Law school seminars dive deep in FOI, free press, film

RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0

Students in my spring seminars, in Freedom of Information Law and in Free Press and Film, did outstanding work, and I am indebted both to them and to colleagues who joined my classes for teaching me and enriching my intellectual life.

Recently I spoke on the telephone to a long-time friend in academics, a professor at another university, many miles away. We shared strikingly similar stories of well paid administrators, whose numbers on campus seems to grow faster than the wealth gap, even while they lament cuts of not-nearly-as-well-paid staff and faculty positions to keep us within budget.

Well, the similarity would be striking if we were not accustomed to it. Universities in the United States combating financial exigency now seem to me like the nation of Oceania in George Orwell's 1984. They are forever locked in conflict with one or another enemy that is not in fact the greatest existential threat. Rather, the government itself perpetuates a state of emergency so that apparatchiks (administrators) can consume the fruits of labor while the masses (faculty and students) abide oppressive regulation and a diminishing standard of living.

My friend suggested that I propose and apply for a new university office, perhaps a Vice Chancellor of Financial Exigency. That sounds ironically lucrative. As they say, "when in Rome"; if the empire is falling, grab all the grapes you can.

Our conversation devolved, as it invariably does, into why we put up with it all. Coming in a very close second to paying the mortgage is an answer that I fear is both cliché and self-condemnatory: We are gratified when our students learn and excel.

Faculty Seminar Contributors

In the spring, I had the privilege to teach two seminars, one my recurring offering in freedom-of-information (FOI) law, the other a one-off, a course on free press and film. The FOI class coincided with the conclusion of my term on the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Advisory Committee, which service afforded me an opportunity to expose my students to leading-edge issues in the field.

The free-press-and-film class allowed me and the class to sink our teeth into the captivating book, featured at The Savory Tort in 2024, Filming the First: Cinematic Portrayals of Freedom of the Press (Lexington Books 2025), by my friend and colleague Helen J. Knowles-Gardner, formerly a political science professor and now research director at the Institute for Free Speech (IFS), and co-authors Professor Emeritus Bruce E. Altschuler, retired from political science at SUNY Oswego, and Professor Brandon T. Metroka, faculty in political science at the University of the Incarnate Word (UIW). (Photos: Knowles-Gardner, from IFS; Altschuler, 2017, by Jim Russel, SUNY Oswego '83, Metroka, from UIW).

My classes were enriched by colleagues who gave generously of their time and energy. Professor Knowles-Gardner joined us in person in Free Press and Film to discuss the book's treatment of the films Denial (2016) and Deliberate Intent (2000) (and to give a campus lecture). Professor Altschuler joined us for three classes, discussing his first three chapters of the book and the films Citizen Kane (1941), RKO 281 (1999), All the President's Men (1976), The Post (2017), Network (1976), and The Social Network (2010). Attorney Dan Greenberg, of the Cato Institute, joined Free Press and Film to discuss his documentary film, American Libel (2025), featured at The Savory Tort last year. (Photo: Dan Greenberg, from Cato.)

My FOI class welcomed attorney and information practice Professor Jason Baron, University of Maryland (U. Md.), and a fellow member of the FOIA Advisory Committee; Arkansas investigative journalist Brandon Howard; independent filmmaker and journalism and mass communication Professor Natalie Pattillo, and a university student leader and student journalist; Professor Robert Steinbuch, featured recently here at The Savory Tort, Bowen Law School, University of Arkansas, Little Rock (UALR); attorney and adjunct professor Gregory V. Sullivan, president of Malloy & Sullivan and president of the New England First Amendment Coalition; and journalism and media studies Professor A.Jay Wagner, Diederich College of Communication, Marquette University, a past member of the FOIA Advisory Committee.

Professor Baron discussed the science of artificial intelligence and how advancements in the era will change the practice of FOI law for both requesters and record officers. Journalist Howard joined the class to talk about his past newspaper reporting and ongoing pro se FOI litigation to access a cold murder investigation case file in northwest Arkansas (see, e.g., The Weekly Vista; see also breaking news). Professor Steinbuch discussed his ongoing transparency advocacy in Arkansas and opinion writing for The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette. Attorney Sullivan discussed his remarkable record of high-profile access litigation and appellate argument on behalf of New England journalists. Professor Wagner discussed his recent work on statutory citizenship requirements to block state access to public records and the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of the laws.

Professor Pattillo and her student, whose identity I am protecting just in case, discussed contemporary challenges facing campus journalists, including recalcitrant administrators. Professor Pattillo's teaching contract at UMass Dartmouth was not renewed this academic year (e.g., LinkedIn, New Bedford Light, Boston Globe (paywall)). 

(Photos: Jason Baron, from U. Md.; Brandon Howard, from LinkedIn; Natalie Pattillo, from the Center for Independent Documentary; Robert Steinbuch, from UALR; Gregory V. Sullivan, from Malloy & Sullivan; A.Jay Wagner, from Marquette University.)

Student Seminar Contributors

Students in both seminars produced a range of thought-provoking papers built upon insightful research and analysis. I am here honored to share selected titles and abstract, with authors' permission. I thank these stars for their work and for their collaborative spirit in learning with and from each other, and I anticipate with great pleasure their shining future contributions to the legal profession.

—in Freedom of Information Law

Jeremy Aylward, Retaining Transparency in the Digital Age: Retention of Electronic Records Under Federal and State Freedom of Information Laws. The proliferation of electronic records and digital communications has fundamentally challenged the legal frameworks governing government transparency and public accountability. While the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Federal Records Act (FRA) establish baseline obligations for the retention and disclosure of electronic records, the enforceability of those obligations remains structurally compromised. This paper analyzes and synthesizes the legal frameworks governing the retention and disclosure of electronic records and messages under federal law and the open records statutes of California, Colorado, and Virginia, with particular attention to how those frameworks can be meaningfully enforced. Drawing on statutory text, agency guidance, and judicial interpretation, this paper examines how each jurisdiction defines "electronic records," what retention schedules apply, how personal device and third-party platform use by public officials is treated, and critically, what mechanisms exist to compel compliance, sanction violations, and remedy the destruction or concealment of covered records. The paper argues that across all four jurisdictions, electronic records retention law suffers from a common structural deficiency: obligations are broad in theory but weak in enforcement. This leaves agencies largely self-policing in an environment where the incentives to retain records often conflict with the incentives to delete them. While California's content-focused judicial approach offers the most expansive access framework, and Colorado and Virginia provide more structured but still under-enforced retention regimes, none of the examined frameworks provides a reliably enforceable mechanism for preventing loss of electronic records at the point of creation or ensuring accountability after the fact. The paper concludes by identifying the enforcement gaps that most critically undermine the transparency purposes of freedom of information law and by synthesizing lessons across jurisdictions for legislative and judicial reform. (Image: RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0.)

Davis Preston, The Public Records Law Battles with State University Athletic Programs. Universities have taken advantage of state public record exemptions to skirt disclosures of their spending. To combat the skirting of disclosures and to provide more transparency, the NCAA mandates budget disclosures. Public records law exemptions still apply to the schools, but the NCAA mandates force the schools to disclose certain financial information anyway. These mandatory budget disclosures have their own limitations that allow schools to avoid full disclosure. They open the door to what money goes where, but withhold important information, such as who donates, how much they donate, and how the fundraising is organized. There are different structures for how athletic departments operate, but most use private or semi-private entities. Schools use privatization to avoid full disclosure after they meet the NCAA mandate. Different states have different laws that allow universities to avoid full disclosure. The University of Arkansas utilizes a private foundation, multiple universities in Florida utilize direct support organizations, and the University of Georgia utilizes disclosure time extensions. The laws are used to circumvent the public records law, which was enacted to hold public bodies accountable and provide transparency. The universities argue that they should have privacy on financials, as this allows them to keep a competitive advantage over other universities. This argument is met with the public interest in how the government spends money and whether this is done with transparency. There should be statutory change to prevent this circumvention of disclosure. Statutory change would entail eliminating exemption for direct support organizations, standardization of the function equivalent test, and the elimination of time extensions. (Image: RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0.)

Natalie Whitt, Civil Enforcement, Criminal Secrecy: Exemption 7 and the Expansion of FOIA Withholding in Immigration. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted to promote accountability and transparency by providing public access to government records, which can be essential where state authority is most coercive. Public oversight of law enforcement depends heavily on access to government records, yet requests for information concerning police misconduct and officer discipline frequently encounter resistance under FOIA Exemption 7. This provision permits agencies to withhold records compiled for law enforcement purposes when disclosure could cause specified harms, including unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, interference with investigations, and safety risks. Although these protections serve legitimate interests, their application in the policing context often limits public access to information necessary to evaluate how coercive state authority is exercised. Courts typically afford a high level of deference to agencies in determining whether records qualify as law enforcement materials and in assessing claimed harms, while disclosure obligations such as segregability receive comparatively limited enforcement. The result can be a practical barrier to transparency in cases involving alleged misconduct, systemic failures, or patterns of negative behavior from law enforcement. This Article argues that the way courts apply Exemption 7 in the context of policing creates barriers to public oversight that are difficult to reconcile with FOIA’s central purpose of promoting accountability for government power. Law enforcement agencies have a unique authority to detain, search, and use force, while transparency regarding the exercise of that authority serves both individual and systemic public interests. However, courts do not consistently distinguish between personal privacy concerns and information reflecting official conduct, and agencies’ assertions of harm are often accepted without requiring narrowly tailored justifications. (Image: RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0.)

Tryon P. Woods, Prison Conditions and Public Access Or 1(st Am.) + 5(th Am.) + 8(th Am.) + 14(th Am.) < 0—Public Access Math. This paper examines the ongoing problem of prison conditions and the public’s access to information about what goes on inside prisons. I approach the topic as a twin problem in which access and conditions are opposite sides of the same coin. The correlation between access restrictions and the unconstitutional treatment of prisoners has a long history and nation-wide scope. Tracking the aftermath of the seminal case of the Attica Prison uprising in 1971 through several lawsuits arising from institutional failures in Arizona, California, Massachusetts, and NYC, this paper argues that in a "total institution" such as a prison or jail, visibility is the leverage on which control hinges. This relationship between the public’s access to information about prison conditions and the constitutional violations suffered by prisoners is refracted in the Court’s First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence on prisons since the passage of FOIA in 1966. Despite the Court’s best efforts, together with prison administrators, the relational reality of law remains undeniable: the undoing of legal personhood for people inside serves as the precondition for inventing the human outside. (When not appearing in class as a law student to sate his insatiable appetite for learning, Professor Woods also is a gifted faculty colleague in crime and justice studies at UMass Dartmouth.—RJPS) (Image: Attica Correctional Facility, 2007, by Bronayur via Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0.)

—in Free Press and Film

Bryce Mayo, "A Victim of the Modern Age": Soft Law, Private Suppression, and the Gap in First Amendment Theory. Film: A Clockwork Orange (1971). The First Amendment limits government suppression of speech but does not restrict decisions by private actors. Constitutional doctrine therefore provides little guidance when expression is constrained through private pressures, market incentives, or self-censorship. These forms of non-governmental suppression rarely enter the public consciousness until controversy surrounding particular works expose gaps in the protection of free expression. Stanley Kubrick’s decision to withdraw A Clockwork Orange from circulation in the United Kingdom illustrates this limitation. Although the film was not subject to a nationwide legal prohibition, public controversy, media criticism, and local regulatory pressures preceded Kubrick’s nearly three-decade self-removal. The film thus remained legally protected yet practically inaccessible within the United Kingdom. This incident provides an example of how expressive works may be limited without formal government censorship. This paper examines Kubrick’s withdrawal through a United States constitutional framework. It focuses on the distinction between state restriction and private control over distribution and argues that the quasi-ban of A Clockwork Orange reveals a structural gap in First Amendment theory: while speech is protected from government censorship, it may nonetheless be suppressed through "soft law" mechanisms that operate outside formal doctrine. By separating the concept of legal protection from the reality of circulation, the paper clarifies how expression may be constrained outside traditional censorship models. Recognizing this distinction clarifies the practical limits of First Amendment protections and refines how free speech is understood in modern media environments shaped by market forces, rating systems, and distribution controls.

Amanda McKim, Speech is Free, But Lies You (Should) Have to Pay For: Alex Jones as a Case Study for the Inefficacies of Defamation Remedies. Film: The Truth vs. Alex Jones (2024). The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against government-imposed limitations on freedom of speech and the press. However, the First Amendment does not protect false, defamatory statements. The intersection of these two areas of law has been analyzed at length, but changes in the way society communicates raises new and more dangerous problems regarding the ways in which courts address the impacts of defamation. With the continually expanding use of smart phones, access to endless perspectives in media, and few ways to definitively “fact-check” sources, misinformation is rampant, and defamation remedies provide increasingly less meaningful relief to victims. Alex Jones, a prominent radio show host, was sued in two states and has three judgments against him for defaming victims’ families in the 2012 Sandy Hook school shooting. The complaints were filed in 2018 and resulted in final judgements in 2022 of $1.5 billion dollars in damages. Jones has since filed for bankruptcy, has yet to pay the victims. He continues to disparage the proceedings to his audience of 30 million daily listeners. The plaintiffs’ inability to recover and Jones’s continuing perpetuation of harmful rhetoric exemplify the ineffectiveness of current remedies to meaningfully address serious speech-based harms. Despite legal scholars’ critiques of equitable remedies in defamation cases, equity might be the best way to address previous harm, prevent future harm, and provide victims with the most appropriate relief. (Image: Instagram post by WBRC-TV 6 News, 2025. With characteristic wisdom and compassion, Ms. McKim suggested that the visual element for this post might honor the victims of Sandy Hook, rather than draw further attention to Alex Jones, who doesn't need help with publicity. I could not agree more.—RJPS)

Sean Pillai, Embedded Reporting and Freedom of the Press in Contemporary U.S. Military Operations. Films: Restrepo (2010), Korengal (2014). Embedding journalists with U.S. military combat operations highlights the ongoing struggle to balance democratic transparency with the practical realities of fighting a war. The system of embed reporting was created to give the public a clearer view of what happens on the front lines, but it also has raised continuing legal and ethical questions about how independent reporters truly can be when the military controls their access and movement. This paper looks at those tensions through the perspectives offered in Restrepo (2010) and Korengal (2014), while examining the most recent policy behind U.S. military media policy. The embed system shows why some limits on access are required in combat zones and that journalists must continue to expose themselves to risk both in the legal realm and physically in combat to protect speech. 

Carson Powell, From Accessible Knowledge to Smoldering Ashes: How a 1953 Novel Reflects a Growing Current Reality. Film: Fahrenheit 451 (2018). A story created in 1953, in which books are outlawed, and "firemen" burn any that are found, illustrates the censorship of knowledge and literature. In Arkansas, on March 30, 2023, the legislature approved Act 372, which included new standards for individuals selling books, whether that be public libraries or small bookstores. Act 372 in theory was approved to protect minors from stumbling onto books and materials of mature topics, but many librarians disagreed with that sentiment. The librarians of Fayetteville Public Library, joined by many other librarians believed that the act forces libraries and bookstores to segregate novels with "mature subjects" into "adult only" areas, with a risk of criminal prosecution for failing to do so. The Fayetteville Public Library, American Civil Liberties Union of Arkansas, and others filed complaints alleging that Act 372, like outright book banning, violates the First Amendment as overbreadth, vague, and content based. The lawsuit further alleged that the Act was intended to limit access of books and media to individuals who have a constitutional right to the books in question. The Arkansas legislature follows a growing trend around the United States of State’s legislators introducing and implementing acts regarding content-based censorship. Increasing enactments of laws aimed at removing “obscene” materials to protect children effectively discriminates against people of color, underrepresented communities, and members of the LGBTQ+ community. The suppression of media, whether by segregating books in the library or bookstore, or by facilitating their removal smaller institutions having to take the books off the shelves at risk of prosecution, reflects the themes of Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451.

Jakob Resnik, Apocalypse When? Latent Power of 47 U.S.C. § 606. Film: Apocalypse Now (1979). 47 U.S.C. § 606 ("the Act"), "The War Powers of the President," is an unused emergency provision of the Telecommunications Act that threatens freedom of speech. Apocalypse Now contains a scene depicting a Time magazine article reporting inaccurately on the Vietnam War. The movie does not say whether Time published the article of its own volition or at the direction of the Government. In the "real world," the Act enables the President to seize and control certain media outlets during emergencies, possibly controlling public reception of the emergency. The Act lacks clear definitions or statutory guardrails, conferring power so broadly that it is easily abused. Apocalypse Now used a prop magazine article to illustrate dishonesty in the media without showing where the lie really came from. Under the Act, a censored message can easily be spread to deceive the public regardless of free speech objections that outlets may raise. This is a threat to free speech.

Corie Scott, Tried Inside a Story: Pretrial Narrative and the Fragility of the Presumption of Innocence. Film: When They See Us (2019). Ava DuVernay’s When They See Us documents what happens when narrative precedes adjudication. The prosecution of the Central Park Five—who now identify as the Exonerated Five—illustrates how media coverage, official statements, and public discourse can converge to construct a story of guilt before evidence is tested in court. That story proved more durable than the convictions it preceded and more resistant to correction than the exonerations that followed. The case is extraordinary in its consequences. The dynamic it reflects is not. This paper examines the tension between First Amendment press freedom and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair trial through doctrinal analysis and a preliminary comparative study of contemporary criminal reporting. Drawing on a close reading of fifteen articles across local news outlets, national publications, tabloid media, and government press releases, the analysis examines patterns in headline labeling, suspect characterization, moral descriptor language, victim framing, contextual background, and the presence or absence of presumption-of-innocence language. The sample is illustrative rather than representative and is offered to surface patterns consistent with the doctrinal concerns the paper identifies. The findings identify patterns that warrant closer legal and empirical attention. Narrative intensity, humanizing context, and presumption-of-innocence framing vary consistently across source types – and, with regularity that raises due process and equal protection concerns, across defendants. White defendants were disproportionately introduced through professional identity and personal context. Black and Latino defendants were more frequently framed through criminal identity and categorical threat language, with government press releases producing the most authoritative and criminalized framing of any source category examined. These patterns point to a structural gap in existing doctrine. First Amendment protections permit the circulation of narratives that assign meaning to accusation. Sixth Amendment safeguards operate within the courtroom to mitigate identifiable prejudice. Neither framework fully addresses how pretrial narratives shape the ground on which guilt is adjudicated. This paper argues that the law’s current approach is incomplete—not because it fails on its own terms, but because it was not designed for an information environment in which narrative formation is rapid, self-reinforcing, and difficult to unwind. The presumption of innocence survives as a formal rule. Whether it survives as a lived condition of adjudication, for all defendants equally, is the question the paper raises—and the one it calls on doctrine and empirical scholarship to more fully answer.

Alayna Wageman, Accountability Gaps at The International Criminal Court: How States Get Away with Murder. Film: A Private War (2018). Women journalists operating in conflict zones are targeted not only because of their reporting, but because of their gender. Sexual violence, intimidation, and physical assault are deployed as deliberate tools to silence women in the press, yet international law has failed to translate its formal protections into meaningful, enforceable accountability. This paper investigates that failure through the legendary war correspondent Marie Colvin. In Colvin v. Syrian Arab Republic, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a default judgment of $302,511,836.00 against Syria for the deliberate targeting and killing of Marie Colvin during her reporting in Homs in 2012. Syria has never paid. Additionally, the conduct that killed Colvin, a state-directed attack on civilian journalists in armed conflict, falls within the jurisdictional reach of the Rome Statute as a war crime under Article 8, yet no International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution followed. Syria is not a signatory and the UN Security Council vetoed the referral. Thus, even when liability is established, the absence of enforceable international laws leaves victims without remedies and states without consequences. Colvin's case is not exceptional. It is representative of a systemic pattern in which gender-based violence suppresses journalistic work and states face no meaningful consequences. This paper highlights three structural deficiencies within the International Criminal Court framework revealed by the Colvin case. This paper contends that addressing these gaps necessitates structural reforms beyond the scope of the current system.

Rebecca Wood, A Relic of the Past: It’s Time To Deal With The Equal Time Rule. Film: Man of the Year (2006). This paper utilizes the 2006 film Man Of The Year to introduce and illustrate systemic inconsistencies in the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) enforcement of the equal time rule. The rule, Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, requires broadcast licensees providing airtime to a legally qualified candidate must also provide equal air time all opposing candidates. The rule is introduced by examining the absence of discussion and enforcement of it and its requirements throughout the film despite a talk-show host’s presidential campaign. This paper suggests that the omission is illustrative of the inconsistent and arbitrary application of the rule in the real world. Next, the history and origins of the rule are explored beginning with the rule’s origin in the Radio Act of 1927 through present day talk show challenges. Subsequently, the rule’s inconsistent implementation and the question of censorship are investigated with examples in media, case law, and FCC proceedings and notices from the rule’s beginning through present day. Finally, possible remedies such as further defining the rule, post-Chevron challenges, or repealing the rule are considered.

Carr, Trump threaten broadcasters unconstitutionally, experts attest, but the play's the thing

Late last week, on Sunshine Week, former Federal Communications Commission (FCC) officials, civil society organizations, and First Amendment scholars organized by D.C.-based TechFreedom, sent a letter to FCC Chairman Brendan Carr asserting the unconstitutionality of threats to revoke broadcast licenses and to prosecute broadcasters for treason.

I joined the letter, which observed that the Communications Act of 1934, while allowing the government broad discretion to regulate "as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires," also disallows censorship.

At risk of exhausting the word "unprecedented," that's the best way to describe the strong-arm tactics of the Trump Administration that have wrought havoc with late-night comedy and hammered historically stalwart network news into conformity. Accusing media of treason for not favorably spinning the Iran war is beyond the pale.

Early in the history of U.S. telecommunication regulation, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the government power to regulate in the public interest. The Court, like the public, was wary of seemingly miraculous new communication technologies. And transmission over unseen electromagnetic waves posed real technical challenges, such as interference and scarcity.

Even when the civil rights era sparked a sea change and invigoration in First Amendment jurisprudence, the peculiar prerogative of public broadcasting regulation persisted. 

Researchers and social activists raised alarms about the impact of television on child development. With "the first televised war" in Vietnam as backdrop, many commentators theorized a causal link between television and social unrest. Accordingly, First Amendment law enshrined the principle of "media balkanization," meaning government regulatory power varied by medium, as between, for example, a newspaper and a TV station.

Late in the 20th century, the status of the internet in the schema of media balkanization was much debated. The internet blurred traditional lines, such as between print and broadcast, and as between journalist and ordinary citizen. As the internet became pervasive in American life, and the technology improved toward handheld recording and video streaming, the prospect of internet regulation seemed ever less akin to broadcast licensing and more akin to censorship. 

Thus, in the 1990s, the Supreme Court charted a course away from disparate treatment of the internet. Still, balkanization doctrine has never been addressed definitively in the digital age, much less abolished. Internet abuses, from revenge porn to social media addiction, continue to bolster arguments for regulatory models tailored to the online environment. And conventional broadcasters still have a foot in the bear trap of FCC licensing, as the agency nears its centennial.

Carr and Trump's threats thus occur at a nadir of constitutional confidence in the government power to regulate by way of broadcast licensing.

Yet constitutionality might be beside the point. A lesson Trump learned well in a lifetime of litigation is that the powerful economic actors that dominate our society fear uncertainty and risk more than they fear impact and loss. That is to say, the Sword of Damocles is more dangerous for its potential than for its blade. 

The threat to censor, or to impose transactions costs in resisting censorship, has proven effective in compelling commercially minded media corporations to toe the official line. 

And therein lies an especially pernicious threat to free speech, because our legal system, thus far, has proven profoundly ill equipped to counter.

Knowles-Gardner tells story of NAACP v. Alabama, landmark civil rights case on freedom of association

Dr. Helen Knowles-Gardner spoke at UMass Law School Wednesday on "When Alabama Tried to Destroy the NAACP (and Freedom of Association)."

In recognition of Black History Month, Dr. Knowles-Gardner, research director at the Institute for Free Speech (IFS), talked about a crucial moment in the nation’s civil rights history. In 1956, Alabama waged war on the NAACP by demanding that the organization turn over its membership lists to the state. The NAACP was unable to operate in Alabama for eight years. Litigation produced the landmark First Amendment freedom of association decision, still relevant today, NAACP v. Alabama (U.S. 1958).

Dr. Knowles-Gardner explained how the civil rights precedent in NAACP has contemporary relevance in cases such as First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin (SCOTUSblog), in which the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in December. The case centers on a New Jersey subpoena for donor names and staff information from a chain of anti-abortion pregnancy centers. The centers argue the state investigation violates the First Amendment freedom of association. The Court seemed skeptical of the state's asserted need for the information. IFS filed an amicus brief, informed by Knowles-Gardner's research, on the side of the centers. The political shoe might be on the other foot in the case, but the freedom-of-association issue is strikingly familiar.

RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

Dr. Knowles-Gardner joined the Institute for Free Speech as research director in 2023 after working for almost 20 years as a political science professor. She has written extensively about American law and politics, including editing or author credits on Judging Free Speech: First Amendment Jurisprudence of U.S. Supreme Court Justices (2015), Free Speech Theory: Understanding the Controversies (2020), and The Tie Goes to Freedom: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy On Liberty (upd. ed. 2018) (C-SPAN, 2009), and research articles in political science and law.

In 2024, Dr. Knowles-Gardner published the first in a series of articles related to this talk and her current research, The First Amendment to the Constitution, Associational Freedom, and the Future of the Country: Alabama’s Direct Attack on the Existence of the NAACP, in the Seattle University Law Review. In 2025, she published Without a Little Help from Your Friends: The Supreme Court's Rejection of the American Jewish Congress Amicus Brief in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (1958) in the Journal of Supreme Court History, for which Dr. Knowles-Gardner serves as managing editor.

Dr. Knowles-Gardner's third co-authored book is Filming the First: Cinematic Portrayals of Freedom of the Press (2025). With this book, I am teaching a seminar at UMass Law this semester, Free Press and Film.

Dr. Knowles-Gardner earned her Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston University and a B.A. in American Studies with first class honors from Liverpool Hope University College (now Hope University) in Liverpool, England. An avid runner, Dr. Knowles-Gardner participates in races across the country, including the Marine Corps Marathon, running with the American flag for Team RWB, a national organization devoted to enhancing the lives of the nation’s veterans. She and her husband, a disabled U.S. Navy veteran, live in upstate New York.

The talk at UMass Law School was co-sponsored by the Black Law Students Association, the Law & Political Economy student organization, and the Office of the Dean.

Did Donald Trump go to prep school with Citizen Kane?

I just re-watched the masterpiece Citizen Kane (1941), and a line I'd never noticed before dropped my jaw.

I'm teaching a seminar on freedom of the press in film this semester with the superb new book by friends and colleagues, Helen J. Knowles-Gardner, Bruce E. Altschuler, and Brandon T. Metroka, Filming the First: Cinematic Portrayals of Freedom of the Press (2025). I wrote about the book here in 2024.

The second film featured in the book is the Orson Welles classic Citizen Kane. It raises for consideration a host of issues around the meaning of the First Amendment, whether as law or ideal, and the role of the press in a democracy. A key issue arises from the central character, Charlie Kane, a fictional analog to the real-life William Randolph Hearst.

Hearst was a media mogul in his time, the late 19th century and early 20th, a central figure in the yellow journalism era. Hearst and Kane alike prompt consideration of the very contemporary problem of media consolidation. My class considered data from a recent Roosevelt Institute report (inset), which described the economics of the news business over the course of American history, culminating in a deeply worrisome status quo.

Prof. Altschuler, who joined my class via Zoom for part of our discussion, wrote in the book that President Donald Trump has twice in interviews identified Citizen Kane as his favorite movie. As Prof. Altschuler remarked to my class, President Trump might not have gotten the message Welles intended.

Quoting an anecdote told by Ruth Warrick, the actress who played Kane's first wife in the movie, Prof. Altschuler reported, "Welles told the cast that the movie 'is about the kind of man that Americans tend to make their heroes, when actually they are the despoilers of their country.'"

I knew all of that, having just read up on the film in anticipation of re-watching it after decades. Yet I was caught off guard by something completely unexpected.

In the film, there is a scene (cued in video below) in which Kane is courting the woman who would become his second wife—the real-life Hearst separated from his wife, who would not grant him a divorce, and lived his later years with a second partner—and to amuse her, Kane, played by writer-director Orson Welles himself, wiggled his ears. 

Kane explained to his romantic interest: "It took me two solid years in the best boys' school in the world to learn that trick. The fellow who taught it to me is now the President of Venezuela" (USA Today).

7 years since shocking hate crime, civil rights suit over Nantucket public meeting surfaces racial tension

Nantucket African Meeting House, 1880
Nantucket Historical Association

A shocking hate crime of vandalism on storied Nantucket Island in 2018 has resulted in sour police-community relations, a free-speech civil-rights claim remanded to trial court just this August, and retention in September of a private firm for an independent review.

In March 2018, the historic 1827 African Meeting House on Nantucket Island was vandalized with hate speech in black spray paint, including the "n-word," as shown in the image below, at bottom, from the appendix to the August appellate court decision. (Sensitive readers be warned.)

To date, no one has been convicted of the vandalism. In a civil rights lawsuit by Nantucket residents Jim Barros and Rose Marie Samuels, the Superior Court in 2022 blamed a suspect, Dylan Ponce, who asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and whom a grand jury refused to indict.

Ponce's employer, Jeffrey Sayle, pleaded guilty to false statement to police and testified that Ponce confessed (The Inquirer and Mirror). The civil case against Ponce was Barros v. Ponce, Civil Action No. 2175CV00004 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 6, 2022) (paywalled at Mass. Lawyers Weekly).

Town Manager Elizabeth Gibson
Town & County of Nantucket

Sayle is the brother-in-law of Nantucket town manager Elizabeth Gibson, who herself is married to the deputy police chief of Nantucket. Given the close relationships of officials and the slow and ultimately unsuccessful police investigation, rumors picked up steam in the years after the 2018 crime that family members of Gibson and police were being protected.

In 2020, Barros and Samuels appeared at a meeting of the town board, as they had before, to demand accountability in the still ongoing investigation. Their remarks fueled continuing suspicion of a cover-up, which prompted the ire of Gibson and police chief William Pittman. 

Chief William Pittman
(captured from public meeting video)

Samuels's exchange with Gibson was especially heated. Angrily denying untruthfulness, Gibson interrupted Samuels and demanded that the chair stop her from speaking further. Samuels, who also accused police of failure to investigate a hit-and-run crash that injured her son in 2018 (more at Change.org), was cowed back to hear seat. She returned to the microphone after Gibson stormed out of the meeting.

Barros accused police of lying because he he had been told by a detective that a perpetrator was identified, but no charges resulted. Pittman, who carried a sidearm, spoke in defense of the police and accused Barros of fueling rumors of a cover-up while claiming to know the identity of perpetrators and refusing to tell police. Pittman retired in 2023.

The salient part of the public meeting is on YouTube, cued here at 27 minutes, and running for 13 minutes:

Barros and Samuels brought a civil rights action against the board, Gibson, and Pittman for violating their free speech rights under the federal and state constitutions, and for intimidation under state civil rights law. The Superior Court granted defendants summary judgment on both counts. In August, the Appeals Court voted 2-1 to to remand Samuels's statutory civil rights claim only to proceed.

The facts matter, in more detail than I've stated them here, because the pretrial disposition turns on whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the claims to a jury. Interested readers can find more detailed articulations of the facts in the judges' opinions.

In short, the court rejected the constitutional claims because neither Barros nor Samuels was actually stopped from speaking. Samuels was allowed to return to the microphone and continue after Gibson stormed out. Barros was allowed to say his piece despite the objections interjected by Pittman.

The civil rights claims were closer calls, though, because intimidation, threat, or coercion is actionable even if the plaintiffs were permitted to speak. The test is one of interference or attempted interference of a protected right, here to speak at the public meeting. 

For pretrial resolution on defense motion, the court views the facts most favorably for the plaintiffs, the non-moving parties. Yet even accepting as true that Barros "was impugned by Pittman, suffered embarrassment, and felt intimidated by Pittman's being armed," the court decided, the sum of Pittman's alleged interference was only impassioned disagreement or disapproval, not intimidation.

Rose Marie Samuels, 2020
(captured from public meeting video)

However, in the case of Samuels, Gibson expressly demanded that she be silenced, and Samuels evidenced intimidation in once returning to her seat. The court concluded, "Gibson's response to Samuels's comments, including Gibson's physically threatening departure from the meeting and hostile, intimate back-and-forth with Samuels, could be sufficient to establish a violation of the [state civil rights act] at trial."

The court's analysis of Samuels's civil rights claim raised an interesting point of "constitutional tort" law, that is, the way tort law is used to operationalize litigation over civil rights. Under state civil rights law, the court explained, "[i]n determining whether conduct constitutes threats, intimidation, or coercion, we apply an objective or 'reasonable person' standard."

Yet like in tort law, the "reasonable person" standard is not wholly objective, but is a test of the reasonable person under the same circumstances as the person being tested, or standing in the shoes of the person being tested. As the court put it, "'objectivity' does not foreclose consideration of the plaintiff's situation"; "we need not ignore who the plaintiff is."

That subjectivity made a big difference in light of Samuels's personal history with police. Considering the facts favorably to her, "she had experienced, and continued to experience, racism from the Nantucket police," the court reasoned. "She mistrusted Gibson, the town manager, who was married to the deputy police chief."

In that emotional context, the court recalled, "Samuels maintains that Gibson 'stormed' past her when leaving the meeting, 'in a physically threatening manner,' 'glar[ed] down' at Samuels from 'within a few feet,' and stopped to ask, twice, whether Samuels was calling her a liar. Samuels characterized Gibson's voice as 'loud and threatening,' and Samuels was frightened by this encounter."

Samuels therefore made a sufficient case to present her claim of intimidation for a jury to decide.

Justice Smyth

Justice Paul Hart Smyth wrote a spirited dissent favoring the plaintiffs on all three counts on which the court affirmed judgment for the defense. He would have sent all four claims, for both plaintiffs, to the jury. Be forewarned, I'm going to quote Justice Smyth at some length, because what he adds to the analysis on Nantucket social conditions I find eye opening.

Speaking to those very circumstances that made a difference in Samuels's statutory claim, Justice Smyth painted a different and bleaker picture of police-community relations on Nantucket.

The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs inhabited a different stratum in the town altogether, as they maintained no apparent political, economic, social, public order, or law enforcement influence over town affairs. First, he described Gibson's social and economic power.

Gibson first began working for the town of Nantucket in 1988, when she was twenty-two years old. She has held the position of town manager since 1995. As town manager, Gibson is a remarkably powerful and influential individual. She exercises direct supervision over almost every town department, including the police, fire, building, finance, health, marine and coastal resources, public works, board of appeals, conservation commission, planning board, council on aging, counsel for human services, historic district commission, parks and recreation, and the shellfish and harbor advisory board. As town manager, Gibson maintains appointment and disciplinary (including discharge) powers over the department chiefs and their employees.... Gibson is not subject to general election, but ... had been reappointed for consecutive terms since 1995.

.... As an acknowledgment of Gibson's influence, multiple town residents warned Barros that he might face adverse consequences to challenging Gibson by implicating her relatives as being involved in the African Meeting House crime. These individuals cautioned Barros, "You know, it's [Gibson's] son and nephew; so, be careful. Watch your back."

He then described the plaintiffs in contrast:

The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs inhabited a different stratum in the town altogether, as they maintained no apparent political, economic, social, public order, or law enforcement influence over town affairs. Samuels, of Jamaican descent, became a full-time resident of Nantucket in 1999; she resides on Nantucket with her son. Samuels has worked in the home healthcare field when her health permits.

James Barros, seventy-six years old [in 2020], worked as a part-time drywaller and plasterer. He has lived intermittently on Nantucket since he was eight years old. Barros, skeptical that the Nantucket police were committed to solving the African Meeting House crime, sought assurance that the police were dutifully investigating the matter .... As Barros stated: "That building is part of me. I'm an African. I have a right to ask who is doing damage to my house."

James Barros
(captured from public meeting video)

Justice Smyth also put additional facts on the table to suggest that the court majority gave Barros's claim short shrift, particularly insofar as circumstances may subjectify the "reasonable person" analysis.

The record supports a rational jury concluding that Pittman's words and conduct threatened Barros to the extent that Barros was terrified when he stood at the town meeting to respond. Barros's fear was based in part on his experience as a Black man who was distrustful and a vocal critic of the Nantucket police. As a consequence of Barros's continued pressure on the police to meaningfully pursue the hate crime investigation, the lead town investigator, Detective Klinger, responded with hostility toward Barros. In addition, numerous people advised Barros "to watch [his] back," and warned him that the Nantucket police were going to "set him up." .... 

The record demonstrates that Barros's fear of the Nantucket police was well grounded. Barros, while driving, was pulled over by the police on two separate occasions following the March 11 board meeting. One Sunday morning, a Nantucket officer pulled Barros over as Barros was headed home from Mass celebrated at St. Mary's Church. The officer approached Barros's truck with his hand on his gun. Although the officer stated that he stopped Barros due to a brake light malfunction, the record indicates Barros's lights were functioning properly and allows the inference of a retaliatory stop. 

In sum, Justice Smyth found sufficient evidence to show interference with civil rights of both plaintiffs, as a matter of fact, and of persons of "reasonable fortitude" in their circumstances, applying the objective test.

Frederick Douglass, center left, at abolitionist meeting, N.Y., 1850.
He first visited Nantucket for an anti-slavery conference in 1841.
Smithsonian Institute/Mr. & Mrs. Set Charles Momjian, via National Park Service

Justice Smyth offered a spirited conclusion that invoked Nantucket's abolitionist history and rallied the judiciary to the defense of speech critical of public officials:

Nearly one hundred and eighty years after Frederick Douglass sought refuge in Massachusetts and traveled to Nantucket to make his first public speech condemning slavery, a person desecrated a site sacred to the island's Black community with the words "Nigger leave." The act was more than an act of property vandalism, as it communicated a direct threat to the plaintiffs' safety and well-being as Black residents of Nantucket. While the United States Constitution, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and our laws will never eradicate the hatred and racism in the hearts of individuals who commit such acts, our legal framework guarantees people the right to speak out against such offenses, to petition local officials for answers, and to criticize local government and police officials for failing in their oaths to support our laws and Constitution and to seek justice for all.

Of course, it would be folly to take the force and endurance of these constitutional rights for granted, perhaps lulled by the longstanding welfare and security of our nation and by our courts' historical commitment to safeguarding free speech rights as fundamental to our representative democracy. We do not have that luxury because, even considering the relative strength of our democracy, these rights are subject to the whim of unchecked power that allows for tyrannical tendencies to suppress contrary viewpoints. Thus, the judiciary's vigilance to protect from government interference our people's right to speak to public issues is as critical today as it was when the First Amendment was ratified in 1791.

(Paragraph break added; citations omitted.)

Nantucket Harbor, 2021
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

I get Pittman's frustration at having failed to secure a prosecution for the vandalism, and, presumably with laudable motivations to avoid conflict of interest, in having ceded the investigation to the district attorney and state police. Nevertheless, he and Gibson, as public officials, have to have thicker skin, especially for justifiable outrage at a public meeting.

I share public outrage that such a hateful act defaced a historic place of contemporary cultural importance, and that no prosecution followed, upon whatever tragicomedy of errors. (I include the image below, from the court's appendix, despite the offensive epithet, to demonstrate the severity and offensiveness of the crime.) To be fair to Nantucketers, after the overnight vandalism in 2018, more than a dozen distraught local residents turned out to scrub the African Meeting House clean by 10 a.m. the next morning (Cape Cod Times). But bad eggs are still at large.

Estimates vary, but cost of living on Nantucket usually is said to exceed the national average by more than 100%, and housing costs run more than 300% over. You can bet that upper-crust property owners aren't doing much of the manual labor on the island to keep that economic engine running. Nantucket depends on a significant Jamaican population to work in the tourism industry. Yet the government on the island is worrisomely non-representative of the population by racial demographics.

Once addressing a crowd in Cork, Ireland, Frederick Douglass was shouted down with cries of, "That's a lie," "He shan’t speak," and "Down with the n—" (Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance, and Abolition). Justice Smyth must have been conscious of the eerie parallel to the meeting dispute and vandalism here. I do not mean to accuse Gibson and Pittman of the same culpability as slave-owners, nor of racism. Rather, I mean to suggest that Nantucket officials ought be cognizant that those same sentiments surfacing today, leveled against black residents, is not a good look.

At some point, the difference between official incompetence and insensitivity, on the one hand, and willful cover-up, on the other hand, becomes immaterial.

In September, a working group of the town board retained a Texas forensics firm, LCG Discovery Experts, to review the investigation into the African Meeting House vandalism—though not to re-investigate the crime. According to Nantucket Current News, the independent review was spurred by a citizen petition.

The case is Barros v. Select Board, No. 23-P-1058 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 19, 2025), available at the Social Law Library. Justice Rachel E. Hershfang wrote the court opinion for herself and Justice Vickie L. Henry, contra the dissent of Justice Smyth.

Court Appendix in Barros v. Select Board