The Federalist Society produced a beautifully illustrated video, as part the SCOTUSbrief series, to accompany the January 14 oral argument (transcript) in the U.S. Supreme Court in Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority, a personal injury suit. The case compels the Court to analyze what, if any, governmental immunity is afforded to a range of New Deal entities, such as the TVA, which Congress broadly authorized "to sue and be sued," decades before the Federal Tort Claims Act came into being. The Federalist Society generously invited me to provide narration for this video. At SCOTUSblog, Professor Gregory Sisk, of St. Thomas Law, has an expert analysis of Monday's oral argument. When available, audio of the oral argument will be posted at Oyez and at C-Span.
Showing posts with label sovereign immunity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sovereign immunity. Show all posts
Friday, January 18, 2019
SCOTUS ponders governmental immunity in boating accident suit against TVA
The Federalist Society produced a beautifully illustrated video, as part the SCOTUSbrief series, to accompany the January 14 oral argument (transcript) in the U.S. Supreme Court in Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority, a personal injury suit. The case compels the Court to analyze what, if any, governmental immunity is afforded to a range of New Deal entities, such as the TVA, which Congress broadly authorized "to sue and be sued," decades before the Federal Tort Claims Act came into being. The Federalist Society generously invited me to provide narration for this video. At SCOTUSblog, Professor Gregory Sisk, of St. Thomas Law, has an expert analysis of Monday's oral argument. When available, audio of the oral argument will be posted at Oyez and at C-Span.
Tuesday, February 27, 2018
City not liable for bullying that resulted in child's quadriplegia, Mass. supreme court holds (and note on infantilization of faculty in higher ed)
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed application of the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act (MTCA) to protect the City of Lynn, north of Boston, from liability in a tragic bullying incident that resulted in the permanent paralysis of the victim, a fourth grader. The case is Corimer v. Lynn, No. SJC-12323 (Feb. 27, 2018).
The boy's mother had reported bullying and harassment of her son on "multiple occasions" in the 2007-08 school year. Ultimately bullies pushed the boy down stairs, resulting in damage to his spinal cord and in quadriplegia.
The 1978 MTCA waives sovereign immunity, but a public actor may be held liable for the tort or violence of a third party only if the public actor "originally caused" the "harmful consequences." Mass. G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j). The courts have struggled to interpret that language, but have, as the SJC restated the rule, looked for "an affirmative act that materially contributed to creating a condition or situation that resulted in [plaintiff's] injuries." A failure to act is distinguished.
The school left the bullies in class in proximity to the plaintiff, and we may assume arguendo that the school was negligent in failing to protect the plaintiff. Even so, those failures were "'too remote as a matter of law'" to represent material contribution to the plaintiff's injuries. In essence, then the "originally caused" standard seems to effect a causation-at-law analysis heightened above even the stringent inquiry invoked upon an intervening criminal actor. On the same basis, the court rejected ancillary plaintiff theories predicated on negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of school staff.
The SJC acknowledged "that bullying is a serious issue" comprising "the emotional pain of day-to-day harassment" and sometimes, as here, "horrific physical consequences." "[T]he elementary school could have and should have done more to protect [the plaintiff]." Nevertheless, the operation of the MTCA is textbook, furthering the "public policy [of] some reasonable limits to governmental liability in order for taxpayers to avoid a potentially catastrophic financial burden."
Allow me a tangential observation about bullying policy:
Many workplace entities, private and public, and including my own, are busily about the business of formulating "anti-bullying" policies. At least in the academic context, I find these efforts nothing less than an end-run of contract, tenure, and academic freedom, calculated to suppress dissent and vigorous debate. This SJC case indirectly illustrates the problem.
Bullying is a concept derived from the K12 environment. In the adult workplace—especially in the academic workplace, where the very job is the exercise of free expression—bullying is co-extensive with harassment, discrimination, tort, and crime. All of those were present in Corimer, harassment even before the child was physically injured. There is no need for a separate policy purportedly to enforce civility (as if such a thing even were possible) among adults. Any effort to create such a policy is nothing more than an authoritarian perversion of modish terminology—on campus, the infantilization of the faculty—and a disservice to children who truly are bullied in school.
Wednesday, May 31, 2017
Court holds no duty/no cause in rape case against state
Sovereign immunity and affirmative duty were at issue in a state tort claims act case of tragic facts decided 3-2 upon rehearing in the Massachusetts Appeals Court on April 12. Pedagogically, the case well illustrates the famous interchangeability of duty and causation, my favorite articulation of which appeared in then-Circuit Judge Scalia’s footnote 4 in Romero v. NRA, 749 F.2d 77, ¶ 10 (D.C. Cir. 1984). On the nuts and bolts, the case well reiterates and demonstrates the strict application of the no-affirmative-duty rule under the state tort claims act, even in a famously progressive jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Jane J. alleged rape by a male patient while they
both occupied the recreational TV room of a locked unit of the Tewksbury State
Hospital. The court engaged solely with
the question whether failure to segregate male and female patients in the rec room
legally caused the rape under the state tort claims act. Holding no cause, the court, per Justice Diana
Maldonado, affirmed summary judgment for the Commonwealth.
Here illustrated in 1907, the Tewksbury State Hospital is on the National Register of Historic Places.
The classic American case of (no) affirmative state duty for
law students studying due process in constitutional law is DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected liability for
state failure to intervene and prevent fatal child abuse. The case essentially restated the peculiarly
American “no duty” doctrine of common law for the context of “constitutional
tort.” Thus the rule of no affirmative
duty manifests across the contexts of common law, due process, and sovereign
immunity. The doctrine of federal law is
replicated in the states, though may be varied by statutory interpretation when
claims are controlled by state waivers of sovereign immunity in tort cases. In this Massachusetts case, statutory
interpretation of the state claims act molded the question into one of
causation—though the DeShaney
question nonetheless constitutes the heart of the inquiry.
Arguments focused on state claims act Mass.
Gen. L. ch. 258, § 10(j). In
relevant part (a list of exceptions omitted here), the section maintains
sovereign immunity against “any claim based on an act or failure to act to
prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation,
including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not
originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf
of the public employer.” Thus the
problem of affirmative duty is phrased in terms of “original[] cause[],” and
the appeals court set out to determine whether non-segregation could be said to
have been an “original cause” of the rape.
In the court’s interpretation, original cause is “strict,”
requiring “‘an affirmative act [not a failure to act] … that creates the “condition or situation”
that results in harm’” (quoting precedent; court’s added text; my
italics). The court recounted a series
of cases rejecting recovery under § 10(j), including one case that held state
lifeguards having negligently abandoned their posts was not the original cause
of a drowning. That result pertained
even though the argument for an intact causal chain was stronger for lack of an
intentional and criminal intervening actor.
Jane J.’s claim could not survive such strict examination.
Justice Gregory Massing, joined by Justice Peter Rubin,
filed a vigorous dissent predicated on special relationship duty arising from involuntary
commitment, or alternatively, on the merits, arguing in the latter vein that the
“hospital ‘materially contributed to creating,’ and did not merely fail to
prevent, the condition that resulted in the plaintiff’s being attacked in the
common room.”
The case is Jane J. v.
Commonwealth, No. 15-P-340 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 12, 2017) (Justia).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)