Law school seminars dive deep in FOI, free press, film

RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0

Students in my spring seminars, in Freedom of Information Law and in Free Press and Film, did outstanding work, and I am indebted both to them and to colleagues who joined my classes for teaching me and enriching my intellectual life.

Recently I spoke on the telephone to a long-time friend in academics, a professor at another university, many miles away. We shared strikingly similar stories of well paid administrators, whose numbers on campus seems to grow faster than the wealth gap, even while they lament cuts of not-nearly-as-well-paid staff and faculty positions to keep us within budget.

Well, the similarity would be striking if we were not accustomed to it. Universities in the United States combating financial exigency now seem to me like the nation of Oceania in George Orwell's 1984. They are forever locked in conflict with one or another enemy that is not in fact the greatest existential threat. Rather, the government itself perpetuates a state of emergency so that apparatchiks (administrators) can consume the fruits of labor while the masses (faculty and students) abide oppressive regulation and a diminishing standard of living.

My friend suggested that I propose and apply for a new university office, perhaps a Vice Chancellor of Financial Exigency. That sounds ironically lucrative. As they say, "when in Rome"; if the empire is falling, grab all the grapes you can.

Our conversation devolved, as it invariably does, into why we put up with it all. Coming in a very close second to paying the mortgage is an answer that I fear is both cliché and self-condemnatory: We are gratified when our students learn and excel.

Faculty Seminar Contributors

In the spring, I had the privilege to teach two seminars, one my recurring offering in freedom-of-information (FOI) law, the other a one-off, a course on free press and film. The FOI class coincided with the conclusion of my term on the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Advisory Committee, which service afforded me an opportunity to expose my students to leading-edge issues in the field.

The free-press-and-film class allowed me and the class to sink our teeth into the captivating book, featured at The Savory Tort in 2024, Filming the First: Cinematic Portrayals of Freedom of the Press (Lexington Books 2025), by my friend and colleague Helen J. Knowles-Gardner, formerly a political science professor and now research director at the Institute for Free Speech (IFS), and co-authors Professor Emeritus Bruce E. Altschuler, retired from political science at SUNY Oswego, and Professor Brandon T. Metroka, faculty in political science at the University of the Incarnate Word (UIW). (Photos: Knowles-Gardner, from IFS; Altschuler, 2017, by Jim Russel, SUNY Oswego '83, Metroka, from UIW).

My classes were enriched by colleagues who gave generously of their time and energy. Professor Knowles-Gardner joined us in person in Free Press and Film to discuss the book's treatment of the films Denial (2016) and Deliberate Intent (2000) (and to give a campus lecture). Professor Altschuler joined us for three classes, discussing his first three chapters of the book and the films Citizen Kane (1941), RKO 281 (1999), All the President's Men (1976), The Post (2017), Network (1976), and The Social Network (2010). Attorney Dan Greenberg, of the Cato Institute, joined Free Press and Film to discuss his documentary film, American Libel (2025), featured at The Savory Tort last year. (Photo: Dan Greenberg, from Cato.)

My FOI class welcomed attorney and information practice Professor Jason Baron, University of Maryland (U. Md.), and a fellow member of the FOIA Advisory Committee; Arkansas investigative journalist Brandon Howard; independent filmmaker and journalism and mass communication Professor Natalie Pattillo, and a university student leader and student journalist; Professor Robert Steinbuch, featured recently here at The Savory Tort, Bowen Law School, University of Arkansas, Little Rock (UALR); attorney and adjunct professor Gregory V. Sullivan, president of Malloy & Sullivan and president of the New England First Amendment Coalition; and journalism and media studies Professor A.Jay Wagner, Diederich College of Communication, Marquette University, a past member of the FOIA Advisory Committee.

Professor Baron discussed the science of artificial intelligence and how advancements in the era will change the practice of FOI law for both requesters and record officers. Journalist Howard joined the class to talk about his past newspaper reporting and ongoing pro se FOI litigation to access a cold murder investigation case file in northwest Arkansas (see, e.g., The Weekly Vista; see also breaking news). Professor Steinbuch discussed his ongoing transparency advocacy in Arkansas and opinion writing for The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette. Attorney Sullivan discussed his remarkable record of high-profile access litigation and appellate argument on behalf of New England journalists. Professor Wagner discussed his recent work on statutory citizenship requirements to block state access to public records and the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of the laws.

Professor Pattillo and her student, whose identity I am protecting just in case, discussed contemporary challenges facing campus journalists, including recalcitrant administrators. Professor Pattillo's teaching contract at UMass Dartmouth was not renewed this academic year (e.g., LinkedIn, New Bedford Light, Boston Globe (paywall)). 

(Photos: Jason Baron, from U. Md.; Brandon Howard, from LinkedIn; Natalie Pattillo, from the Center for Independent Documentary; Robert Steinbuch, from UALR; Gregory V. Sullivan, from Malloy & Sullivan; A.Jay Wagner, from Marquette University.)

Student Seminar Contributors

Students in both seminars produced a range of thought-provoking papers built upon insightful research and analysis. I am here honored to share selected titles and abstract, with authors' permission. I thank these stars for their work and for their collaborative spirit in learning with and from each other, and I anticipate with great pleasure their shining future contributions to the legal profession.

—in Freedom of Information Law

Jeremy Aylward, Retaining Transparency in the Digital Age: Retention of Electronic Records Under Federal and State Freedom of Information Laws. The proliferation of electronic records and digital communications has fundamentally challenged the legal frameworks governing government transparency and public accountability. While the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Federal Records Act (FRA) establish baseline obligations for the retention and disclosure of electronic records, the enforceability of those obligations remains structurally compromised. This paper analyzes and synthesizes the legal frameworks governing the retention and disclosure of electronic records and messages under federal law and the open records statutes of California, Colorado, and Virginia, with particular attention to how those frameworks can be meaningfully enforced. Drawing on statutory text, agency guidance, and judicial interpretation, this paper examines how each jurisdiction defines "electronic records," what retention schedules apply, how personal device and third-party platform use by public officials is treated, and critically, what mechanisms exist to compel compliance, sanction violations, and remedy the destruction or concealment of covered records. The paper argues that across all four jurisdictions, electronic records retention law suffers from a common structural deficiency: obligations are broad in theory but weak in enforcement. This leaves agencies largely self-policing in an environment where the incentives to retain records often conflict with the incentives to delete them. While California's content-focused judicial approach offers the most expansive access framework, and Colorado and Virginia provide more structured but still under-enforced retention regimes, none of the examined frameworks provides a reliably enforceable mechanism for preventing loss of electronic records at the point of creation or ensuring accountability after the fact. The paper concludes by identifying the enforcement gaps that most critically undermine the transparency purposes of freedom of information law and by synthesizing lessons across jurisdictions for legislative and judicial reform. (Image: RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0.)

Davis Preston, The Public Records Law Battles with State University Athletic Programs. Universities have taken advantage of state public record exemptions to skirt disclosures of their spending. To combat the skirting of disclosures and to provide more transparency, the NCAA mandates budget disclosures. Public records law exemptions still apply to the schools, but the NCAA mandates force the schools to disclose certain financial information anyway. These mandatory budget disclosures have their own limitations that allow schools to avoid full disclosure. They open the door to what money goes where, but withhold important information, such as who donates, how much they donate, and how the fundraising is organized. There are different structures for how athletic departments operate, but most use private or semi-private entities. Schools use privatization to avoid full disclosure after they meet the NCAA mandate. Different states have different laws that allow universities to avoid full disclosure. The University of Arkansas utilizes a private foundation, multiple universities in Florida utilize direct support organizations, and the University of Georgia utilizes disclosure time extensions. The laws are used to circumvent the public records law, which was enacted to hold public bodies accountable and provide transparency. The universities argue that they should have privacy on financials, as this allows them to keep a competitive advantage over other universities. This argument is met with the public interest in how the government spends money and whether this is done with transparency. There should be statutory change to prevent this circumvention of disclosure. Statutory change would entail eliminating exemption for direct support organizations, standardization of the function equivalent test, and the elimination of time extensions. (Image: RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0.)

Natalie Whitt, Civil Enforcement, Criminal Secrecy: Exemption 7 and the Expansion of FOIA Withholding in Immigration. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted to promote accountability and transparency by providing public access to government records, which can be essential where state authority is most coercive. Public oversight of law enforcement depends heavily on access to government records, yet requests for information concerning police misconduct and officer discipline frequently encounter resistance under FOIA Exemption 7. This provision permits agencies to withhold records compiled for law enforcement purposes when disclosure could cause specified harms, including unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, interference with investigations, and safety risks. Although these protections serve legitimate interests, their application in the policing context often limits public access to information necessary to evaluate how coercive state authority is exercised. Courts typically afford a high level of deference to agencies in determining whether records qualify as law enforcement materials and in assessing claimed harms, while disclosure obligations such as segregability receive comparatively limited enforcement. The result can be a practical barrier to transparency in cases involving alleged misconduct, systemic failures, or patterns of negative behavior from law enforcement. This Article argues that the way courts apply Exemption 7 in the context of policing creates barriers to public oversight that are difficult to reconcile with FOIA’s central purpose of promoting accountability for government power. Law enforcement agencies have a unique authority to detain, search, and use force, while transparency regarding the exercise of that authority serves both individual and systemic public interests. However, courts do not consistently distinguish between personal privacy concerns and information reflecting official conduct, and agencies’ assertions of harm are often accepted without requiring narrowly tailored justifications. (Image: RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0.)

Tryon P. Woods, Prison Conditions and Public Access Or 1(st Am.) + 5(th Am.) + 8(th Am.) + 14(th Am.) < 0—Public Access Math. This paper examines the ongoing problem of prison conditions and the public’s access to information about what goes on inside prisons. I approach the topic as a twin problem in which access and conditions are opposite sides of the same coin. The correlation between access restrictions and the unconstitutional treatment of prisoners has a long history and nation-wide scope. Tracking the aftermath of the seminal case of the Attica Prison uprising in 1971 through several lawsuits arising from institutional failures in Arizona, California, Massachusetts, and NYC, this paper argues that in a "total institution" such as a prison or jail, visibility is the leverage on which control hinges. This relationship between the public’s access to information about prison conditions and the constitutional violations suffered by prisoners is refracted in the Court’s First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence on prisons since the passage of FOIA in 1966. Despite the Court’s best efforts, together with prison administrators, the relational reality of law remains undeniable: the undoing of legal personhood for people inside serves as the precondition for inventing the human outside. (When not appearing in class as a law student to sate his insatiable appetite for learning, Professor Woods also is a gifted faculty colleague in crime and justice studies at UMass Dartmouth.—RJPS) (Image: Attica Correctional Facility, 2007, by Bronayur via Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0.)

—in Free Press and Film

Bryce Mayo, "A Victim of the Modern Age": Soft Law, Private Suppression, and the Gap in First Amendment Theory. Film: A Clockwork Orange (1971). The First Amendment limits government suppression of speech but does not restrict decisions by private actors. Constitutional doctrine therefore provides little guidance when expression is constrained through private pressures, market incentives, or self-censorship. These forms of non-governmental suppression rarely enter the public consciousness until controversy surrounding particular works expose gaps in the protection of free expression. Stanley Kubrick’s decision to withdraw A Clockwork Orange from circulation in the United Kingdom illustrates this limitation. Although the film was not subject to a nationwide legal prohibition, public controversy, media criticism, and local regulatory pressures preceded Kubrick’s nearly three-decade self-removal. The film thus remained legally protected yet practically inaccessible within the United Kingdom. This incident provides an example of how expressive works may be limited without formal government censorship. This paper examines Kubrick’s withdrawal through a United States constitutional framework. It focuses on the distinction between state restriction and private control over distribution and argues that the quasi-ban of A Clockwork Orange reveals a structural gap in First Amendment theory: while speech is protected from government censorship, it may nonetheless be suppressed through "soft law" mechanisms that operate outside formal doctrine. By separating the concept of legal protection from the reality of circulation, the paper clarifies how expression may be constrained outside traditional censorship models. Recognizing this distinction clarifies the practical limits of First Amendment protections and refines how free speech is understood in modern media environments shaped by market forces, rating systems, and distribution controls.

Amanda McKim, Speech is Free, But Lies You (Should) Have to Pay For: Alex Jones as a Case Study for the Inefficacies of Defamation Remedies. Film: The Truth vs. Alex Jones (2024). The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against government-imposed limitations on freedom of speech and the press. However, the First Amendment does not protect false, defamatory statements. The intersection of these two areas of law has been analyzed at length, but changes in the way society communicates raises new and more dangerous problems regarding the ways in which courts address the impacts of defamation. With the continually expanding use of smart phones, access to endless perspectives in media, and few ways to definitively “fact-check” sources, misinformation is rampant, and defamation remedies provide increasingly less meaningful relief to victims. Alex Jones, a prominent radio show host, was sued in two states and has three judgments against him for defaming victims’ families in the 2012 Sandy Hook school shooting. The complaints were filed in 2018 and resulted in final judgements in 2022 of $1.5 billion dollars in damages. Jones has since filed for bankruptcy, has yet to pay the victims. He continues to disparage the proceedings to his audience of 30 million daily listeners. The plaintiffs’ inability to recover and Jones’s continuing perpetuation of harmful rhetoric exemplify the ineffectiveness of current remedies to meaningfully address serious speech-based harms. Despite legal scholars’ critiques of equitable remedies in defamation cases, equity might be the best way to address previous harm, prevent future harm, and provide victims with the most appropriate relief. (Image: Instagram post by WBRC-TV 6 News, 2025. With characteristic wisdom and compassion, Ms. McKim suggested that the visual element for this post might honor the victims of Sandy Hook, rather than draw further attention to Alex Jones, who doesn't need help with publicity. I could not agree more.—RJPS)

Sean Pillai, Embedded Reporting and Freedom of the Press in Contemporary U.S. Military Operations. Films: Restrepo (2010), Korengal (2014). Embedding journalists with U.S. military combat operations highlights the ongoing struggle to balance democratic transparency with the practical realities of fighting a war. The system of embed reporting was created to give the public a clearer view of what happens on the front lines, but it also has raised continuing legal and ethical questions about how independent reporters truly can be when the military controls their access and movement. This paper looks at those tensions through the perspectives offered in Restrepo (2010) and Korengal (2014), while examining the most recent policy behind U.S. military media policy. The embed system shows why some limits on access are required in combat zones and that journalists must continue to expose themselves to risk both in the legal realm and physically in combat to protect speech. 

Carson Powell, From Accessible Knowledge to Smoldering Ashes: How a 1953 Novel Reflects a Growing Current Reality. Film: Fahrenheit 451 (2018). A story created in 1953, in which books are outlawed, and "firemen" burn any that are found, illustrates the censorship of knowledge and literature. In Arkansas, on March 30, 2023, the legislature approved Act 372, which included new standards for individuals selling books, whether that be public libraries or small bookstores. Act 372 in theory was approved to protect minors from stumbling onto books and materials of mature topics, but many librarians disagreed with that sentiment. The librarians of Fayetteville Public Library, joined by many other librarians believed that the act forces libraries and bookstores to segregate novels with "mature subjects" into "adult only" areas, with a risk of criminal prosecution for failing to do so. The Fayetteville Public Library, American Civil Liberties Union of Arkansas, and others filed complaints alleging that Act 372, like outright book banning, violates the First Amendment as overbreadth, vague, and content based. The lawsuit further alleged that the Act was intended to limit access of books and media to individuals who have a constitutional right to the books in question. The Arkansas legislature follows a growing trend around the United States of State’s legislators introducing and implementing acts regarding content-based censorship. Increasing enactments of laws aimed at removing “obscene” materials to protect children effectively discriminates against people of color, underrepresented communities, and members of the LGBTQ+ community. The suppression of media, whether by segregating books in the library or bookstore, or by facilitating their removal smaller institutions having to take the books off the shelves at risk of prosecution, reflects the themes of Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451.

Jakob Resnik, Apocalypse When? Latent Power of 47 U.S.C. § 606. Film: Apocalypse Now (1979). 47 U.S.C. § 606 ("the Act"), "The War Powers of the President," is an unused emergency provision of the Telecommunications Act that threatens freedom of speech. Apocalypse Now contains a scene depicting a Time magazine article reporting inaccurately on the Vietnam War. The movie does not say whether Time published the article of its own volition or at the direction of the Government. In the "real world," the Act enables the President to seize and control certain media outlets during emergencies, possibly controlling public reception of the emergency. The Act lacks clear definitions or statutory guardrails, conferring power so broadly that it is easily abused. Apocalypse Now used a prop magazine article to illustrate dishonesty in the media without showing where the lie really came from. Under the Act, a censored message can easily be spread to deceive the public regardless of free speech objections that outlets may raise. This is a threat to free speech.

Corie Scott, Tried Inside a Story: Pretrial Narrative and the Fragility of the Presumption of Innocence. Film: When They See Us (2019). Ava DuVernay’s When They See Us documents what happens when narrative precedes adjudication. The prosecution of the Central Park Five—who now identify as the Exonerated Five—illustrates how media coverage, official statements, and public discourse can converge to construct a story of guilt before evidence is tested in court. That story proved more durable than the convictions it preceded and more resistant to correction than the exonerations that followed. The case is extraordinary in its consequences. The dynamic it reflects is not. This paper examines the tension between First Amendment press freedom and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair trial through doctrinal analysis and a preliminary comparative study of contemporary criminal reporting. Drawing on a close reading of fifteen articles across local news outlets, national publications, tabloid media, and government press releases, the analysis examines patterns in headline labeling, suspect characterization, moral descriptor language, victim framing, contextual background, and the presence or absence of presumption-of-innocence language. The sample is illustrative rather than representative and is offered to surface patterns consistent with the doctrinal concerns the paper identifies. The findings identify patterns that warrant closer legal and empirical attention. Narrative intensity, humanizing context, and presumption-of-innocence framing vary consistently across source types – and, with regularity that raises due process and equal protection concerns, across defendants. White defendants were disproportionately introduced through professional identity and personal context. Black and Latino defendants were more frequently framed through criminal identity and categorical threat language, with government press releases producing the most authoritative and criminalized framing of any source category examined. These patterns point to a structural gap in existing doctrine. First Amendment protections permit the circulation of narratives that assign meaning to accusation. Sixth Amendment safeguards operate within the courtroom to mitigate identifiable prejudice. Neither framework fully addresses how pretrial narratives shape the ground on which guilt is adjudicated. This paper argues that the law’s current approach is incomplete—not because it fails on its own terms, but because it was not designed for an information environment in which narrative formation is rapid, self-reinforcing, and difficult to unwind. The presumption of innocence survives as a formal rule. Whether it survives as a lived condition of adjudication, for all defendants equally, is the question the paper raises—and the one it calls on doctrine and empirical scholarship to more fully answer.

Alayna Wageman, Accountability Gaps at The International Criminal Court: How States Get Away with Murder. Film: A Private War (2018). Women journalists operating in conflict zones are targeted not only because of their reporting, but because of their gender. Sexual violence, intimidation, and physical assault are deployed as deliberate tools to silence women in the press, yet international law has failed to translate its formal protections into meaningful, enforceable accountability. This paper investigates that failure through the legendary war correspondent Marie Colvin. In Colvin v. Syrian Arab Republic, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a default judgment of $302,511,836.00 against Syria for the deliberate targeting and killing of Marie Colvin during her reporting in Homs in 2012. Syria has never paid. Additionally, the conduct that killed Colvin, a state-directed attack on civilian journalists in armed conflict, falls within the jurisdictional reach of the Rome Statute as a war crime under Article 8, yet no International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution followed. Syria is not a signatory and the UN Security Council vetoed the referral. Thus, even when liability is established, the absence of enforceable international laws leaves victims without remedies and states without consequences. Colvin's case is not exceptional. It is representative of a systemic pattern in which gender-based violence suppresses journalistic work and states face no meaningful consequences. This paper highlights three structural deficiencies within the International Criminal Court framework revealed by the Colvin case. This paper contends that addressing these gaps necessitates structural reforms beyond the scope of the current system.

Rebecca Wood, A Relic of the Past: It’s Time To Deal With The Equal Time Rule. Film: Man of the Year (2006). This paper utilizes the 2006 film Man Of The Year to introduce and illustrate systemic inconsistencies in the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) enforcement of the equal time rule. The rule, Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, requires broadcast licensees providing airtime to a legally qualified candidate must also provide equal air time all opposing candidates. The rule is introduced by examining the absence of discussion and enforcement of it and its requirements throughout the film despite a talk-show host’s presidential campaign. This paper suggests that the omission is illustrative of the inconsistent and arbitrary application of the rule in the real world. Next, the history and origins of the rule are explored beginning with the rule’s origin in the Radio Act of 1927 through present day talk show challenges. Subsequently, the rule’s inconsistent implementation and the question of censorship are investigated with examples in media, case law, and FCC proceedings and notices from the rule’s beginning through present day. Finally, possible remedies such as further defining the rule, post-Chevron challenges, or repealing the rule are considered.

Law prof makes salad, sandwich

I have been fortunate to know many multi-talented persons in my line of work. I'm not sure any, though, can hold a candle to the breadth of expertise of my friend and colleague Professor Rob Steinbuch. There needs to be a way to list this on SSRN; from KATV Little Rock:

 

Ark. Gov swings again at state FOIA

Arkansas Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders has proposed a bill to undercut the highly regarded transparency regime of that state's Freedom of Information Act.

I was at the Arkansas Capitol when a veritable mob of citizen opposition stopped an anti-transparency reform bill in the spring. Try, try again must be the Governor's m.o.

My friend and colleague Professor Robert Steinbuch testified effectively against the spring reform bill. Here he is telling Conduit News Arkansas why the newest incarnation is no good either.

UPDATE, Sept. 16. My understanding is that the bill was gutted this week. A substantially narrowed enacted version applies only to secret information about the governor's security detail. The matter was discussed on Arkansas Week.

Citizens defeat attack on state transparency law

A bill that would have gutted the state Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was defeated in committee in the Arkansas House on March 29. A more modest bill amending the open meetings act passed.

My friend Professor Robert Steinbuch testified decisively against the comprehensive HB1726, which read like a wish list of transparency opponents, dismantling one provision after another of the state FOIA. I was there.

Bill sponsor Rep. David Ray presented the bill to the House State Agencies and Governmental Affairs Committee, though there can be little doubt that the bill was devised by lobbyists such as Arkansas's municipalities or counties. The bill attacked the strongest points of the FOIA that mark differences from state norms, such as Arkansas's short, three-day turnaround and lack of attorney-client privilege.

In fairness, there is room for negotiation on some of these points. An excellent one-time student of mine and Steinbuch's, Deputy Attorney General Ryan Owsley presented the bill alongside Ray. Having long served as opinions counsel, Owsley knows the FOIA well, and he fairly criticized the law for areas in which its well meaning text might be outpaced by practical realities. For example, record custodians say they're too often unduly stressed by the three-day deadline, especially when redactions are routinely required from today's typically voluminous electronic records rife with exempt personally identifying information.

But the bill proponents claimed too much. They whinged, for example, about record custodians compelled "to violate the law" and place themselves in legal jeopardy. In fact, to my knowledge, no Arkansas judge has ever demanded that custodians respond to requests other than reasonably, notwithstanding the three-day deadline. Like the 20-day deadline of the federal Freedom of Information Act, the three-day deadline is largely notional in practice. Its more salient admonition is that when records are immediately available, they should be provided immediately. A better bill might codify the de facto oversight process for voluminous productions.

Bill proponents moreover obfuscated. They articulated purported horror stories of FOIA abuse amounting to harassment of public officials. But their stories hardly bore out.

One oft repeated claim in the hearing was that a FOIA requester made a request of a school district that would have yielded 800,000 records and taken two years to process. But there was a lot of information missing from this claim.

For starters, no one ever said that the records were produced, only asked for. I could make a request tomorrow for all the records of a school district, and then someone could testify with outrage that a requester demanded millions of records. Neither side is well served by overbreadth. It's not unusual at all for an ordinary-citizen requester to over-ask, and then for a custodian to work with a requester to help narrow the request to what the requester really wants. The two years' labor claim was always made in the conditional tense, so it seems the referenced situation was somehow resolved without a crisis.

Second, no one ever said what medium or format the 800,000 records were in. I once FOIAd the voter rolls for several ZIP codes in Arkansas. If every one of those files was considered a "record," then I FOIAd some million records. But I received them in just a few minutes as a kind election official downloaded the data to a USB stick for me.

Third, no one ever said anything about the content of the 800,000 records. Maybe the request was justified. Journalists in the hearing testified to matters such as the discovery of juvenile abuse through public record requests. If that's what those records revealed, then I say, get to work.

Many police testified in favor of the bill. One police witness complained about requests from the ACLU investigating police conduct. I'm not sure I have a problem with those requests. Remarkably, one police witness complained because a journalist's investigation of a fatal shooting by police determined that the shooting was justified. Was the officer hoping for a different conclusion? Exoneration hardly suggests that the records were ill sought to begin with.

Insofar as the bill sought to tackle points of the FOIA that might benefit from fair-minded reform, the problem with HB1726 was procedural as well as substantive. Surely as a matter of political strategy, the bill was introduced late in the session, when legislative committees are overworked—the instant hearing went well into the night—and tend to be less scrutinizing of what they pass.

The bill was introduced on a Monday and immediately came up in committee on Wednesday. It was stunning and telling that so many citizens organized to turned out against the bill so fast. In the interim, the state FOIA advisory body, a legislatively constituted entity that exists for the very purpose of vetting FOIA legislation, obliged the timeline with an emergency meeting on Tuesday. But Rep. Ray was a no-show and complained at the hearing that he had had a conflict. He blamed the advisory group for his timeline.

Disappointingly, HB1726 came to committee with the support of Governor Sarah Huckabee Sanders. A young aid represented the Governor at the hearing, and I could not help but think that he was set up to take the heat. One witness aptly pointed out that transparency is a plank in the state Republican platform. This was not Gov. Sanders's only recent embarrassment.

A second bill, sponsored by Rep. Mary Bentley, passed the committee later in the night. HB1610 would set a one-third-of-members threshold to trigger the open meetings act. Like other jurisdictions, Arkansas has struggled with the threshold question. To the aggravation of municipality lobbyists, the state supreme court has held that the act is triggered by even a two-person meeting if transparency would be subverted.

The bill hardly got a full hearing in the committee. Because of the late hour after the HB1726 debacle, the committee limited witnesses on each side to 15 minutes in sum. But they testified in the order they signed up. So time ran out on the opposition side upon citizen witnesses who were not as effective as advocates such as Professor Steinbuch and attorney Joey McCutchen.

I dared think that HB1726 was a mere smokescreen to push through HB1610. But HB1726 was such a disaster that it's hard to believe so much thought went into a concerted strategy.

Professor Steinbuch is author of the treatise, The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (LexisNexis 8th ed. 2022). I was a co-author of the preceding fourth, fifth, and sixth editions. The book originated with Professor John Watkins in 1988.

Below is the hearing on both bills on March 29. The hearing is remarkable for putting on exhibit the wide range of constituencies that support and oppose transparency in state and local government, and their reasons.

Arkansas bill would compel admin sharing at two public law schools, saving money for education

On March 29, I testified on a bill in the Arkansas legislature that would consolidate back-office functions of the state's two law schools, making more money available for the educational mission.

Senator Mark Johnson generously invited me to present with him his SB370 to the Arkansas Senate Education Committee. The bill furthers a theme I articulated in a 2011 white paper before I left Arkansas for New England.

In the 2011 paper, I posited that Arkansas might provide more and better opportunities to students at both Fayetteville and Little Rock law schools if the two public schools were not locked into "pseudo-competition," but, rather, shared administrative services as one law school on two campuses. I roughly estimated a savings of $800,000 to $1.2m, which could be used to enhance the program of legal education.

Rutgers University did exactly that in 2015, combining its New York-proximate Newark school into a two-campus institution with its capital-proximate Camden school, despite their locations at opposite ends of New Jersey. Penn State presently is planning to merge its law schools at capital-proximate Carlisle and research-oriented University Park.

Of the 25 states with less than median population in the United States, Arkansas is one of only three with two public law schools. The others are Kentucky and Kansas. Kentucky has five million people to Arkansas’s three million. Kansas has two public law schools only because of Washburn’s unusual history as one of the last remaining municipal universities in the nation. If one compares the states of the Eighth Circuit, only Arkansas and Missouri have two public law schools. Missouri has double Arkansas’s population and also has two private schools.

SB370 does not go as far as the merger I proposed in 2011, as effected at Rutgers and planned for Penn State, but the bill would take a step in that direction by merging back-office functions without affecting student-facing services. There's no good reason for both schools to be maintaining separate operations in advancement, for example. The advancement professional in Little Rock alone earns more than $109,000, plus benefits.

Senator Johnson asked me to address in particular for the committee any potential ramifications for ABA accreditation for the schools, were SB370 to become law. For the most part, SB370 will have no effect at all on accreditation, because the bill does not affect the program of legal education.

As written, SB370 proposes a "joint dean," which was a stumbling block. As long as Arkansas wishes to retain two separately and fully accredited law schools, each will have to have a chief administrative officer, whatever the person is called. The two deans presently earn about a quarter million dollars each per year, give or take, plus benefits. I told the committee, there will have to be two deans. But they need not earn so much in a semi-combined institution. Each of Rutgers's campuses retains a dean, but they split the administrative supplement to their faculty salaries.

Senator Johnson already was aware of the "joint dean" issue and had prepared an amendment for the committee. However, a senator objected to viewing the bill without the amendment engrossed, so Senator Johnson pulled the bill for re-engrossment.  With the legislative session waning, the bill might not have time to come back to committee for a vote. But the idea will remain sound, and I am hopeful that it will have its day. The students of the state's two public law schools all deserve the best and fullest range of opportunities that Arkansas higher education has to offer.

I am grateful to Senator Johnson for his kind and erudite engagement with my 2011 paper and the invitation to join him, and to my friend and colleague Professor Robert Steinbuch for helping to coordinate my visit to Arkansas.

Chag Pesach sameach, happy First Contact Day

Mosaic in Netherlands, reading, "בשמאלה עשר וכבוד"
("in her left hand riches and honor") (Proverbs 3:16),
showing "Kohanim hands."
(Kleuske via Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0)

Passover periodically coincides with First Contact Day, as it does this year, on April 5, 2023.

Passover is a major Jewish holiday, thus moves with the lunisolar Hebrew calendar. The cause for celebration is not exclusive to Judaism, as the holiday marks the Israelite escape from slavery in Egypt. Passover was on April 5 most recently in 1985, 1993, and 2004, but it won't happen again until 2069.

April 5 is also First Contact Day, a delightful celebration from the fictional Star Trek universe marking the day that earthbound humans first learn they are not alone in the universe. Vulcans revealed, or will reveal, themselves to humans on April 5, 2063, so the holiday often is identified with the Vulcan hand gesture of fingers paired and separated in a "V."

There's more connection between the two holidays than an occasional overlap on the calendar. In 1967, Leonard Nimoy, the actor who first played Mr. Spock, the famous Vulcan of Star Trek lore, borrowed the hand gesture from his Jewish heritage.  The Take explained the origin:

[Nimoy] drew upon childhood memories of Jewish synagogue services he attended with his Yiddish-speaking grandfather. The V-shaped position is the shape of the Hebrew letter "shin," which is the representative letter of the word "Shaddai," a term for God, and is a gesture traditionally used by the Kohanim (Hebrew "priests"), Jews of priestly descent, during a blessing ceremony. It’s also the first letter of "Shalom," the Jewish word for hello, goodbye, and peace.

The "Vulcan salute" (🖖) earned emoji status in 2014. Usually accompanied by the utterance, "Live long and prosper," it's not so distant a cousin of shalom.

Thanks to attorney, and my long-ago TA, Kevin Hart for being the first to wish me a happy First Contact Day, and to my friend Professor Robert Steinbuch for reminding me of the Vulcan salute's Jewish heritage.

Chag Pesach sameach, and happy First Contact Day.

'Civility' is code for conformity

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court two weeks ago struck down a town policy purporting to require civility in public meetings. The town policy resembles attempts to restrict academic freedom.

Board meeting, via Southborough Access Media video
(Kolenda at center).

'Civility' in Politics

In December 2018, Southborough, Massachusetts, resident Louise Barron took advantage of a public comment period at a town board meeting to call out board members on fiscal policy and, ironically, compliance with state open meetings law. Though not obliged to, board members responded. The discussion became heated, resulting in Barron calling one selectman, Daniel Kolenda, "a Hitler," and Kolenda abruptly ending the comment period and expelling Barron. (The meeting is on YouTube (cued). Read more at Wicked Local.)

Board policy provides for an open public comment period for extra-agenda items with this admonition:

All remarks and dialogue in public meetings must be respectful and courteous, free of rude, personal or slanderous remarks. Inappropriate language and/or shouting will not be tolerated. Furthermore, no person may offer comment without permission of the [c]hair, and all persons shall, at the request of the [c]hair, be silent. No person shall disrupt the proceedings of a meeting.

Barron challenged the policy and her expulsion under the freedom of assembly and freedom of speech provisions of the 1780 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, articles 19 and 16, respectively. Barron forewent challenge under the younger (1791) First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to keep the case in state court. 

And just as well. The Massachusetts Declaration is a revered document in its own right in American history and global human rights, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not hesitated to construe its provisions as more protective of civil rights than the federal standard. Indeed, for many years, well before I came to work in Massachusetts, I taught a public seminar on the First Amendment for the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas and used the Massachusetts Declaration to demonstrate the close connection of FOI and assembly.

Article 19 provides, "The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give instructions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer."

In teaching freedom of information law, I often shorthand the constitutional context of access law as the "flip side of the coin" of the First Amendment. The idea is that the freedom of speech is meaningless, especially in the core protection of political expression, if one does not know the facts to speak about.

The coin characterization is useful, but it's not entirely accurate. The First Amendment recognition of assembly as ancillary to expression aptly indicates an interrelationship that is more an intertwining than a duality.

Board meeting, via Southborough Access Media video
(Barron at right).

In the opinion of the court, Justice Scott L. Kafker recounted Article 19's "illustrious" history.

The provision also has a distinct, identifiable history and a close connection to public participation in town government that is uniquely informative in this case. ... [Article] 19 reflects the lessons and the spirit of the American Revolution. The assembly provision arose out of fierce opposition to governmental authority, and it was designed to protect such opposition, even if it was rude, personal, and disrespectful to public figures, as the colonists eventually were to the king and his representatives in Massachusetts.

Our interpretation of the text, history, and purpose of art. 19 is further informed by the words and actions of Samuel and John Adams, who not only theorized and commented upon the right, but were historic actors well versed in its application during the revolutionary period, particularly in the towns. Both Adams cousins emphasized in their correspondence and their actions the importance of the right to assemble.... Samuel Adams wielded it to great effect in his attempt to "procure a Redress of Grievances" when the British governor of the colony attempted to exercise control over assemblies after the Boston Massacre.... 

More philosophically, John Adams explained that the right of assembly was a most important principle and institution of self-government, as it allowed "[every] Man, high and low ... [to speak his senti]ments of public Affairs.".... Town inhabitants, he wrote, "are invested with ... the right to assemble, whenever they are summoned by their selectmen, in their town halls, there to deliberate upon the public affairs of the town." .... "The consequences" of the right of assembly, in Adams's words, were that "the inhabitants ... acquired ... the habit of discussing, of deliberating, and of judging of public affairs," and thus, "it was in these assemblies of towns ... that the sentiments of the people were formed ... and their resolutions were taken from the beginning to the end of the disputes ... with Great Britain." .... Alexis de Tocqueville made a similar point in Democracy in America: "Town-meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it." ....

Cousins Samuel Adams and John Adams
(via JohnAdamsInfo.com)

The court had little difficulty concluding that the town policy thus ran afoul of article 19. 

There was nothing respectful or courteous about the public assemblies of the revolutionary period. There was also much that was rude and personal, especially when it was directed at the representatives of the king and the king himself.

The court furthermore held the town policy overbroad and vague in violation of the article 16 freedom of speech. The case did not require the court to determine whether the First Amendment public forum doctrine applies to article 16 problems, the opinion explained. Massachusetts precedents already establish that content-based restrictions of political speech are subject to strict scrutiny. Worse, the court reasoned, the policy is viewpoint based, as it allows "polite[] praise[]" of public officials while condemning "rude[] or disrespectful[] critici[sm]."

Well reasoned as it is, the decision in Barron v. Kolenda, No. SJC-13284 (Mar. 7, 2023), does not break new ground in freedom of speech, even in Massachusetts law. And the case has been well reported with commentary, for example by J.D. Tuccille for Reason ("Let Massholes Be Massholes, Says Bay State's High Court"), and by Pioneer Legal, The New York Times, and the Brennan Center. What enticed me to write about the case is the likeness of the civility code to efforts to extinguish academic freedom.

'Civility' in the Workplace

The go-to code word on American college campuses to curb faculty freedom has been "collegiality." Introducing a 2016 report, the AAUP explained:

In recent years, Committee A has become aware of an increasing tendency on the part not only of administrations and governing boards but also of faculty members serving in such roles as department chairs or as members of promotion and tenure committees to add a fourth criterion in faculty evaluation: "collegiality." For the reasons set forth in this statement, we view this development as highly unfortunate, and we believe that it should be discouraged....

.... Historically, "collegiality" has not infrequently been associated with ensuring homogeneity and hence with practices that exclude persons on the basis of their difference from a perceived norm. The invocation of "collegiality" may also threaten academic freedom. In the heat of important decisions regarding promotion or tenure, as well as other matters involving such traditional areas of faculty responsibility as curriculum or academic hiring, collegiality may be confused with the expectation that a faculty member display "enthusiasm" or "dedication," evince "a constructive attitude" that will "foster harmony," or display an excessive deference to administrative or faculty decisions where these may require reasoned discussion. Such expectations are flatly contrary to elementary principles of academic freedom, which protect a faculty member’s right to dissent from the judgments of colleagues and administrators.

I witnessed this problem in action in those "recent years." "Collegiality" as an excuse to demand conformity was key in prompting me to write and speak in 2009 and 2010 about the importance of what I termed "penumbral academic freedom." 

Are you part of "the team" at work?
(Rawpixel Ltd via Flickr CC BY 2.0)

The problem has only worsened. In fact, I see the "collegiality" expectation as a piece of the broader problem of corporate ideology that insists on everyone being a "team player." That's the coded language designed to alienate workers who hesitate to take on extra duties or to give up personal time without fair compensation. Too long in coming, the "quiet quitting" movement is a direct response to this self-serving worldview.

Though "team speak" is not a specially academic problem, the ever more corporatized public university embraces the jargon. Routinely, I hear my work for a public entity described as "public service." The characterization is invariably paired with a demand that I take on some additional responsibility with no more, if not with less, compensation, and certainly with less compensation than a similarly skilled colleague at a private institution.

The rhetoric is exhausting. I'm not on your "team." The faculty is not my football side. The office is not my church. The institutional "mission" is not my creed. Rather, I do a job. I get paid for the job. Quid pro quo. Often, I enjoy my work, and sometimes, I'm good at it. But it's work. Then (even when the switch is merely virtual) I go home. Where I don't work for anyone else. Where I have a family and a life. Where I hope to win the lottery and quit my job.

That arrangement should be a source of pride, not shame. A public institution performing a public service is no less laudable because its staff is paid rather than volunteer. When administrators, especially handsomely compensated deans and chancellors, break out the "public service" rhetoric, hat in hand, I want to ask why they cash their paychecks, if they're so committed to "public service."

Just as I digested the court's Barron decision and commentary last week, Professor Robert Steinbuch, a (genuinely collegial) colleague at another public law school, told me about a proposed amendment to his school's selection criteria for distinguished professorships. 

Apparently, there was dissatisfaction by some faculty, I assume for the very reasons the AAUP warned, that "collegiality" was an express factor in the assessment. Thus, the law school faculty development committee proposed changes including the following (red-ink deletions and additions as in original).

In awarding named professorships, the Dean shall consider criteria in addition to a candidate's meritorious work in their particular field, including but not limited to donor specifications associated with the title, the overall mission of the law school, and continued excellence in scholarship, teaching, service, civility, and respect and collegiality as outlined in the Bowen Faculty Handbook, and established University policy, or the Association of American Law Schools Best Practices.

....

III. SERVICE & COLLEGIALITY

....

In the space provided below, please describe any additional information you wish to provide reflecting exemplary service rendered in the spirit of civility, respect collegiality and collaboration at the law school and the university level and wider recognition at the national or international level.

....

Self-Assessment: Using the categories of scholarship, teaching, service, civility, and respect and collegiality in this Application, in the space provided below, please provide a candid assessment of how you would represent this Named Professorship while you held the award.

I suppose that any candidate selected for a distinguished professorship at this public law school, like anyone commenting on the performance of public officials in Southborough, Massachusetts, before Barron, "must be respectful and courteous" and refrain from the "rude" and "personal." Faculty governance is all well and good, as long as no one is offended.

Let the revolution be quelled.

FOI seminar shines light on transparency research

In fall 2022, students in my freedom-of-information (FOI) law seminar produced another range of compelling research papers in which they inquired into hot issues in the law of access to government.

It's been my privilege to teach a law school seminar in FOI since 2004. For other teachers who might like to include FOI in the higher ed curriculum, my 2012 casebook and companion teaching notes are now available in full on my SSRN page. Please contact me if my contemporary syllabus or other materials can be of help. I teach the law of access broadly, from state law to federal, and in all branches of government. Students moreover are encouraged to pursue research projects in any vein of transparency and accountability, including access to the private sector, which has been a focus in my research, too.

In fall 2022, my students had the fabulous opportunity to participate contemporaneously in the online National FOI Summit of the National Freedom of Information Coalition (NFOIC).  I'm grateful to NFOIC President David Cuillier and Summit Organizer Erika Benton for making our participation possible.

My fall class was joined by a number of guest speakers who vastly enhanced students' exposure to FOI law, research, and practice. I am especially grateful to Professor Alasdair Roberts, UMass Amherst, who joined us live to talk about all things FOI, from his classic book Blacked Out (Cambridge 2012) to the implications for transparency and accountability of the research in his latest book, Superstates (Wiley 2022).

I thank Professor Robert Steinbuch, Arkansas Little Rock, who joined us to discuss his tireless work as an advocate in the legislature for transparency. He now writes powerfully about transparency and accountability as a regular columnist for The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, and he is author of the treatise, The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (LexisNexis 8th ed. 2022). I thank Professor Margaret Kwoka, Ohio State, who took time away from her ongoing FOI research in Mexico to join us to talk about that work and her recent book, Saving the Freedom of Information Act (Cambridge 2021).

I also thank attorney Alyssa Petroff and current law student Megan Winkeler, who joined us via Zoom to talk about their FOI research.  An alumna of my FOI seminar (as well as Comparative Law) and now a judicial law clerk for the Maine Supreme Court, Petroff discussed her recent article in The Journal of Civic Information on access to information about private prisons in Arizona.  An alumna of my 1L Torts classes, Winkeler has four years' experience in negotiation and mediation training and currently is researching negotiated rule-making in administrative law.

Here are the students' ambitious projects.

Madison Boudreau, The Benefits and Drawbacks of Reform Targeting Police Misconduct. The movement to increase public access to police misconduct and disciplinary records has proven to be a beneficial and necessary step toward heightened transparency and accountability of police departments and officers. However, states that have taken strides to open up access to these records continue to grapple with the ongoing barriers to public access despite their efforts. States seeking to implement similar changes to their open records laws will benefit by remaining aware of potential drawbacks to access despite reform. In the absence of impactful reform that effectively mandates the disclosure of these records, police departments have shown to prefer to remain under a cover of darkness, their internal personnel procedures left unchecked. As a result, the cycle of police secrecy is bound to viciously repeat itself.

Aaron Druyvestein, The Rise of Vexatious Requester Laws: Useful Regulation or Evasive Government Practice? The concept of freedom of information allows anyone to request any agency record for any reason, a model that has been replicated around the world and celebrated as a necessity for promoting democracy. The underlying goals of FOI to promote accountability are contingent on the government providing a strong and efficient FOI system. However, with the dramatic increase in FOI requests in the country, brought about in large part by better utilization of technology in FOI processes, there has been an increase in the burden on administrative agencies as a result of excessive, repetitive, or vindictive FOIA requests. Since 2010, governments' responses to these burdensome requests have resulted in the creation of so-called vexatious requester laws, which are intended to mitigate the effect of these requests on agencies.

Critics of vexatious requester laws argue that the laws are nothing more than a feeble attempt by the government to undermine otherwise valid records requests under the guise of improving government efficiency and reducing requester harassment. Concerns have been expressed that the laws' reliance on ambiguous terminology such as "vexatiousness" will give agencies discretion to deny requests based on subjective and unverifiable agency determinations of the requester's intent or motives for requesting. This paper analyzes the rise and application of vexatious requester laws as seen in the three states—Illinois, Connecticut, and Kentucky—that have passed statutory provisions permitting administrative agencies to deny requests to vexatious requesters. In addition, this paper investigates the policy implications of such laws on the broader FOIA system.

Alise Greco, Read It Before You Eat It: An Explicatory Review of the 2016 Nutrition Facts Label and Balancing FDA Transparency with Consumer Comprehension and the Food Industry. As the nation recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic, it is difficult to ignore how drastically the American lifestyle has changed, especially with regard to diet and exercise. The Nutrition Facts Label (NFL), largely meant to influence and assist consumer decision-making for food and beverages, was last updated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2016. This paper explains the 2016 NFL regulation in greater detail in light of a current need by many Americans to make informed, healthier choices based on science rather than social media or misleading, corporate-designed packaging. The FDA is put under the microscope and evaluated on its ability to balance the needs of consumers to be provided transparent, useful information and the demands from industry to make a profit.

Nicholas Hansen, Only Those Who Count The Vote Matter: A Comparative Examination of Arizona and Federal Transparency Regulations Pertaining to Election Data and Procedure and Their Impact on Citizen Confidence in Democracy. This analysis details the protections afforded under the state of Arizona’s election data exemptions under both the Arizona Open Meetings Act and the Arizona Open Records Act, and provides comparisons to the protections afforded under similar exemptions provided at the federal level. Characterizations of the election data and procedural protections for both levels of government are offered, and examinations of what information is permitted for provision under FOIA requests substantiate these characterizations. This analysis proceeds with an understanding that examinations must be confined to information that is both the subject of and relevant to either historical or ongoing FOIA requests, rather than the information made available to the public through the procedures associated with courtroom disclosures. 

This author posits that Arizona’s trend toward enforcing relative transparency when courts are compelled to examine the efficacy and validity of local election procedures might serve as a model for states whose courts are less inclined toward making such information available to the public at large. Recent lawsuits, including those associated with the largely settled controversies alleged pertaining to the 2020 Presidential election, and those suits pertaining to the use of Dominion Voting System’s voting machines substantiate this advocacy.

This analysis concludes with a determination as to whether or not Arizona’s FOIA exemptions as they pertain to election data and procedural information inspire greater public confidence than those utilized at the federal level. Also offered are policy recommendations as to how the Arizona judiciary might be able to better handle future election data and procedural controversies by utilizing the already extant tools within the FOIA rules, as well as policy recommendations for legislative reform in other states and the federal level, should local legislators and Congress see fit to implement a more transparent, more accessible system of legal procedures to deal with future election controversies.

Mitchell Johnson, Transparency and Tragedy: How the Texas Public Information Act is Being Weaponized After Uvalde, Yet Can Be Used for Good. This comment examines the Texas "law enforcement exception" under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA) regarding the mandamus lawsuit that several media outlets filed to obtain records from the Department of Public Safety (DPS) after the Robb Elementary shooting on May 24, 2022. The paper focused on the DPS, and not on another law enforcement agency at the scene of the shooting on May 24, because of the actions of Colonel Steven McCraw. Colonel McCraw, the highest ranking official in the DPS, has provided inconsistent accounts to the public of what occurred on May 24. This comment also examines the specific exceptions that the DPS claims. The DPS claims that the records that are sought for disclosure are either (1) records relating to an active investigation, or (2) records that relate to the purposes of law enforcement. The DPS’s current utilization of these exceptions is not grounded in law. No criminal investigation is taking place because the shooter is deceased. Furthermore, while Colonel McCraw has stated that his agency is reviewing his troopers’ and rangers’ actions to determine whether there should be a referral to prosecutors, criminal charges might be futile because of governmental immunity. Also, many of the records requested pertain to "basic information" of a crime that must be disclosed under the PIA. Last, the comment proposes that the PIA should be amended to incorporate case law and create a "criminality showing" if a law enforcement agency wishes to withhold documents under an active investigation exception.

Ashley Martinez-Sanchez, The New Jersey Open Public Records Act and the Public Interest in a Narrow Statutory Interpretation of the "Criminal Investigatory" Exemption. The New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA) expresses a strong public policy in favor of open and transparent government. OPRA champions the idea of a citizen's right of access to government records to ensure an informed public. However, transparency is not absolute. The OPRA permits secrecy for ongoing law enforcement investigations.  Courts should narrowly read the "criminal investigatory" exemption. This paper analyzes the evolution of the exemption over the years. It further examines what the future looks like for it in the legislative and judicial context.  I reference New Jersey case law and recent events in the state to contextualize the importance of narrowly reading the exemption. Inversely, the paper suggests that a narrow interpretation of the exemption not only would impede transparency efforts, but would raise civil rights concerns, particularly for marginalized and vulnerable communities in New Jersey. 

Marikate Reese, Police Accountability: Does it Really Exist? This paper demonstrates the power of police unions, and their contracts, in limiting accountability, transparency, and access.  The contracts are the catalyst to shielding officers from disciplinary actions, limiting civilian oversight, and restricting access to misconduct records. While states, such as New York, have become more transparent with their records, the unions still dictate a large part of police procedure.  This procedure includes, but is not limited to, delay of officer interrogations, obstructing investigations of misconduct, and destroying disciplinary records.  The procedures are safeguards put in place by collective bargaining practices, law enforcement bills of rights, and civil labor law protections.  The overall purpose of these safeguards is to establish rights, protections, and provisions for law enforcement officers including the arbitration process, training standards, and process of investigation. This paper provides a brief coverage of the protections afforded by collective bargaining, police bills of rights, and civil labor laws that stand in the way of the public transparency barriers and racial injustice.  Furthermore, this paper addresses how these procedural protections limit accountability while taking a look at the existing laws among various states.  This paper suggests several ways states have made strides for accountability and what limitations might arise as a result.

James Stark, What's the Deal with Doxing? Doxing is an entropic issue plaguing today’s society. Defining what it means to be “doxed” has been a problem that’s compounded by the fact that not all forms of doxing are equal. Some play a useful role in public discourse, while other forms of doxing enable harassment of private citizens. The current anti-doxing laws can be summed up in three categories. First are the “incidentals,” which tend be older laws that just incidentally happen to address doxing in some way due to the language used. The second category is “Daniel’s Law,” which is a law that has picked up traction for trying to protect public officials from doxing and its harms. Lastly are the “general” statutes, which were crafted to specifically fight doxing in general and protect as many people as possible from doxing. In order to properly combat doxing, legislatures need to agree that doxing is the unwanted release of personal or identifying information about an individual as a form of punishment or revenge, and that it can affect anyone, in government or not. The legislatures must focus on creating “general” statutes, and tailor the laws to protect the individuals, while allowing discourse around public officials. A poorly written anti-doxing law will result in either censorship or inadequate protection of individual Americans.

Marco Verch Professional Photographer via Flickr CC BY 2.0

Chad Tworek, Public But Private Athletic Departments. This paper address the Florida state policy that allows public universities to designate their athletic departments as private, thus evading the records requests for which compliance is required for any other public agency. In Florida, there are athletic departments at public universities that are private. While they are not funded by the university, they still act as an agent of the university and are afforded the same protections as public universities. If anyone is to sue these departments and seek to claim damages, there is a statutory cap on damages, $200,000. The cap pertains because courts find them to be mere components of the public entities they serve. Yet protection from public records requests allows these departments to accumulate money in secret and to spend without accountability. Such organization of athletic departments is moreover occurring elsewhere in the United States. The impact is to keep the public in the dark about how these arms of government do business.