist Comparison of Indigenous Language Rights Protection in Bolivia and Peru. Focusing on the divergent political trajectories since the 1980s, this paper conducts a functionalist microcomparison of the frameworks for indigenous language rights in Bolivia and Peru. The research first establishes the historical and political contexts of both countries. It then provides a detailed examination of the Bolivia legal framework, highlighting recent legislative advancements, key provisions, and their successful implementation and impact in the country. In contrast, I discuss Peru's evolving legal framework, identifying differences and significant challenges in implementation. The analysis uses a functionalist approach to compare legal frameworks, identifying successful elements in the Bolivian model that are absent or underdeveloped in the Peruvian. The study culminates in the proposal of a solution designed to catalyze a significant leap forward in Peru's constitutional recognition of indigenous language rights, mirroring the progress achieved in Bolivia.

John McCauley, The Merchant: The Object of Economic Legislation & Regulation. This paper is focused on the differences and similarities between the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 definition of “merchant” and the Egyptian Commercial Code definition of “Trader,” and how those definitions work into other statutes when a dispute arises. The UCC is analyzed according to different jurisdictions within the United States, with jurisdictional splits being noted, particularly around farmers. The topic is introduced with a brief history of each codification effort, how disputes of trade are handled procedurally, and how the courts of each respective jurisdiction interpret their definitions of those who conduct trade. This paper seeks to adhere to critical comparative methodologies and be mindful of the different cultural contexts that lead to the expression and subsequent regulation of one who conducts trade and said merchant’s explicit duties. In essence, this paper seeks to unravel choices of law with policies in mind which lead to the defined terms of “merchant” and “trader,” and who or what is interpreted as falling within and without that category, and what are some of the obligations attached to the merchant status. This paper looks at global market dynamics, and interpretive and legislative fiats, as well as statutory language to conclude who or what is defined as a merchant in the United States and Egypt and why. A commercial code is an expression of what a government believes is the proper way of doing business and thus regulates it, and the merchant or trader is the one who is to adhere to that regulation. With those premises in mind, it is key to look at the similarities and differences in these systems and cultural contexts to examine potential policy goals in enacting such legislation.

Hannah Patalsky, Comparing Mechanisms for Artist Compensation in the United States and the European Union (Taylor’s Version). This paper compares two distinct legal frameworks: the Living Wage for Musicians Act (2024) (LWMA), a bill recently reintroduced in the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, and Articles 18 through 22 of the EU Digital Single Market Directive (DSM Directive). Both of these mechanisms are designed to address the persistent issue of inadequate artist compensatory rights in the era of online streaming. The LWMA aims to establish an “Artist Compensation Royalty Fund” as an economic intervention, which would guarantee artists near-immediate payment through a statutory framework and additional stream of revenue flowing from listener to musician. In contrast, the DSM Directive focuses on member-state involvement in a contractual approach, seeking to balance the relationship between artists, on one side, and labels and agents, on the other. The primary DSM Directive articles of focus in this paper are Articles 18 through 22, which are designed to counteract the power dynamics and inequalities between these groups. This paper examines the benefits of each approach, as well as the limitations and drawbacks. The paper demonstratively applies each framework to the well-known ownership dispute between Taylor Swift and Scooter Braun, demonstrating how outcomes may differ under each mechanism to showcase the practical, real-world applications of these compensatory mechanisms. Fundamentally, this paper compares a statutory and contractual framework to find the best approach to artist compensation. Ultimately, this paper argues that each framework seeks to remedy a different issue in the modern digital and stream-based economy, and that understanding the differences among these remedies is essential to evaluating how legal systems can meaningfully address inherent inequalities and imbalances across the music industry. The LWMA aims to address the problem of insufficient streams of revenue for artists. At the same time, the DSM Directive directly targets any inequalities that may have arisen during the contracting phase that may lead to long-term exploitation of artists. In comparing these legal mechanisms that are addressing the same issue, this comparison reveals not only the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, but also the potential benefits of creating a hybrid model, including fair revenue and fair contracting conditions.

Tamar Shimon, Hate Speech: Overprotected or Undervalued? A Comparative Analysis Between U.S. and German Student Speech on College and University Campuses Post October 7. This paper analyzes the impact of protecting hate speech, particularly antisemitic speech, on post-secondary institutions within the United States and Germany. The world is no stranger to antisemitism. This type of hate has existed for millennia. However, with the events of October 7, 2023, a new wave of antisemitism found a home amongst a new generation of people: young university and college students. For months, U.S. college and university officials allowed for antisemitism to take hold on their campuses, subjugating Jewish students to abuse from their fellow students. But this was not the same response in Germany. Rather than allow the “protests” to become rampant and violent, German university and college officials quickly placed bans and restrictions for fears of antisemitism reemerging at such a drastic rate that was last seen in the 1920s. Free speech is a fundamental right within the United States and Germany; however, both countries take different approaches when it comes to protecting hate speech. This paper explores the differentiations in each country’s free speech rule, specifically focusing on the way in which each country sees the importance of hate speech to its society. To understand this differentiation, the events on and post October 7, 2023, on college and university campuses across the United States and Germany will be analyzed to determine whether the United States can somehow implement Germany’s model but still uphold the values of free speech.

Tryon P. Woods, Indigenous Fishing Rights, Comparative Settler Colonialism, and the Problem of Modern Law. This paper is a comparative legal analysis of United States v. Washington (W.D. Wash. 1974), known as the “Boldt decision” after the presiding judge’s opinion, and the 2024 ruling in Sapporo District Court on the Raporo Ainu Nation fishing rights lawsuit in Japan. Regarded as a legal landmark in indigenous rights and land use management in North America, the Boldt decision recognized the treaty rights of Native tribes to off-reservation inland fishing.  It held that such Native fishing was not subject to State regulation.  The recent Ainu lawsuit in Japan similarly sought to assert indigenous rights to fish Japanese inland waters but was rejected by the court. Comparative analysis of the two cases reveals distinct national histories regarding indigenous rights in law, which in turn, are indicative of differing forms of racialization in the national development of the United States and Japan that align with distinct histories of settler colonialism. This discrete legal comparison raises further questions regarding law’s mutability in the face of dynamic culture; how dominance is reworked as rule of law; and the problems stemming from shared ecology.

Ellie Zhang, Fair Use vs. Second Creation: A Comparative Study of Short-Video Law Between the United States and China. This paper examines how U.S. and Chinese copyright law treat short-video “second creations,” focusing on two common formats: (1) reaction and review videos that intersperse short excerpts and (2) parody. After setting out the U.S. open-ended, fair-use framework under 17 U.S.C. § 107 and China’s rights-first, enumerated “reasonable use” approach under Article 24, the paper asks when these videos amount to protected commentary and when they become unlicensed, market-substituting derivatives. For interspersed-clip reactions, U.S. doctrine tends to credit transformation and lack of substitution, whereas Chinese courts emphasize “reasonable use” and substitution risks; both systems disfavor compilation-style recaps. For parody, U.S. law treats targeted critique as paradigmatic transformative use so long as the borrowing is reasonably necessary and does not usurp cognizable licensing markets. By contrast, Chinese law lacks an explicit parody exception, channeling analysis through “appropriate quotation,” the two-step constraints, and moral-rights concerns, producing a narrower space for unlicensed parody. The paper closes with practical guidance for creators and a policy recommendation: clearer, semi-open exceptions in China and more attention in U.S. cases to audiovisual modes of critique when judging transformation and necessity.

The students' research was well supported by ace Law Librarian Katelyn Golesby, who updated and reconstructed a superb library guide in foreign, comparative, and international legal research.

Lead image by Google Gemini. Guest images from respective biographical pages, as linked; no claim to rights. Flags by Flagpedia.

Rescission of law dean offer prompts valid angst, but political ire over higher ed impunity is long time coming

Waterman Hall, University of Arkansas
Larry Miller via Flickr CC BY-NC 2.0

Legal academics is aflutter over the rescinding of an offer of the deanship at the law school of the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, to Emily Suski, a law professor at the University of South Carolina, upon pressure from conservative politicians.

I've lately been cited and quoted on the matter, partly because I lived and worked as a law professor in Arkansas for thirteen and a half years, until 2011. I'll say a bit more here.

The Suski story has been much in the news, from The Arkansas Times to The New York Times, and has been framed by our present era of political strife. The rescission was motivated by conservative state lawmakers apparently unhappy over leftward leanings in Suski's record as an academic and a lawyer.

I am not opining, and have not opined, on the rescission in sum, because I don't know what was in the minds of lawmakers and the university president. I have made no study of the record. I said as much to Arkansas Democract-Gazette (ADG) reporter Neal Earley late last week. If you want a view from the ground, my colleague Robert Steinbuch, law professor and columnist, talked about the matter toward the end of this interview with KATV (cue to about 2:05).

I did tell the ADG, where I was fairly represented in a story Monday, to which Earley contributed, that I have First Amendment concerns if, and insofar as, the political decision was motivated by retaliation for viewpoints expressed in litigation or academic work. I agree with a statement of the president of the Arkansas Bar Association that a lawyer should not be discriminated against by a public entity for employment based on positions taken in prior litigation.

But the matter is not that straightforward.

Some Arkansas politicians are vexed by Suski's sign-on to an amicus brief in the SCOTUS-bound transgender athlete case, on the side of the athlete challenging West Virginia law. Some might be displeased with her support for the U.S. Supreme Court nomination of now-Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. A single, clear rationale for rescinding has not been articulated, and likely, motivations are varied.

I have authored, contributed to, and signed amicus briefs myself, I told Earley, in support of principles notwithstanding the position of litigants. For example, my amicus positions on the freedom of information have aligned me with affirmative action skeptics and animal rights activists. Whether, or to what extent, I agreed with the litigants' many public positions was immaterial to my advocacy for transparency, accountability, or civil liberties in the matters at hand.

I'm not shy with my opinions. But if you want them, the responsible thing is to ask, not assume. The world is gray. My own views have nuance. I'm sure Suski's do too.

At the same time, this story ought not be framed merely in terms of contemporary partisanship. I told the ADG that I understand lawmakers' reaction in "a broader context of long-time suppression of (the conservative) viewpoint in legal academics."

That's true. Earley asked for examples, and I gave him several. I've done work with the Federalist Society and with the Heritage Foundation. I supported law students at the University of Massachusetts Law School in establishing a Christian Legal Society (as yet not an official chapter).

That doesn't mean I agree with every position taken by those organizations. (I'm not alone.) It does mean that I have over the years left those groups off my CV when applying for this or that in legal academics, because their mention would have killed my application. At the same time, I have never felt compelled in legal academics to conceal association with the AAUP or the ACLU. Those alignments are badges of achievement.

I didn't make the rules, and I don't approve of them. This is the world as I found it. Having had some privileges and not others while trying to advance my academic career, I have not buried my head in the sand about unjustified biases. For legal academics now to be wringing their hands over censorship of left-leaning causes might be justified in the instant case, but implicates more than a little hypocrisy.

One quote of mine in the ADG story was right, but could benefit from context: "I feel almost a bit of relief to say that thank heavens someone is paying attention." That sounds, erroneously, like approval of the politics of the Arkansas legislators in the Suski case, contrary to my refusal only a sentence earlier in the story to state approval or disapproval.

Rather, I made that statement in discussion with Earley of a different point, namely, that legislators in Arkansas, in other states, and in Washington, D.C., have abdicated their responsibility for the accountability of public institutions, especially in higher education. Regardless of the merits of the decision in Arkansas, the idea is refreshing that Arkansas legislators would hold the University of Arkansas to any standard at all. 

In my experience in Arkansas, the university, a political behemoth, did not hesitate to throw its weight around at the capitol. And legislators kowtowed to its will. For example, legislators, with few noteworthy exceptions, happily parrot the fiction that the filthy-rich university foundation is a private entity properly immune from the state freedom of information act, though in fact, public officials dictate how the money is spent.

When I spoke to Earley, I was not thinking about Arkansas legislative accountability in any matter of my personal interest. But maybe I should have been.

For The Arkansas Times blog, Dr. Walter Kimbrough opened an opinion piece with reference to a lawsuit I brought almost 20 years ago when working in Arkansas. Kimbrough is a former president of two HBCUs and now an executive vice president of the UNCF (the "United Negro College Fund," though the organization usually uses just its initials nowadays). 

I'm flattered that Kimbrough, whom I greatly respect, remembers my case, the best account of which was penned by the great Scott Jaschik, who retired in 2023, and can be read still at Inside Higher Ed.

Kimbrough's headline highlights the "cancel culture" angle in the Suski story. Invocation of my case shows that what happened to Suski is not new, because it happened to me—even if the shoe was on the other foot, from a conventional political perspective.

At least my takeaway from Kimbrough's comparison is be careful what tactics you use, because it won't feel good when they're turned against you. If abstracted to politics, it's basically the same logic justifying humane treatment of war prisoners, not because you're worried about the enemy, but because you're worried about your own. Regardless of who fired first, conservatives who once lamented the victimization of cancel culture now look hypocritical when they engage in it.

Not necessary to his thesis (and maybe undercutting it?), but salient to me, Kimbrough observed that no Arkansas legislator cared to intervene when I was "canceled." Don't I know it. The same can be said for organizations from the AAUP and ACLU to FIRE and the National Association of Scholars. Crickets for an embattled professor in flyover country. Again, this is not what I was thinking about when I talked with Earley, but it does bolster my point about accountability.

Kimbrough mentioned that I dropped that Arkansas lawsuit. He might have added that I received, as Jaschik reported (same article), a complete exoneration of any wrongdoing by the law school in Little Rock—which is what I had asked for all along.

Some people have asked me privately, don't I feel bad for Emily Suski?

Of course I do. Everyone should. She was a victim in all of this. Yes, the law school's offer letter did say the offer was contingent on university approval. But offer letters contain all kinds of boilerplate qualifiers. For all intents and purposes, Suski was instructed, publicly, to pack her bags. And then she had the rug pulled out from under her.

But while we feel bad for her, let's also place blame where it belongs. That's not just with politically motivated legislators, but with leaders in public academic institutions, who have long acted with impunity, abusing legislative deference and elevating their own agendas and preferences above their responsibility to the taxpayer.

Law students test-screen 'actual malice' documentary

Yesterday, my students in Comparative Law and in Torts got to be test-screen audiences for American Libel, a new documentary written and produced by my friend and colleague Dan Greenberg (TST), a senior research fellow at the Cato Institute.

American Libel challenges the policy wisdom of the "actual malice" rule in U.S. First Amendment law. The rule requires, in key part, that public-figure and public-official defamation plaintiffs prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant wrote with actual knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. The rule originated in the landmark case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (U.S. 1964), and subsequently was rejected by other liberal-democratic jurisdictions, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, as insufficiently protective of personal reputation. The film assigns blame in part to Sullivan for our present misinformation epidemic and the collapse of public confidence in journalism.

Greenberg garnered student feedback and led fruitful discussions with students after two showings, morning and night. I am grateful to Greenberg for taking the time to visit us in Dartmouth, Mass., and share his work. And I am grateful for my students who devoted three hours to screening and discussion, asked informed questions, and offered full-hearted and thoughtful critique.

The screenings were a tremendous learning experience for all of us. It's fair to say that everyone looks forward to American Libel reaching general audiences.

You can read more about American Libel at the film's website. My students prepared by reading my "Reconsidering Sullivan" in 2 Tortz (2025 ed.) (free download at SSRN), pp. 516-535. Comparative Law students also read excerpts on Australian and Canadian law from Marie-France Major, Comparative Analogies: Sullivan Visits the Commonwealth, 10 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. 17 (1999), and Jessica Lovell for INFORRM (2019) on the UK "public interest" defense.

Belgian scholar finds fault on both sides of Atlantic, charts midway course for U.S.-EU data privacy

KU Leuven Profs. Jan Wouters, Evelyne Terryn, and Peggy Valcke; Sylvia Lissens; me; KU Leuven Prof. Marieke Wyckaert, dissertation committee chair; and via Zoom, Prof. Przemysław Pałka, Jagiellonian University, Poland (photo presumed © and used with permission) 

Congratulations to newly minted-Doctor Sylvia Lissens, who defended her dissertation in the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies at Katholieke Universiteit (KU) Leuven in Belgium on October 1.

Dr. Lissens's dissertation is The U.S. and EU Approach Towards Personal Data Protection: "A Collision of Tides or a Convergence of Waves?": A Legal Exploration of the Differences and Convergences Between the United States and the European Union. The first paragraph of the dissertation gives a sense of its ambitious scope:

This research addresses the question of what the core differences between the U.S. and EU legal approaches towards personal data (protection) are and if there are signs of convergences. The question is approached through functional comparative law research conducted on three levels to reflect the perspectives of the three main stakeholders: the private sector, civil society, and the public sector, consisting of government intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The United States and the European Union seem to understand and qualify personal data differently in words and deeds, but upon closer inspection they have more in common than may seem at first sight. Consequently, it was possible to develop a roadmap for how the U.S. and EU approaches can co-exist, based on the convergences between the U.S. and EU approaches towards data privacy on all three levels.

I have learned and benefited immensely from serving on Lissens's dissertation committee for about the last five years. I myself posited a convergence in the data privacy expectations of American and European people many years ago, before the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) superseded its predecesor EU Data Protection Directive. I dared not then conceive a practical framework for a U.S. "adequacy" determination under what became the GDPR, which is the aim of Dr. Lissens's work. 

Faculty of Law at KU Leuven, Belgium
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

The dissertation is especially bold by European standards for suggesting that the EU might have to trim the sails of the GDPR to meet the United States partway. Most works in this vein take the GDPR at face value as a favorable norm. Lissens rather criticizes the GDPR for exporting worldwide norms with almost imperial ferocity, thus failing to give legal regimes and cultural communities around the world an opportunity to develop data privacy standards that might be qualitatively different or appropriately more or less protective of personal liberty. This critique resonates with contemporary critical perspectives in comparative law, which might note that the individualist model of privacy right that the GDPR promotes discounts the prominence of collectivist values in non-European legal systems.

On October 1, Lissens defended her theses ably against healthy skepticism both from European interrogators and from me. I asked whether the hodgepodge of U.S. state data protection systems, as long as Congress remains paralyzed, can possibly be GDPR "adequate" when the state systems reach only consumer transactions. 

Consumer privacy is mostly what the GDPR is worried about, Lissens reasoned, and the EU might have to settle for the states' laboratory approach. Contrary to what I have witnessed as the prevailing ethos among young people in Europe, Lissens argued that European people might have to become comfortable with the notion known to U.S. law that being photographed in a public place is not a privacy violation.

On the national security front, Lissens, like EU courts and human rights advocates, finds plenty cause for concern in dragnet U.S. security surveillance. But she also calls out EU member states for national security practices that are not so different from American methods.

I asked Lissens whether the U.S.-EU Data Privacy Framework can hold up when it does not require the United States to divulge to European complainants how their privacy was compromised or what was done about it. She fairly answered that European citizens usually can expect nothing more from their own governments. 

Moreover, Lissens questions the competence of European courts in the EU treaty system to apply data protection law at all to the national security apparatuses of EU member states, much less to challenge U.S. policy. While she has admiration for the work of European privacy advocates such as Max Schrems, she challenges the very premise of the Schrems decisions in the EU Court of Justice insofar as they assumed jurisdiction over national security policy by way of data protection enforcement.

Among Lissens's distinguished credentials is a 2020-21 stint at Duke University, my alma mater in law, where she held a scholarship to study as a master's student and started adding expertise in U.S. law to her multi-jurisdictional expertise. Lissens, who herself has taught comparative law and graciously visited my class in the past via Zoom, is on the academic job market. She is a gifted scholar and teacher, so schools, place your bids.

Podcast features legal ed collab in 13 countries

On October 1, colleagues and I will start a new eight-week run of the Global Law Classroom (GLC), and program leader Professor Melanie Reid has published a GLC podcast.

The GLC uses Zoom to bring together students and faculty around the world to study issues in international and comparative law. Students work in geographically diverse breakout groups, so get to know their counterparts from other countries. I've wrote here at The Savory Tort about the GLC in 2024, and colleagues and I discussed the project at Global Legal Skills conference in Brno, Czechia, in May 2025.

Professor Reid, at the Duncan School of Law, Lincoln Memorial University, conceived of the GLC when Zoom became instrumental to legal education in the pandemic, and has led the initiative since. This year, Professor Reid recorded a podcast to go along with the GLC, Beyond the Global Law Classroom. The podcast comprises 22 episodes, each an interview with a GLC faculty member to learn more about the perspective from that person's legal system and personal experience.

Professor Reid kindly featured me and The Savory Tort in episode 14. 

This year's GLC will welcome students and faculty from China, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, besides the United States. My Comparative Law class will participate from Massachusetts. 

Our subject-matter units include global lawyering, environmental law, human rights, criminal law, security and energy law, artificial intelligence, and negotiation. For the faculty, I have served as coordinator of the environmental law team, and as a member of the human rights team, developing curriculum for those units.

Global collab promotes teaching law without borders

Peltz-Steele, Lewinbuk, Rott-Pietrzyk, Kim, Rigó
© Used with permission

Collaborators and I had the privilege of discussing the Global Law Classroom (GLC) at the 17th Global Legal Skills Conference (GLS 17), hosted by the Global Legal Skills Institute and the Faculty of Law at Masaryk University (MUNI Law) in Brno, Czechia, last week.

The GLC is a collaboration of faculty around the world to bring together students across borders, via Zoom, to study international and comparative law and learn from each other. I wrote about the GLC here at The Savory Tort about a year ago, after a 2022 pilot run and just before we executed the first official program over eight weeks in fall 2024. I used the GLC as a one-credit component of my Comparative Law class, and I will again in the upcoming fall 2025.

© Used with permission

© Used with permission

In presenting on the GLC to our GLS 17 colleagues in Brno on Thursday, we provided a demonstration hypothetical in data protection for attendees to discuss in small groups. I developed the fact pattern initially with Cristina Blasi Casagran, Autonomous University of Barcelona, and we used it in the fall 2024 GLC human rights module to demonstrate divergence in U.S. and EU approaches to privacy.

For GLS 17, I created a video narrative (below) and briefed the audience on the salient doctrine of the respective legal systems (inset below video) (both CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).

RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

The GLC is the brainchild of Melanie Reid, Lincoln Memorial Law, who could not join us in Brno, but will lead a discussion of the project later this summer at the annual conference of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS).

The GLC faculty team in Brno was led by Rosa Kim, Suffolk Law, and also comprised Katerina Lewinbuk, South Texas College of Law; Balázs Rigó, Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) (Hungary), and Ewa Rott-Pietrzyk, University of Warsaw (Poland). It was great fun for the five us to be together IRL after so much labor together on Zoom.

I'll have another report from GLS 17 here at The Savory Tort on Wednesday, June 4.

Updated 'TORTZ' features latest on Amazon liability, Texas 2-step, DaBaby defamation foes, much more

New 2025 editions of TORTZ: A Study of American Tort Law, volumes 1 and 2 are posted and ready for academic year 2025-26.

Two-volume TORTZ is free to download at SSRN: volume 1 and volume 2.

The books can be purchased in well bound, paperback hardcopy, both volumes for about US$61 plus shipping, from Lulu.com. The price is cost in the United States and just a couple dollars more elsewhere in the world.

Revisions in the 2025 edition include:

Premises Liability

• Discussion of Varley v. Walther (Mass. App. Ct. 2025) on "open and obvious" dangers in premises liability.

Product Liability

• Discussion of Amazon's product liability exposure, including the 2025 order of the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
• Discussion of the Texas two-step, including its rejection In re LTL Mgmt., LLC (3d Cir. 2023), and Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse's (D-R.I.) bill, the Ending Corporate Bankruptcy Abuse Act.

Life and Death

• Revised explanation and distinction of "wrongful birth," "wrongful life," and "wrongful conception" actions.
• Discussion of the waning "suicide rule" in the context of the wrongful death suit by the family of Boeing whistleblower John M. Barnett in Stokes v. Boeing (D.S.C. 2025).
  

Government Immunity

• Discussion of Justice Clarence Thomas's displeasure with the Feres doctrine, dissenting from denial of certiorari in Carter v. United States (U.S. 2025).
• Discussion of 17 plaintiff families' victory in the bellwether Pearl Harbor-Hickam AFB water contamination trial, in Feindt v. United States (D. Haw. 2025).
  

Public Nuisance

• Note of Trumbull County v. Purdue Pharma (Ohio 2024), according with Okla. v. Johnson & Johnson (Okla. 2021), on opioids and product liability, excerpted in the book.
• Note of the Virgin Islands public nuisance lawsuit against Coca-Cola and Pepsico over single-use plastics, Commissioner v. Pepsico (V.I. Super. Ct. filed 2025).
• Note of Oklahoma's dismissal of a public nuisance claim over the Tulsa Race Massacre in Randle v. Tulsa (Okla. 2024).

Media Torts

• Discussion of the latest developments and Rule 11 sanctions in the battery and defamation litigation between promoters and rapper DaBaby, pending appeal from Carey v. Kirk (S.D. Fla. 2025).
• Update on impeached South African Judge John Hlophe's vendetta against former High Court colleague Judge Patricia Goliath, who innovated on anti-SLAPP in Mineral Sands Resources Ltd v. Reddell (High Ct. Wn. Cape Feb. 9, 2021) (upheld).
• Update on the enactment of revenge porn legislation in Massachusetts, the 49th state adopter, and the latest data protection bill in Massachusetts.

'DaBaby' Jonathan Kirk
HOTSPOTATL via Wikimedia CC BY 3.0

Business Torts

• Discussion of the expansion of civil RICO by the Supreme Court in Medical Marijuana v. Horn (U.S. 2025).

Civil Rights

• Discussion of the landmark decision in climate change litigation in Europe, VKSS v. Switzerland (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 2024), in contrast with the dismissal of Juliana v. United States (9th Cir. 2024).
• Note of the plaintiff victory in the Abu Grahib torture case, Al Shamari v. CACI (E.D. Va. 2024).
• Update on the real-life "Hotel Rwanda" protagonist's lawsuits against Rwanda and GainJet, the former defendant dismissed, Rusesabagina v. Rwanda (D.D.C. 2023), and the latter case, Rusesabagina v. GainJet (W.D. Tex. 2024), now pending appeal.

New Resources

• References to new audiovisual productions related to tort law and cases, such as "What Happened to Karen Silkwood?" on Impact x Nightline (2024); the latest on table saws from NPR: Planet Money (2024); Nicole Piasecki's "Dear Alice" from This American Life (2024); the documentaries Downfall: The Case Against Boeing (2022), and Youth v Gov (2020) (re Juliana v. United States), both now available on Netflix.
• References to recently published work on tort law and theory by Ken Abraham & Catherine Sharkey; Andrew Ackley; Christopher Ewell, Oona A. Hathaway, & Ellen Nohle; Dov Fox & Jill Wieber Lens; Kate Falconer, Kit Barker, & Andrew Fell; Jayden Houghton; Michael Law-Smith; Anatoliy Lytvynenko; Michael Pressman; Joseph Ranney; and Sarah Swan.

As in past editions, the coverage includes all of the fundamentals of common law tort, as well as full introductory treatments of  

• defamation, 
• privacy,  
• interference, and  
• private and public nuisance, 

and introductions to  

• business torts, 
• the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
• 'constitutional tort,' and  
• worker compensation and alternative compensation systems. 

Printed in color, Tortz is replete with

•   'RED BOX'   treatments of fundamental rules to help students prepare for the bar exam, 
•   'BLUE BOX'   bibliographies of suggested further readings,
•   'YELLOW BOX'   assignments to online readings and audiovisual materials, and
•   'GRAY BOX'   state differences for Massachusetts bar candidates, or as demonstrative.