French law students embrace common law; Le Havre confronts modern environmentalism, slave history

Le Havre, France

Our cultural and legal understanding of reputation and privacy are among the countless features of the social contract undergoing rapid evolution in the Trump political era, in Europe as well as the United States.

(All images by RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 with no claim to underlying content.) 

Once a fringe area of tort law to which most new lawyers had no exposure at all in law school, defamation and privacy have taken center stage in society, in part thanks to their weaponization in polarized politics and popular culture. Hulk Hogan famously shut down Gawker with a multi-pronged privacy suit masking a billionaire's vendetta (Holiday). Melania Trump sued a blogger and the Daily Mail for falsely claiming she worked as a high-end escort (DiBenedetto). And Donald Trump, well, Donald Trump... inter alia, won a fee award and suffered a massive loss, not over sexual relationships as much as deceptions that ensued.

Faculty of International Affairs, University of Le Havre

Last week, I had the great privilege to teach a one-credit course on American litigation over defamation and privacy to undergraduate law students at the University of Le Havre in the Normandy region of France. You can check out the course and course materials at the blogspot, Litigating Reputation in America. I'll leave the downloadable documents in place for the duration of summer 2026 (Perma.cc for later review).

"Litigating Reputation in America" course site

I centered the class on the fascinating transnational defamation civil suit that French President Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte Macron are prosecuting in Delaware against American podcaster Candace Owens. The case arises from a host of Owens's sensationalist assertions, especially that Brigitte Macron was born a man. A hearing on a motion to dismiss, on jurisdictional grounds only, is scheduled for June 22.

Notwithstanding the seemingly readily disprovable falsity and outrageousness of the assertions at issue, the Macrons face an uphill battle in U.S. courts. Kalshi thinks they'll win (63.7% presently). But the smart money in American defamation litigation is never on the plaintiff. Cf. Tucker Carlson's successful defense against Karen McDougal on grounds, more or less, that no one takes Carlson seriously, so his outrageous assertions could have done no harm.

Meanwhile, in January, a French criminal court convicted 10 defendants of cyberbullying Brigitte Macron with the born-a-man claim (CNS). The contrast between an uphill civil suit in the States and criminal prosecutions in Paris fairly indicates a profound divergence in how social, economic, and political cultures in the United States and Europe, especially in France, respectively value reputation and free speech, and how law and process accordingly balance the two.

In an intensive 15 classroom hours, 24 Le Havre students learned the fundamentals of defamation and privacy torts and engaged with 11 contemporary, ripped-from-the-reporter case studies I prepared for them. The students explored the development of defamation and privacy litigation from client counseling to discovery and dispositive motions, alongside key rules of civil procedure. They argued Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and negotiated settlements, then rounded out the week with a two-hour final exam.

Civil-law law books, including obligations, at La Galerne Bookstore, Le Havre

I've been teaching American law modules to English-as-a-second-language law students in Europe for 20 years, and never have I seen students perform so well. They embraced the rough-and-tumble of the American adversarial model, while remaining sensitive to issues of professionalism and public policy. True to European thinking, they evinced skepticism of corporate-protective defense doctrines and absolutist free speech claims. They readily adapted their civil-law-trained thinking to precedent-driven common law and analogical argument.

It happened that the well circulated American news story dropped while I was in France, as Futurism put it, "College Professors Say Incoming Students No Longer Understand Middle School Math and Science." I commented on some of my friend chats that the same surely is true for English and arts; it's just harder to quantify.

When I started teaching legal writing in the late 1990s, the challenge was to get students to pay attention to their choices of subjects and verbs. Now many students don't even know what I mean when I say "subject" and "verb." An aside: Shout out to my own relentless K12 grammar instructors: Sharon Reuwer, who in elementary school literally hit me on the head with a book—you could do that back then—until I got my sentence diagramming right; and to Dr. Barbara Dezmon, who in middle school initiated me in language as forensic art, more than mere mechanics.

So as my undergraduate French students dissected their case studies, synthesizing argument from facts and points of law, I could not help but observe, and wonder why, they delivered work product more adeptly than I can expect from most first-year graduate students in the United States. That's not to impugn my home students' potential, nor to generalize unfairly, nor to disrespect those who put in the work and rise to the occasion, but only to fear that too many Americans are inexcusably ill served by their K16 preparation.

Haropa Port offices, Le Havre

I am deeply indebted to the organizing and teaching faculty of the Le Havre program. Professor Baptiste Allard is the driving force behind the program at the University of Le Havre Faculty of International Affairs, along with his Le Havre collegaue, Professor Pierre Capelle. The students are now in week two of the four-week program, in a comparative study of constitutional and administrative law with Professor Akram Faizer of the Duncan School of Law at Lincoln Memorial University.

In the coming weeks, the French students will further explore American law and legal skills with Professor Christine E. Cerniglia, director of clinical and experiential legal education at Stetson Law, and Professor Melanie Reid, associate dean of faculty at the Duncan School of Law. Professors Cerniglia and Reid aim to develop an ongoing relationship with Le Havre that will see American students participating, too, to exchange learning with their French counterparts.

Catène de containers (2017),
a prominent contemporary sculpture by Vincent Ganivet;
behind: post-war apartments in the brutalist architectural style of Auguste Perret

I had some time in Le Havre for tourism, which afforded me the opportunity to explore some scholarly interests in areas including environmental law and the legal history of human rights and the transatlantic slave trade.

Professor Allard is my partner on the environmental law team of the Global Law Classroom, a project born of Professor Reid's ingenuity. I have learned volumes from Professor Allard about the role of global shipping and sea transportation in global environmental law and climate change. Admittedly, there are times when the ins and outs of EU shipping regulations make my eyelids droop. But in Le Havre, I took a boat tour of Haropa Port, and what I saw there charged the subject with a new vitality for me.

Entrance to Port of Le Havre

I've seen many commercial ports in the world, but never so close, gliding on a small passenger boat through an intracoastal waterway alongside massive tankers and container ships. The Port of Le Havre is the largest container port in France, with three terminals, and also receives world-class cruise liners. Oil is the port's number one cargo commodity, implicating the port in contemporary geopolitics. Seeing the scale of the operation, it's impossible not to wonder at humanity's ability to transform a natural landscape to commercial ends, and also to be fretful over environmental risks and consequences.

Kriti Journey, a crude oil tranker, flagged Marshall Islands

Hafnia Nanjing, an oil and chemical tanker, flagged Singapore

 

Container loading

Almost as intriguing as the physical operations of the port are its works in communications and public relations. The boat tour I took and the port's public exhibition center are awash with boastful facts. There also are brochures and special exhibition days that feature recent and upcoming green initiatives at the port. That's good, of course. Yet for the touristic observer such as me, even unusually informed as I am, it's impossible casually to disentangle fact and propaganda, much less to interrogate the presentation for greenwashing.

Vole au Vent, a heavy-lift, self-elevating, jack-up installation vessel, flagged Luxembourg,
loading locally manufactured wind turbines for off-shore destinations

A register of slave transactions,
Maison de l'armateur

The Port of Le Havre also figures in the history of slavery. People from Africa were trafficked through Le Havre, part of the triangular route, to French colonies in the Americas. Le Havre was the imputed port of origin for more than 450 slave voyages trafficking at least 142,341 persons from 1571 to 1848, according to data at Slave Voyages

Maison de l'armateur

. A memorial plaque in "the slave streets of Le Havre" remembers 90,000 trafficked persons. Either way, incredibly, Le Havre was only the third largest slave port in France, where an estimated 1.38 million people were embarked for enslavement.

"Closet" celebrating accomplished
free persons of color,
Maison de l'armateur

The Le Havre Ship Owner's House, or Maison de l'armateur, is a preserved 18th century residence that showcases the opulent lifestyle of the successful merchant of the time. That lifestyle was built on a range of commodities, slavery included. Yet Africans who passed through Le Havre, including those who remained and were enslaved before definitive abolition in France in 1848, were omitted from patriotic historical narratives—whitewashing.

Socially and legally, modern France has dedicated itself peculiarly, present populist inclinations notwithstanding, to memory initiatives, that is, the compulsory remembrance of historical wrongs. The criminalization of Holocaust denial is probably the most often cited example of "French memory laws." But brutal colonialism and the slave trade figure in too.

Accordingly seeking to balance its presentation, the Ship Owner's House presently features a fascinating tandem exhibition, Reminiscences: Phantoms of Slavery (May 8 to Sept. 20, 2026). The exhibition is not set aside in a single space, the usual museum M.O.; rather, the African story is told right alongside the ordinary exhibition with the juxtaposition of radically differently themed art and information. The juxtaposition is often clever, for example, haunting the vestibule of a genteel bedroom with an amber glow behind silhouettes of African celebrants.

Émile Loubon, Le Port du Havre au XIXe siècle (1843),
with museum tags showing offloaded goods

Diorama depicting post-colonial reparations rally, Maison de l'armateur

Acerbic art characterizing a black stain on whitewashed history, Maison de l'armateur

There's plenty in Le Havre to stimulate the mind, not to mention the palate, of the law student and law professor. I hope the students who endured my lessons got something worthwhile from the week, if I dare not hope they learned as much as I did.

I offer my sincere gratitude to the students and staff at Le Havre, to Professors Allard and Capelle, as well as Professor Allard's husband for his hospitality, and to Professors Cerniglia, Faizer, and Reid, as well as Professor Cerniglia's partner, for their generous friendship and collegiality.

Jusqu’au Bout du Monde (2018) by Fabien Mérelle, Port of Le Havre; St. Joseph's Church, behind

Law students test-screen 'actual malice' documentary

Yesterday, my students in Comparative Law and in Torts got to be test-screen audiences for American Libel, a new documentary written and produced by my friend and colleague Dan Greenberg (TST), a senior research fellow at the Cato Institute.

American Libel challenges the policy wisdom of the "actual malice" rule in U.S. First Amendment law. The rule requires, in key part, that public-figure and public-official defamation plaintiffs prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant wrote with actual knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. The rule originated in the landmark case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (U.S. 1964), and subsequently was rejected by other liberal-democratic jurisdictions, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, as insufficiently protective of personal reputation. The film assigns blame in part to Sullivan for our present misinformation epidemic and the collapse of public confidence in journalism.

Greenberg garnered student feedback and led fruitful discussions with students after two showings, morning and night. I am grateful to Greenberg for taking the time to visit us in Dartmouth, Mass., and share his work. And I am grateful for my students who devoted three hours to screening and discussion, asked informed questions, and offered full-hearted and thoughtful critique.

The screenings were a tremendous learning experience for all of us. It's fair to say that everyone looks forward to American Libel reaching general audiences.

You can read more about American Libel at the film's website. My students prepared by reading my "Reconsidering Sullivan" in 2 Tortz (2025 ed.) (free download at SSRN), pp. 516-535. Comparative Law students also read excerpts on Australian and Canadian law from Marie-France Major, Comparative Analogies: Sullivan Visits the Commonwealth, 10 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. 17 (1999), and Jessica Lovell for INFORRM (2019) on the UK "public interest" defense.

Greenberg: 'Why American Libel Law Is a Disaster'

My friend and colleague Dan Greenberg, a senior research fellow at the Cato Institute, has penned an editorial in which he explains "Why American Libel Law Is a Disaster" (free sign-up).  

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Alan Dershowitz's libel suit against CNN at the end of August for lack of evidence of "actual malice," the extraordinary standard of U.S. First Amendment law that requires public-figure plaintiffs to prove defendants' intent, knowledge, or smoking-gun recklessness as to the falsity of what they utter.

I don't disagree with the outcome in Dershowitz. But like concurring Judge Barbara Lagoa, I have serious reservations about the "actual malice" rule. The standard, calcified in constitutional law by New York Times v. Sullivan (U.S. 1964), is unique in the world in its broad application in tort litigation in purported protection of the freedom of expression.

Brigitte and Emmanuel Macron, 2019
PICRYL public domain

Though I am a free speech and press advocate six days out of seven, I have long been persona non grata in media defense circles when the subject of Sullivan rolls around. As a torts teacher, I understand that under-compensating victims of genuine harm, and of letting tortfeasors off the hook for socially intolerable conduct, have far-reaching adverse consequences for the social order. And I daresay that our present epidemic of misinformation has a direct lineage to Sullivan.

Dan Greenberg, who bears scars similar to mine as a plaintiff-survivor of formally unsuccessful defamation litigation, has written an op-ed for The Dispatch, "Why American Libel Law Is a Disaster."  He uses as case in point the libel suit (CNN) of French President Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte against "self-styled independent journalist" Candace Owens—and the fact that the Macrons almost surely will lose, despite the absurd and damaging assertions of the defendant.

Here are the opening paragraphs. 

Did you know that the president of France and his wife Brigitte are actually blood relatives in an incestuous marriage? Or that Brigitte is a transgender woman? Or that President Emmanuel Macron was manipulated into becoming the president of France through a CIA mind control program? Or that the Macrons conducted an extensive campaign of violence, fraud, and identity theft to cover all of this up?

Well, you probably didn’t know this, because nothing would lead a reasonable person to believe any of it is true. But this didn’t stop Candace Owens, a self-styled independent journalist, from propagating that delusional narrative. Over the last year, Owens produced an eight-part podcast, Becoming Brigitte, that placed the Macrons at the center of a vast and incredible conspiracy. In July, the Macrons sued Owens for libel in Delaware.

Professor Eugene Volokh at Reason has key excerpts from Dershowitz v. CNN, Inc. (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025), from Judge Lagoa's concurrence, and from the contrary concurrence of Judge Charles Wilson.

There is more on the Sullivan debate, including an edited version of the complaint in Greenberg's 2013 defamation suit against an Arkansas newspaper, in my textbook, 2 Tortz, ch. 15(B)(5)(c), "Reconsidering Sullivan," from page 516.

Court's pass on Wynn bid to revisit 'actual malice' makes sense, but standard still fuels misinformation

Wynn operates the Encore Casino in Everett, Mass.,
since a dust-up with authorities over ownership.
Holiday Point via Flickr CC BY 2.0

The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear casino mogul Steve Wynn's bid to overturn the New York Times v. Sullivan "actual malice" standard, despite the known appetite of some justices to revisit the 1964 precedent.

The outcome is not a surprise and probably for the best, because Wynn had lousy facts to support his argument. Unfortunately, Sullivan's complicity in our present misinformation crisis remains real and ever more problematic. Cases such as Wynn's undermine legitimate recognition of the dysfunction Sullivan has wrought.

I've written and spoken before, and will not here belabor, my ardent opposition to the Sullivan standard, which requires public figures to demonstrate, even prove—usually upon filing a complaint, with no access to evidence in the possession of the defense—that the defendant subjectively knew of the falsity of the publication, or at least that there's a smoking gun disproving the defendant's denial.

Sullivan came about with good intentions. In a nutshell, the Supreme Court was determined to enforce Brown v. Board (U.S. 1954) and bring about the civil rights order required by the Reconstruction Amendments, specifically in Sullivan by heading off southern officials' weaponization of tort law. But the wide berth that the Court cut for freedom of speech vis-à-vis the competing values of personal reputation and human dignity was cemented in constitutional law, and now we face the consequences of an irremediable imbalance.

Steve Wynn
Sarah Gerke via Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

In Wynn's case, defendant Associated Press surfaced two complaints of sexual assault filed with police against Wynn in the 1970s. The reporting occurred in the context of contemporary allegations of a pattern of misconduct, which Wynn roundly denies. The AP report probably falls within the common law "fair report" privilege, which shields from liability the re-publisher of allegations in official documents. The advanced age of the reports raises a thin question on the "fair" prong of the analysis, and the degree to which the privilege has been constitutionalized is debatable. But those issues are neither here nor there, for the courts in the Nevada lawsuit never got that far.

Wynn's suit was dismissed under the Nevada anti-SLAPP law because, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, Wynn failed to demonstrate sufficient proof of actual malice in his pleading. Wynn offered little more in the way of allegation than that the police complaints were "implausible," so should have been disbelieved—hardly that they were contradicted by evidence in the defendant's possession. There was an allegation that the AP reporter regarded a complainant against Wynn as "'crazy'"—but, again, that hardly equates to "lying." Anyway, were the fair report privilege eventually implicated, the salient fact would be the truthful rendition of the reports, not the truth of their underlying contents.

Besides bemoaning Sullivan, I have lamented at length on the ill wisdom of anti-SLAPP laws, such as they have been adopted throughout the United States, another song of woe I won't here reiterate. I also have acknowledged consistently that anti-SLAPP works well when it works well (and could work better). Wynn's case proves both points. He didn't get his day in court, nor hardly a hearing. But I suspect his ability to prosecute all the way to Washington has more to do with his wealth than with the merits of his claim.

Wynn's appeal strategy was principally to attack Sullivan head on. Wynn knows, or his lawyers know, that near immunity for false, even ludicrous, allegations against public figures has everything to do with the vigor of misinformation circulating in the American marketplace of ideas. But Wynn was ill able to illustrate an injustice against a meritorious cause, the kind of fertile soil one needs to nurture willingness to overturn a 60-year-old, civil rights-era precedent.

For some further context of judicial dissatisfaction with Sullivan, here's an excerpt from my 2 Tortz: A Study of American Tort Law (Lulu 2024 rev. ed.), on "Reconsidering Sullivan."

Doubts about sacrosanct Sullivan were once uttered at one’s own risk in legal academic circles. But U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas legitimized debate with a concurrence in denial of certiorari in McKee v. Cosby (U.S. 2019). An actress, McKee, in 2014, publicly accused actor-comedian Bill Cosby of rape 40 years earlier. A letter from Cosby’s attorney to mass media attacked McKee’s credibility, but did not specifically deny the asserted facts of the encounter. McKee alleged defamation, and the courts concluded that the letter stated only unverifiable opinion.

Media advocates certainly hoped that Thomas’s commentary was a one-off. It was not. Two years later, Justices Thomas and Neil Gorsuch dissented from denial of certiorari in Berisha v. Lawson (U.S. 2021).... Earlier the same year, highly regarded U.S. Circuit Judge Laurence Silberman had joined Thomas’s call, dissenting in Tah v. Global Witness Publishing (D.C. Cir. 2021) (involving accusation of bribery against international human rights organization). A likeminded concurrence by Florida appellate Judge Bradford L. Thomas followed in Mastandrea v. Snow (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022) (involving accusation city official was “on the take” in development matter). And that same year, the Journal of Free Speech Law published Professor David McGowan’s A Bipartisan Case Against New York Times v. Sullivan (2022). Justice Thomas reiterated his “view that we should reconsider the actual-malice standard,” Blankenship v. NBCUniversal, LLC (U.S. 2023) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari), thrice more in 2022 and 2023.

Mass-media misinformation during the Donald J. Trump Presidency, contributing to the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, shook the confidence in Sullivan even of some devoted liberal stalwarts in the academy. On the one hand, President Trump had used defamation, among other legal tools, to attack critics. He was accused of weaponizing transaction costs, but Sullivan remained an important substantive bulwark. On the other hand, Trump evaded “Me Too” accountability not only with denials, like Cosby, but with ruthless accusations of lying, which loyal political supporters embraced and amplified.

The busy federal court for the Southern District of New York has seen its share of politically charged defamation litigation. That’s where writer E. Jeanne Carroll, availing of a New York look-back statute, brought two suits against President Trump, alleging sexual battery in the 1990s and defamation for calling her claims “a complete con job,” “a hoax” and “a lie.” Juries awarded Carroll in excess of $80 million for sexual battery and defamation, despite the actual malice standard. Trump appealed. Do the verdicts show that Sullivan works? In 2022, Sarah Palin lost a defamation claim in S.D.N.Y. against The New York Times over a staff editorial that blamed her in part for the mass shooting that wounded U.S. Rep. Gabby Giffords. Exceptionally against the usual no-actual-malice motion to dismiss, Palin had won discovery. And discovery revealed some ethically problematic sloppiness behind the scenes at the Times. Nevertheless, bad journalism is not actual malice, and the court and jury so concluded. Palin’s appeal from the Second Circuit was seen widely as a contender to draw Sullivan reconsideration, but the Court passed.

Whether a function of social media, declining civility, or partisan extremism, data show that defamation litigation is up. And courts are not as quick as they once were to dismiss for a plaintiff’s inability to prove actual malice. Still, the public-plaintiff win remains a rarity, especially for the public official or public figure who doesn’t have the resources to go to the mat.

The case is Wynn v. Associated Press, No. 24-829 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2025).

In 'Baywatch' case, court ponders discovery rule for models' tort claims over ads posted on Facebook

Models suing an adult entertainment club occasioned the high court of Massachusetts to ponder the problem of social media and the statute of limitations on media torts in a decision Wednesday.

When I heard that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided a case about Baywatch, I knew I would want to blog about it.

Alas, I was misled. "Bay Watch" in the instant matter has nothing to do with the The Hoff or 1990s TV.

Plaintiffs allege this ad depicts model Paola Cañas.
From Compl. ex. D.

Still, it's an interesting case. Bay Watch, Inc., is the owner of an adult entertainment club in Stoughton, Massachusetts, Club Alex's. In a lawsuit filed in federal district court in June 2021, six globally recognized models alleged that Club Alex's posted their images, some of them in scant swimwear, to Facebook to promote the club, even though none of the models had any association with the club. The models alleged trademark infringement, misappropriation ("right of publicity"), defamation, and conversion.

The issue in the trial court was the statute of limitations for the state tort claims. Sitting on the generous end of the spectrum, Massachusetts allows three years for media tort claims. But the ads the plaintiffs complained about appeared from 2013 to 2015. The district court accordingly granted summary judgment on the tort claims to the defendant in 2023. But on a plaintiff motion to reconsider at the end of the year, the court agreed to certify the limitations question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).

Alas, not that one (IMDb).

The plaintiffs in the trial court had tried to avail of "the discovery rule," a common law rule that tolls the statute of limitations when it would work an unfairness on a plaintiff who is reasonably not cognizant that she suffered an injury for which there might be a legally responsible actor. 

The discovery rule gets a lot of play in toxic tort cases, in which illness alleged to have resulted from exposure to toxic substances might take years to manifest, and the risk of exposure might not even have been known to the victim at the time. Buttressing his decision with gender-equity-oriented social science, the late Judge Jack Weinstein famously used the discovery rule in the 1990s to give reprieve to plaintiffs suing the makers of DES, a once widely prescribed synthetic estrogen replacement that turned out to be dangerously carcinogenic.

The discovery rule is appealing as a matter of fairness, but applying it can introduce a thorny question of fact. And there are many more thorns when the rule is invoked in a case without the clear delimiters of physical injury.

It's often said, as a default matter, that the limitations period for media torts, such as defamation, runs from the time of publication. Usually that rule works well enough. But in some cases, plaintiffs are able to invoke the discovery rule. If cases are any indication, then defamation occurs in the disruption of business relationships more often than in the pop culture paradigm of media subject versus publisher. A businessperson, for example, might think she lost a contract on the merits of a bid and only later discover that she lost the contract upon the whisper of a false and harmful rumor into the right ear.

Proliferation of media in the internet age has made courts slightly more willing to afford plaintiffs an argument for the discovery rule, because mass media publication in a sea of online content might not rise to an injured's attention as quickly as a story in the town paper in ye olden days. But courts' patience is not without limit. In the online environment, courts have adapted another rule familiar to the conventional interplay of mass media and the discovery rule. As the SJC opined, in part quoting the Massachusetts Appeals Court:

"[W]here an alleged defamatory publication is broadly circulated to the public, and did not involve concealment or confidential communications," the discovery rule will not be applied, and the cause of action will accrue upon publication, as such widespread publication should have been discovered by the plaintiff.

In other words, the limitations period runs upon publication, unless plaintiff can invoke the discovery rule because a reasonable person would not have recognized the harm and arguably causal actor, unless the thing was out there for everyone so the plaintiff should have recognized the harm and arguably causal actor—in which case we come back around to publication again.

If that sounds circular .... Right. The problem with this approach is that if a reasonable person would not have recognized harm, cause, and actor, then, by definition, the plaintiff cannot be expected to have recognized harm, cause, and actor. In tort analysis, the word "should" means "a reasonable person would."

What this approach really allows is for the court to deny the plaintiff the latitude of the discovery rule as a matter of law, and to dismiss, without having to hassle (or Hassel) with the plaintiff's reasonable cognizance as a question of fact suitable for trial. In short, what the court giveth, the court may taketh away.

And that's what happened in the instant case. The federal district court first indicated that it was inclined to dismiss because the ads appeared too long ago. When the plaintiffs tried to invoke the discovery rule, the court was skeptical. These are world famous models with agents whose job it is to scan for unlicensed uses of clients' likenesses, and with lawyers who have sued over misappropriations before. All the same, the court concluded, credibility notwithstanding, these images were out there in the world long enough that the plaintiffs should have found out about them. So no discovery rule.

What seems to have given the court pause on reconsideration is that the images here were posted on social media. A paralegal in the employ of the plaintiffs

attested that there is no software that would allow her to efficiently search for the images in question and that Internet search engines do not search social media posts. As a result, the only available method is this "particularized research of particular establishments." It is this process, presumably, that led the plaintiffs to the defendant's Facebook posts.

But that took time.

The witness had a point. Google seems slow to index social media when it does at all. Many writers have trumpeted "the death of the search engine," as users prefer to seek answers in familiar social media not as polluted as Google search results with commercialization and distortions resulting from digital marketing under the guise of "optimization."

As well, the tech giants seem to have backed off image searching. When reverse image search first came out, I had fun seeing what famous people Google thought I looked like. Now, no matter what image I start with, Google either finds me, or finds nothing, saying, "Results for people are limited. Try searching a larger [image] area." The search tools can't have gotten dumber; that must be a choice. The SJC observed in evidence in the case that Facebook terminated its image search tool in 2021.

You see it, right?

There are now reverse image search apps, by the way, especially for celebrity matches. I'm apparently a dead ringer for UK actress Natalie Dormer (image via Flickr by Gage Skidmore CC BY-SA 2.0, cropped) or the great James Earl Jones (image via Flickr by Phil Davis CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, edited). Eat your heart out, Hollywood. The Celebs app sees me.

The federal district court thus asked the SJC to clarify how the statute of limitations works in a social media world.

In a characteristically methodical opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Scott Kafker stepped through the analysis in 25 pages. The opinion is elaborative, but it adds nothing new. The approach remains: publication, unless discovery rule, unless broad circulation. At greater length in conclusion, here is the court's explanation of the discovery rule in the context of social media:

Claims ... that arise from material posted to social media platforms accrue when a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, that he or she has been harmed by the defendant's publication of that material. Given how vast the social media universe is on the Internet, and how access to, and the ability to search for, social media posts may vary from platform to platform and even from post to post, that determination requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances regarding the social media posting, including the extent of its distribution, and the accessibility and searchability of the posting. The application of the discovery rule is therefore a highly fact-specific inquiry, and the determination of whether plaintiffs knew or should have known that they were harmed by a defendant's post on social media must often be left to the finder of fact. If, however, the material posted to social media is widely distributed, and readily accessible and searchable, a judge may determine as a matter of law that the discovery rule cannot be applied.

The record was insufficient, the SJC opined, to determine how the approach should work in the instant case. The plaintiffs had equivocated, the SJC observed, when asked when they first knew about the postings. If they knew before 2018, the court reasoned, then case over. Someone should ask them that.

It is possible for the conventional "whisper" scenario to play out on social media. The SJC cited a California case, Jones v. Reekes (Cal. Ct. App. 2022), in which plaintiff had been blocked from viewing the defendant's postings. Still, the California court concluded that the postings "were otherwise available to the public[,] and the block was easily circumventable;" moreover, the plaintiff was on alert generally to the defendant's derisive commentary. So the plaintiff was precluded from availing of the discovery rule, and the date of publication controlled.

Now I can't unsee it.

Jones was thus not exceptional as a mass media case, and I don't think Bay Watch is either. I suspect the SJC was being deferential to the federal trial court, giving it a chance to make the final call. It seems to me quite clear already that the district court did what the SJC commanded when it first ruled for the defense in 2023. The SJC having confirmed the rule, there seems little more for the district court to do but reenter that judgment.

The result might seem unfair to the assiduously searching plaintiffs, or, more precisely, their agents and lawyers. But the statute of limitations furthers meritorious competing interests, including finality in freedom from legal jeopardy on the part of all publishers.

The case in the SJC is Davalos v. Bay Watch, Inc., No. SJC-13534 (Mass. Sept. 4, 2024) (Kafker, J.) (FindLaw). The case in the federal court is Davalos v. Baywatch, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-11075 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2023) (Gorton, Dist. J.) (Court Listener).

UPDATE, Sept. 12: I was saddened to hear of James Earl Jones's passing shortly after I published this post (N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2024). All joking of resemblance aside, I was a fan.

Free torts textbook ready for academic year 2024-25

TORTZ: A Study of American Tort Law is complete and revised for the coming academic year 2024-25.

The two-volume textbook is posted for free download from SSRN (vol. 1, vol. 2), and available in hardcopy from Lulu.com at cost, about $30 per volume plus shipping.

• SSRN volume 1
• SSRN volume 2
• Lulu.com hardcopies

This final iteration of the book now, for the first time, includes its final three chapters: (16) interference and business torts, (17) government liability and civil rights, and (18) tort alternatives.

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TORTZ TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

A. Welcome
B. The Fundamental Problem
C. Parameters
D. Etymology and Vocabulary
E. “The Pound Progression”
F. Alternatives
G. Review

Chapter 2: Intentional Torts

A. Introduction
B. Assault

1. History
2. The Restatement of Torts
3. Subjective and Objective Testing
4. Modern Rule
5. Transferred Intent
6. Statutory Torts and Harassment

C. Battery

1. Modern Rule
2. The Eggshell Plaintiff
3. Knowledge of a Substantially Certain Result
4. Common Law Evolution and Battered Woman Syndrome

D. False Imprisonment

1. Modern Rule
2. Problems

E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

1. Dynamic Intent
2. Modern Rule
3. The “Heart Balm” Torts

F. Fraud

1. Fraud in Context
2. Modern Rule
3. Pleading Fraud
4. Exercise

G. The “Process” Torts

1. Innate Imprecision
2. Modern Rule
3. Majority Rejection of Malicious Civil Prosecution

H. “Prima Facie Tort”

1. Origin of Intentional Tort
2. Modern Rule

Chapter 3: Defenses to Intentional Torts 

A. Introduction
B. Defenses of Self, Other, and Property
C. The Spring Gun Case
D. Arrest Privilege and Merchant’s Privilege
E. Consent

1. Modern Rule
2. Scope of Consent
3. Medical Malpractice
4. Limits of Consent

F. Consent in Sport, or Recklessness

1. The Problem of Sport
2. Recklessness

Chapter 4: Negligence

A. Introduction
B. Modern Rule
C. Paradigmatic Cases
D. Historical and Theoretical Approaches to Negligence

1. Origin
2. Foreseeability
3. Custom
4. Augmented Standards
5. Economics

a. Introduction
b. “The Hand Formula”
c. Coase Theorem, Normativity, and Transaction Costs

6. Aristotelian Justice
7. Insurance and Loss-Spreading

E. Landowner Negligence, or Premises Liability

1. Theory of Duty and Standards of Breach
2. Common Law Tripartite Approach
3. Variations from the Unitary Approach in the Third Restatement
4. Applying the Framework, and Who Decides

F. Responsibility for Third-Party Conduct

1. Attenuated Causation, or “the Frances T.  Problem”: Negligence Liability in Creating Opportunity for a Criminal or Tortious Actor
2. Vicarious Liability and Attenuated Causation in the Employment Context: Respondeat Superior and “Direct” Negligence Theories

G. Statutory Torts and Negligence Per Se

1. Statutory Torts
2. Negligence Per Se

a. Introduction
b. Threshold Test
c. Three Mile Island

H. Medical Negligence
I. Spoliation of Evidence

1. Introduction
2. Minority Rule
3. Recognition or Non-Recognition of the Tort Approach
4. Majority Approach

J. Beyond Negligence

Chapter 5: Defenses to Negligence

A. Express Assumption of Risk (EAOR)
B. EAOR in Medical Negligence, and the Informed Consent Tort

1. Development of the Doctrine
2. The “Reasonable Patient” Standard
3. Modern Rule of Informed Consent
4. Causation in Informed Consent
5. Experimental Medicine

C. “Implied Assumption of Risk” (IAOR)

1. Everyday Life
2. Twentieth-Century Rule
3. Play and Sport
4. Work

D. Contributory Negligence

1. Twentieth-Century Rule
2. Complete Defense
3. Vitiation by “Last Clear Chance”

E. Comparative Fault
F. IAOR in the Age of Comparative Fault

1. The Demise of “IAOR”
2. Whither “Secondary Reasonable IAOR”?
3. Revisiting Mrs. Pursley at Gulfway General Hospital

G. Statutes of Limitations
H. Imputation of Negligence

Chapter 6: Subjective Standards

A. Introduction
B. Gender

1. The Reasonable Family
2. When Gender Matters

C. Youth

1. When Youth Matters
2. Attractive Nuisance
3. When Youth Doesn’t Matter

D. Mental Limitations

1. General Approach
2. Disputed Policy

Chapter 7: Strict Liability

A. Categorical Approach
B. Non-Natural Use of Land
C. Abnormally Dangerous Activities

1. Defining the Class
2. Modern Industry

D. Product Liability

1. Adoption of Strict Liability
2. Modern Norms
3. “Big Tobacco”
4. Frontiers of Product Liability

Chapter 8: Necessity

A. The Malleable Concept of Necessity
B. Necessity in Tort Law
C. Making Sense of Vincent
D. Necessity, the Liability Theory

Chapter 9: Damages

A. Introduction
B. Vocabulary of Damages
C. Theory of Damages
D. Calculation of Damages
E. Valuation of Intangibles
F. Remittitur
G. Wrongful Death and Survival Claims

1. Historical Common Law
2. Modern Statutory Framework

a. Lord Campbell’s Act and Wrongful Death
b. Survival of Action After Death of a Party

3. Problems of Application

H. “Wrongful Birth” and “Wrongful Life”
I. Punitive Damages

1. Introduction
2. Modern Rule
3. Pinpointing the Standard

J. Rethinking Death Compensation

Volume 2

Chapter 10: Res Ipsa Loquitur

A. Basic Rules of Proof
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur (RIL)

1. Modern Rule
2. Paradigmatic Fact Patterns

Chapter 11: Multiple Liabilities

A. Introduction
B. Alternative Liability
C. Joint and Ancillary Liability
D. Market-Share Liability Theory
E. Indemnification, Contribution, and Apportionment

1. Active-Passive Indemnity
2. Contribution and Apportionment
3. Apportionment and the Effect of Settlement

F. Rules and Evolving Models in Liability and Enforcement
G. Review and Application of Models

Chapter 12: Attenuated Duty and Causation

A. Introduction
B. Negligence Per Se Redux

1. The Problem in Duty
2. The Problem in Causation
3. The Problem in Public Policy

C. Duty Relationships and Causation Timelines

1. Introduction
2. Frances T. Redux, or Intervening Criminal Acts
3. Mental Illness and Tarasoff Liability
4. Dram Shop and Social Host Liability
5. Rescue Doctrine and “the Fire Fighter Rule”

a. Inverse Rules of Duty
b. Application and Limits

6. Palsgraf: The Orbit and the Stream

a. The Classic Case
b. A Deeper Dig

D. Principles of Duty and Causation

1. Duty
2. Causation

a. The Story of Causation
b. Proximate Cause in the Second Restatement
c. Scope of Liability in the Third Restatement
d. Proximate Cause in the Third Restatement, and Holdover Rules
e. A Study of Transition: Doull v. Foster

E. The Outer Bounds of Tort Law

1. Balancing the Fundamental Elements
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED)

a. Rule of No Liability
b. Bystanders and Borderline NIED

3. Economic Loss Rule

a. The Injury Requirement
b. Outer Limits of Tort Law
c. Loss in Product Liability and the Single Integrated Product Rule

Chapter 13: Affirmative Duty

A. Social Policy
B. The American Rule
C. Comparative Perspectives
D. Bystander Effect, or “Kitty Genovese Syndrome”

Chapter 14: Nuisance and Property Torts

A. Trespass and Conversion
B. Private Nuisance
C. Public Nuisance and the Distinction Between Private and Public
D. “Super Tort”

Chapter 15: Communication and Media Torts

A. Origin of “Media Torts”
B. Defamation

1. Framework and Rules
2. Defamation of Private Figures

a. Defamation Proof
b. Defamation Defense

3. Anti-SLAPP Defense
4. Section 230 Defense
5. Constitutional Defamation

a. Sea Change: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
b. Extending Sullivan
c. Reconsidering Sullivan

C. Invasion of Privacy

1. Framework and Rules

a. Disclosure
b. Intrusion
c. False Light
d. Right of Publicity
e. Data Protection

2. Constitutional Privacy and False Light
3. Demonstrative Cases

a. Disclosure and Intrusion
b. Right of Publicity
c. Bollea v. Gawker Media

4. Data Protection, Common Law, and Evolving Recognition of Dignitary Harms

Chapter 16: Interference and Business Torts

A. Business Torts in General

1. Tort Taxonomy
2. The Broad Landscape
3. Civil RICO

B. Wrongful Termination
C. Tortious Interference

Chapter 17: Government Liability and Civil Rights

A. Sovereign Immunity

1. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
2. Text and History of the FTCA
3. Discretionary Function Immunity

B. Civil Rights

1. “Constitutional Tort”
2. Core Framework
3. Official Immunities
4. Climate Change

C. Qui Tam
D. Human Rights

1. Alien Tort Statute
2. Anti-Terrorism Laws

Chapter 18: Tort Alternatives

A. Worker Compensation

1. Introduction and History
2. Elements and Causation
3. Efficacy and Reform

B. Ad Hoc Compensation Funds

UK anti-SLAPP bill takes fire

The United Kingdom has an anti-SLAPP bill on the table, and lawyer Gideon Benaim has cataloged objections.

In broad strokes, the bill follows the usual pattern of anti-SLAPP, looking for free speech and public interests on the part of the defendant, which then burdens the plaintiff with proving probable success on the merits out of the gate.

Benaim published his objections on the INFORRM blog, part 1 and part 2. Some of his objections track those that I articulated in 2021 as to American anti-SLAPP statutes. I lamented the unfairness of expecting a plaintiff to meet an extraordinary proof standard such as actual malice as to falsity without the benefit of discovery. The equivalent UK approach expects a plaintiff to overcome a bare public interest defense without the opportunity to probe the publisher's process or motives.

Benaim also points out, as I have, that anti-SLAPP is as likely to be invoked by the powerful against the weak as vice versa; Goliath media giant against aggrieved individual; or, as happened, President Trump against sexual assault complainant Stormy Daniels.

Benaim is a rarity, a plaintiff's lawyer in media torts. Not that everyday aggrieved individuals will be able to score a place on his client list, which includes JK Rowling, Naomi Campbell, Roman Polanski, and Gordon Ramsay.

At least in the United States, at least, the already daunting odds of prevailing in a media tort case against a publisher with expert defense counsel on retainer causes most would-be plaintiffs not to sue at all, no matter how just their causes. They can't find counsel and certainly can't navigate complex media torts pro se. And that's before anti-SLAPP comes into play, threatening a losing plaintiff with having to pay the attorney fees of the media giant's high-dollar representation.

As I've written before, anti-SLAPP works well when it works well. Statutes just aren't drafted to ensure that that's always the case. It looks like the UK is struggling with the same problem.