Showing posts with label FTC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FTC. Show all posts

Saturday, September 5, 2026

Byzantine, needless procedures make it too hard for David to sue Goliath in R.I. small-claims court

RJ Peltz-Steele with Google Gemini CC0 1.0
A Savory Tort Investigation (Continued) 

Following up my eye-opening journey through the byzantine processes of small-claims filing, I wrote this week to my Rhode Island state legislators and to the state attorney general recommending some reforms.

To the legislators, I urged the following reforms to the small-claims court process.

  1. Filing should not cost a complainant the inconvenience and expense of notary service.
  2. Filing should not preclude a complainant from providing a valid service-of-process address for a respondent’s registered agent.
  3. Filing should not charge a complainant with the responsibility of generating for the respondent hardcopies of an answer form, instructions, and interpreter instructions in four languages, requiring a filing portfolio of 19 pages, plus a second copy, for a complaint of only one or two lines.
  4. Service of process to in-state defendants should not require of a complainant the inconvenience and expense of enlisting, in person, the services, personally executed, of a sheriff or constable.

"Most importantly," I wrote, "especially for individual non-lawyers who would sue well represented corporations, these conditions represent utterly unnecessary barriers to access to justice."

To the attorney general, I suggested that the office should not shirk its responsibility to exercise concurrent enforcement authority with federal agencies, especially to stop plain violations of state consumer protection law, such as deceptive sales practices. 

The full letter appears below.


September 4, 2026

Rep. Jennifer Smith Boylan & Sen. Pamela J. Lauria, 82 Smith St., Providence, RI

Hon. Peter F. Neronha, 150 S. Main St., Providence, R.I.

Dear Representative, Senator, and Attorney General:

I enclose for your information a blog article about a small claims lawsuit I am prosecuting in Rhode Island Small Claims Court. The article suggests some needed reforms to strengthen consumer protection, including issues I wish to highlight for your consideration.

There is much not to like about the experience that led me to file a small claim. And the law being what it is, at both state and federal levels, my prospects to prevail are slim, for myriad reasons hardly related to the merits of the case. I am content to prosecute this matter anyway in the hope of pressuring the defendant and its industry to reform practices that are abusive of consumers. If at any time you would like to have a longer conversation about what state government can do to better protect Rhode Island consumers, count me in.

Meanwhile, the merits of this action really are tangential to my purpose in writing to you; rather, especially for you, Representative, and for you, Senator, I wish to highlight self-evident defects in the pleading process in small-claims court that should not be difficult to correct through legislation or simple administrative reform:

  1. Filing should not cost a complainant the inconvenience and expense of notary service.
  2. Filing should not preclude a complainant from providing a valid service-of-process address for a respondent’s registered agent.
  3. Filing should not charge a complainant with the responsibility of generating for the respondent hardcopies of an answer form, instructions, and interpreter instructions in four languages, requiring a filing portfolio of 19 pages, plus a second copy, for a complaint of only one or two lines.
  4. Service of process to in-state defendants should not require of a complainant the inconvenience and expense of enlisting, in person, the services, personally executed, of a sheriff or constable.

All of these conditions waste the time, energy, and money of complainants. Conditions (1), (3), and (4) do not pertain in small-claims court in neighboring Massachusetts; moreover, a complainant in Massachusetts can complete the whole process from home through an e-filing system, and for less money (about $62) than in Rhode Island (more than $150).

Most importantly, especially for individual non-lawyers who would sue well represented corporations, these conditions represent utterly unnecessary barriers to access to justice.

Especially for you, Attorney General, I wish to highlight an issue with the consumer protection services of your office. While I am grateful, truly, for the responsiveness of your office in general, and the capable people who work there, the office succumbs to a common malady in state consumer protection in the states, which is its blanket deference to federal authorities when a respondent is in a regulated industry, or sometimes just out of state.

As an attorney, you know as well as I do that neither jurisdiction nor venue depends on the defendant’s place of business; and that federal law in regulated industries does not wholly preempt state law.

Quite to the contrary, state AGs are vital players to hold industry to account while agencies such as FTC and DOJ only count letters. I daresay, moreover, because you do not live on a desert island, that you recognize the need for state consumer protection to step up in an era in which the federal government is pulling back from, un-staffing, and de-funding, justifiably or not, consumer support, and instead cozying up to big business.

Thus for salient example, when a Rhode Islander at home contracts with one of the few service providers in the oligopolistic airline industry, thus establishing both venue and internet jurisdiction, that contract should be regarded as worthy of the same enforcement of state consumer protection law as any in-person sales transaction on any Rhode Island main street. Such a respondent, even in a regulated industry, has no safe harbor in federal regulatory compliance from charges of deception. I understand that some preemption analyses are more complicated, such as for pharma. But concurrent authority does not excuse the AG from enforcement of state law.

Also as you well know, individuals, whether or not lawyers, usually are unable to enforce their own consumer rights, whether because of boilerplate waivers and alternative-dispute-resolution clauses, statutory rights that fail to authorize private enforcement, or simply transaction costs, including know-how. If the regulatory authorities fail to fill the gap, then industry quickly apprehends and exercises its autonomy to abuse consumers with impunity.

I thank you for your attention and welcome your further interest in these or related matters of consumer protection in Rhode Island.

Sincerely,
/s/
Rick Peltz-Steele

Tuesday, September 1, 2026

Airlines abuse customers, who have nowhere to turn and face byzantine barriers in small claims courts

A Savory Tort Investigation

I sued Air France yesterday.

Consumer Protection and Airline Impunity

The instant matter is simple. I bought a roundtrip ticket from Boston to Paris specifically as offered by Air France because seat selection upon check-in came with the ticket. (I have a dodgy knee and an over-the-hill bladder, so seat selection on long hauls matters to me. You asked.)

Air France consistently promised seat selection.
Air France turned the flight over to Delta for operation, and Delta refused to honor seat selection upon check-in. Delta rather demanded $89 per seat assignment. Delta would not even give me a random seat upon check-in; I was told I would have to wait for a seat assignment at the gate, after everyone with higher priority was given an assignment.

I contacted Air France multiple times and was told that Delta's terms superseded Air France's, to call Delta. I contacted Delta multiple times, and I was told that my problem was with Air France.

I'm not the only person to experience precisely this problem. Redditors and online reviewers have reported the same frustration and the same shirking of responsibility by the airlines over seat selection and other purchase terms. 

That matters here, because I don't file lawsuits just for me. I believe I have a professional responsibility to use my skills as a litigator now and then if it will make the world better for many people.

I made complaints to governmental authorities, the attorney general's office in my home state of Rhode Island, and the U.S. Department of Transportation. Of course, those complaints went into the circular file.

The R.I. AG's office, while having been helpful in other matters, has in the past sent me to the feds on airline issues, notwithstanding their concurrent jurisdiction over ticket sales. And the U.S. DoT, which used to issue at least a polite email of acknowledgment, said nothing, probably distracted by the premiere of Great American Road Trip.

Delta sees things differently, blames Air France.
Delta, it must be said, sent me an email offering something, I think it was a $55 credit, on a future flight. I did not accept.

I also sent a comprehensive demand letter to Air France in June. They replied in July with yet another email, this one at least sufficiently detailed to suggest, for the first time, that they did understand the problem. They were unwilling to pay anything, of course. And more importantly, they did not say the problem was redressed, and they again blamed Delta.

This isn't about money for me, if that's still not clear. What I want is for the airlines to stop using operator agreements as an excuse to reneg on plain promises to consumers. Had Air France simply taken responsibility for the wrong and promised it's no longer happening, I would have dropped the matter.

But Air France couldn't help itself. Repeatedly, responses blamed Delta. They did not address the salient observation of the demand letter: that I have no contract with Delta, even if it were willing to accept responsibility rather than send blame back around.

So as I promised in the demand letter—one must keep one's promises—I sued for breach of contract and deceptive business practices. Like some other states, Rhode Island has a reasonably friendly statute for such consumer claims, and it entitles me to the greater of $500 statutory damages or compensatory damages, plus costs, with the possibility of a damage multiplier, up to three times, in the court's discretion. 

I am not going here to address the problem of arbitration terms among airline terms of service, slyly diverting consumers from the courts and stripping them unwittingly of their Seventh Amendment rights. I must mention that such boilerplate terms usually put any court claim of the kind I discuss here out of reach for the consumer. Worse, arbitration systems are rigged for corporate respondents, evidenced at minimum by the simple fact that they prevail in arbitration far more than reason or chance says they should. The proceedings moreover remain secret, undermining civil justice for everyone else. I have good reason to believe that I am not bound in this matter by compelled arbitration terms, but any reader or prospective plaintiff should be warned.

My goal here remains simply reform of industry practice for consumer protection. I've written before about the abuse American consumers suffer at the hands of airlines, especially in comparison with our European counterparts, and our present era of deregulation in the United States is stripping away what little enforcement there was. 

Yesterday, for example, I was shopping for an airfare online and saw a United fare with no carry-on, that is, bringing a carry-on is not allowed, not an option. That almost compels a person to check a bag, yet the fare did not include a checked bag; you could buy that later: what regulatory authorities call "drip pricing," or what President Biden called "junk fees," and which makes it exceedingly difficult to compare fares. 

These deceptive sales strategies utterly undermine absolutist economic libertarianism, demonstrating, in my view, why responsible libertarianism must support reasonable regulation to ensure a level marketplace. The Biden Federal Trade Commission regulated against junk fees. Trump has not rescinded the regulations, to my knowledge. But non-enforcement is functionally the same. A meaningful regulation would afford a private right of action with damages that would command airlines' attention.

It seems, in the great American tradition of rugged individualism, that enforcement is left to the consumer, who is scarcely given two sticks to rub together to get anything done. And at this point, it seems that a financial hit, even a small one, along with the hassle of answering in court, is required to compel Air France to own up to the simple responsibility of delivering what it sells.

If only it were that easy. 

Small Claims Court and Barriers to Consumer Protection

I am a lawyer (D.C. license) and a litigator, and I have filed many lawsuits. But what I just experienced trying to file a small claim was harrowing and would be prohibitive to a person not equipped as I am. What's worse is that touted digital tools that are supposed to make access to the courts easier are not helping at all.

Here is a series of problems I encountered in filing my small claim. Never mind, by the way, that my claim should be a class action, which is prohibitively difficult even for me to put together, if even possible under the law, which in the United States has grown hostile to consumer class actions, even while Europe, again, moves in the opposite direction.

My small claim was rejected by Massachusetts courts. And then they changed their minds.

I tried first to file a small claim in Massachusetts. It was rejected.

My personal-jurisdiction claim over Air France in Rhode Island is sufficient, but thin, based on my online ticket purchase. There's always a risk of getting a judge who is hostile to plaintiffs and not familiar with the law of internet jurisdiction. Small claims are sometimes not appealable, so if you get a bad ruling, you might be stuck, no matter the law.

Personal jurisdiction over Air France (technically, "Societe Air France") is easier by conventional measures in Massachusetts, because Air France operates out of Boston Logan airport and has assets and employees there. If I prevail in Rhode Island, Air France can make me register my judgment in Massachusetts to collect. Even though I can demand costs, registration of foreign-state judgments is a hassle, beyond the ken of non-lawyer plaintiffs, and requires an outlay of hundreds of dollars just for filing, even before executing enforcement.

Small-claims filing instructions at Mass.gov purport
to afford venue where a plaintiff works.
Happily, the Massachusetts courts website told me that small claims courts in the commonwealth will exercise venue based on a plaintiff's place of work—or home, or business. I work in Massachusetts. Even better, the courts accept e-filings.

I dutifully prepared all of my paperwork and stepped through the online e-filing procedure. It's not a bad user interface, for the most part. 

Alas, the next business morning, my claim was rejected. I had listed my home address in Rhode Island. The form asked for the address where I wished to receive correspondence, not the address I would use to assert venue. There was no field for another address. 

I called the small-claims office of the clerk in New Bedford, Massachusetts, District Court. Let me be clear here that, first, they promptly answered the phone, which is a lot more than I can say for Air France or Delta; and second, they were very, very kind. My whinging here is no denigration of the people involved, who I believe are trying do their honest best in a byzantine bureaucracy.

They told me, though, that the website is wrong, that Massachusetts courts will recognize venue only for a resident plaintiff, or a plaintiff who owns a business in the commonwealth. At least, they said, I would not be charged the filing fee ($62), and I should get in touch if my card is charged erroneously. 

By email—they have an email address, also more than I can say for Air France or Delta—I sent the office the web page I had relied on—not to hassle them, but seriously, to make sure it's corrected, so that other people, especially non-lawyers, don't waste the time and energy that I did. I also reported the error to the state IT office via the page feedback form.

I then went about several hours' work to file my claim in Rhode Island instead. I run a serious risk that Air France simply will ignore the summons; it has no assets, no liability exposure, in Rhode Island. I can obtain a default judgment. But then, again, I will have to go to the extraordinary effort and expense of registering my judgment in Massachusetts and pursuing an enforcement action there.

After I returned home from the courthouse in Providence, Rhode Island, I received an email from the clerk's office in New Bedford: "Please e-file your complaint and we will accept it."

Sigh.

I'm not going to file right now, I responded, because I don't want to pay for two lawsuits. But if Air France ducks out on the Rhode Island summons, it will be cheaper for me to sue again in Massachusetts, rather than register the foreign-state judgment in non-small-claims district court.

Small claims clerks do not understand corporate service of process. Or they do, and I don't?

A second problem I encountered relates to service of process. Neither Massachusetts nor Rhode Island small claims court would accept a service-of-process address for the defendant. Both insisted that service go to the defendant business address. That policy puts plaintiffs, especially non-lawyers, at risk of dismissal for defective service.

Every business, when it registers with a state government for licensing, in almost any state—I've seen some exceptions, and that's a whole other story in undermining consumer protection, but thankfully, Massachusetts keeps pretty good records—provides a mailing address, where it wants to receive business correspondence, and a service address, specifically for legal service of process. Big businesses, such as Air France, contract with companies, "registered agents," specially in the business of receiving legal notices.

Air France lists a New York corporate address and a Boston registered
agent in its filing with the Massachusetts Secretary of Commerce.
 

In the case of Air France, its filing with the Massachusetts Secretary of Commerce lists, not unusually, an address in New York City for the corporate office, and an address in Boston for service to the registered agent, Corporation Service Company. Typically, a business relies on its registered agent only for the initial pleading, and in responsive pleading lists an address for corporate counsel to receive correspondence subsequently.

The Massachusetts e-filing system, which is not bad overall, as I said, has only one field for a defendant's address. Instructions say to provide the address where the defendant receives its correspondence. That's the defendant's corporate address. There is no field for a registered agent at a different address. 

But failing to serve a corporation by way of its registered agent means plaintiff's complaint can be dismissed for defective service. And it seems that someone knows this, because the instructions to users of the e-filing system admonish would-be plaintiffs to look up the defendant's address(es) in the database of the Massachusetts Secretary of Commerce. There's even a link to do so.

If a filing is accepted in the Massachusetts e-filing system, service follows by certified mail. There's a fee assessed for that mailing, simultaneously with the filing fee. There is no opportunity for a plaintiff to add a service address later.

So I emailed the clerk to ask about this problem. Because my filing ultimately was rejected, it never became an issue. But I asked also when we spoke on the phone. 

The clerk to whom I spoke did not seem to be familiar with corporate service of process or registered agents. She said that the small claims office always serves the business address, and that that service would effect legal process. I have my doubts, but at least I shelved that assurance for what I can tell a judge when I'm fighting against defendant's motion to dismiss.

In Rhode Island, there is no e-filing. There is a form for small claims, and it, like in Massachusetts, has only one field for the defendant's address. I entered both addresses there. When filing a civil complaint, a lawyer usually lists a "Serve on:" or "Registered agent:" address below the defendant's corporate address.

But when I went to file, the Rhode Island clerk would have none of it. She, too, seemed baffled by the idea that there would be more than one address for the defendant. She would not accept the filing that way and demanded that I cross out and initial the service address. So I did, muttering, "That's not the law," under my breath. And I filed ($75.75).

I still went by UPS to make a copy of all of the pleading papers ($6.10). I stopped home to scan a copy for myself. And when I went to the post office to send the papers via certified mail, return receipt, I sent sets to both addresses ($11.89 each).

Service of process in Rhode Island is a racket.

In ye olden times, and still when a plaintiff fears a defendant might evade accountability, service of process was effected in person, by a sheriff, constable, or professional process server knocking on the defendant's door. Private investigators sometimes picked up contract service work between meatier jobs. Personal service is so clumsy that it's sometimes the stuff of comedy in movies, such as Pineapple Express (2008).

Now we live in an enlightened age. Well, most of us. Not Rhode Island, the smallest state. Back there in a moment.

In this era of enlightenment, we understand that service of process can be effected more efficiently by paper and ink, through our perfectly well functioning postal system. This, in fact, besides state compulsion, is why companies contract with registered agents: so that we can all agree that that is the address where you send the pleading.

I hear you asking: "OK Boomer, why not use the internet?" Well, first, it's Gen-X to you. We do exist. And please don't be condescending. This is still a developing country. There's nothing wrong with triplicate forms. Press hard.

I have filed small claims in Rhode Island before, and I effected service with the usual certified mail and return receipt, even if I had to overpay the clerk's office to send it for me.

On the backs of complainants,
R.I. sheriffs get a piece of the action.

photo RJ Peltz-Steele CC0 1.0
No more, apparently. Rhode Island now requires that a small claims pro se plaintiff march from the courthouse in Providence, R.I., to the state Sheriffs Headquarters in Cranston, R.I., eight miles away, closes at 4 p.m.!, and there find a sheriff or constable to effect service ($70).

Oh, and stop by a bank or post office, because Sheriffs Headquarters does not take credit cards, debit cards, checks, or cash. You'll need a money order made out to "R.I. STATE SHERIFFS" ($2.65).

Oh, and stop by a copy shop, because you'll need two copies of all the paperwork you brought to the clerk's office, where you were instructed to bring only one, plus two copies of the summons the clerk just gave you ($6).

Alas, there's another wrinkle. R.I. Sheriffs will not serve an out-of-state defendant. How to do that? A flyer at the clerk's office in Providence instructs the pro se plaintiff to "contact that State for service." 

Anyone have the telephone number for Massachusetts? 

I was incredulous. Yet the clerk in Providence was unfazed. I asked whether I could effect service on an R.I. defendant, hypothetically, by sending certified mail, return receipt, myself. No, she said. State law requires that the Sheriffs Office or a constable effect service. I'm not so sure about that, but I'm not a Rhode Island lawyer.

How do I effect service in Massachusetts, then?, I asked. She said she could not tell me, for fear of giving me bad advice about something beyond her purview. Fair enough. But where could I find out?

I figured if certified mail, return receipt, was good enough for the New Bedford District Court, it was good enough for me. And I couldn't see a judge turning me away when I have a return receipt in hand. Still, here we are with another problem that could end the non-lawyer's case before it gets going, and flush the sunken $75 R.I. filing fee down the drain.

When the clerk returned with my summons, after having consulted with a colleague, she said, "You can send this certified mail." That must have been hard to admit. 

Yet it does prompt the question, why is certified mail fine for an out-of-state defendant, but no good for a Rhode Island defendant?

Maybe the sheriffs' slush fund is running short.

Rhode Island requires plaintiffs to prepare paperwork to a point of absurdity.

I did my homework before I went to the courthouse in Providence. I still screwed up. 

I spilled a bucket of printer ink—one of the most expensive liquids on earth, and a whole other story in regulators' failure to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive corporate practices—to prepare my filings for the Rhode Island court. I followed instructions to the letter. I even printed and had notarized an extra copy of the complaint. Not required, but I fancy myself a boy scout!

Let's pause there to note that Rhode Island requires a small claims complaint to be notarized. I used my AAA membership to avail of the service there. Still, I had to stop by that office on my way to the courthouse. That's actually the service I use most frequently at AAA—nothing to do with my car or travel. Someone stopping in at a UPS store for a one-off notarization would have to pay $10 or $15 per stamp.

Notarization of such a filing as routine and small-time as a small claims pleading is not normal in the states; Massachusetts does not require it. And it's profoundly anachronistic, having little purpose: yet another barrier to ordinary people's access to the courts.

But I haven't yet told you the best part.

To file a small claim in Rhode Island, the plaintiff must present, in hardcopy, the court form for the defendant's answer to the complaint, as well as court instructions for how to complete the answer form.

R.I. court instructions in Cambodian stand ready
to aid the New York corporate lawyer who needs them.
Wait, there's more!

The plaintiff also must present four pages of instructions on how the defendant can seek interpreter services, the pages respectively in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Cambodian.

Cambodian.

The clerk looked at me skeptically and asked, "Do you have the papers for the answer?"

Clearly she anticipated having to send me packing, another schmuck who failed to follow directions. I could not tell from her anticipation whether she relished the seemingly inevitable rebuff, or was just wary of how another frustrated, infuriated claimant might react. 

"Yes," I said, proudly, presenting the papers. A boy scout craves the approval of authority figures.

But I couldn't help myself. 

"I even have instructions in Cambodian for my corporate defendant's team of New York lawyers," I said.

Unfazed.

Alas, I did make a mistake. I had printed the answer form without the instructions. The horror!

In my defense, the user instructions did not specify which version of the answer form to prepare, with or without instructions. I assumed, mistakenly, that it was not my job to tell New York attorneys how to file a responsive pleading, against me, for their transnational corporate client. 

To the clerk's credit, and I do appreciate this, because my parking meter ($1.60) was ticking, she provided me, gratis, a hardcopy of the correct form with instructions to include with my growing portfolio—now 19 pages for a two-sentence complaint.

I understand the need for both the instructions and the interpreter forms when the defendant is an individual. Access to justice is a two-way street, and, say, a landlord who is a frequent flier in the courts should not be able to exploit a tenant's ignorance of legal process and rights. 

But on the face of my complaint, I am suing a transnational corporation with a U.S. office on Broadway in Manhattan. Am I really Goliath in this scenario?

Is there no rule of reason? Or do we just assume that the little people ought not be bothering big corporations anyway?

It is virtually inconceivable that a non-lawyer could navigate the small claims process, at least not without rendering the case vulnerable to dismissal for a procedural fault.

I'm not sure anyone outside the U.S. Chamber of Commerce thinks we do not have an access to justice problem in the United States. And in the marketplace, consumer frustration has hit a record pitch.

Let's review. My claim is straightforward. I contracted for a service and did not get that service. I am suing for the value of the service that I did not get. That's a loss equivalent to $178, or $500, as the legislature decided is a fair statutory minimum.

Besides my hours and hours of time, my barrels of printer ink, and my fuel, parking, and heartache, I have thus far spent $105.63 on my $178 loss. And that's just to get in the courthouse door. If Air France does not answer my complaint, I'm looking at hundreds more dollars for enforcement, even with a default judgment in hand.

And I am only one consumer, of, no doubt, thousands, who bothered to follow up on a broken promise. I'm just one consumer savvy enough to know how to sue, at least in theory. 

No wonder, then, corporate America simply counts on the fact that it can rip off consumers for hundreds of dollars at a time with impunity. Even if one consumer fights back and prevails, the profits are enough to roll around and spill champagne in.

And our legal system facilitates this abuse. Small claims court was devised to redress this very problem, yet the hurdles to clear the entrance gate are so high, the court might as well shut its doors. Let's not forget that I was twice given incorrect guidance by clerks, notwithstanding good intentions, so far in my journey. I'm already supposed to know what I'm doing, and all this is before even getting to the merits of the case.

There are a lot of ways we could reform consumer protection and access to justice. For starters, I should not be bringing this claim. State AGs or federal agencies, at minimum, should be making sure that consumers get what they pay for, or at least that corporations cannot willfully continue deceptive practices after they're made aware of them.

Even writ small, there are countless ways that the ills of local courts, as I've outlined here and no doubt many more, could be fixed to make access to justice just a little bit easier. Our public officials only have to want the courts we pay for to work for people as well as they work for corporations. 

Friday, February 14, 2025

Researcher seeks to ease persistent anticompetitive constraints on indie films in online environment

Yaleth Calderon, a film school graduate and candidate for the California bar, has published a law review note on antitrust, online technology, and independent filmmaking.

Are There Plenty of Movies in the Sea?: How a Revision of the Terminated Paramount Decrees Could Benefit the Market for Independent Filmmakers appears in the latest issue, volume 20, page 111, of the UMass Law Review. Here is the abstract:

In the early years of filmmaking, the Supreme Court passed the Paramount Decrees as a set of rules prohibiting certain practices by major production companies that restrained competition within the industry. The creation of the internet has not only changed the way society has consumed media, but it has also affected the opportunities for filmmakers to share their works with the world. In 2020, the Paramount Decrees were overturned, dramatically limiting the distribution channels, creative control, and marketing opportunities held by independent filmmakers. This note outlines the injury felt by independent filmmakers and proposes specific rules inspired by the Paramount Decrees that the Federal Trade Commission could enact to mitigate some of the adverse effects of the decision.

The journal is transitioning to a new online publication platform, so volume 20 is not yet online. The new platform is expected to launch in summer 2025. Meanwhile, Calderon generously has made the piece available to Savory Tort readers here.

In an author's note, Calderon wrote that "[t]his article is an attempt to contribute to the ever-changing challenges towards film distribution in the digital era."

Calderon is an alumna of my comparative law class, in which it was a pleasure to have her. She received her B.A. in Cinema and Digital Media and English, with an emphasis in literature, criticism, and theory, from the University of California Davis. Last year, she served as a judicial extern at the L.A. Superior Court. After finishing law school this spring, Calderon plans to return to her home Los Angeles to practice law in California.

Calderon's subject matter is dear to my heart, too. Morgan Steele, my daughter, works in film in Los Angeles and has directed shorts. She just made a cameo in an Instagram promo (below) for The Gorge (streaming today on AppleTV+ (subscription wall)). Paul McAlarney, my friend and former TA and RA, now a New York lawyer, was an independent filmmaker before law school.

Exactly as Calderon recognizes, the streaming environment has multiplied the potential for independent distribution in film, but anticompetitive practices in the market have precluded the full realization of that potential, to the detriment of both creators and viewers.

Tuesday, February 4, 2025

RFK, Jr. hearing prompts reconsideration of civil, regulatory responsibility for vaccine misinformation

"Are you supportive of these onesies?" Sen. Sanders asks.
© C-SPAN (YouTube; license).
The showdown between Bernie Sanders and RFK, Jr., featuring anti-vacc onesies, got me thinking about articles published by a former student, later academic and bar colleague, positing tort and regulatory approaches to harmful vaccine misinformation.

I wrote in 2017 about physician-attorney Donald C. Arthur's Commercial Deception by Anti-Vaccine Homeopathic Websites: A Consumer Protection Approach, 10:1 Biotechnology & Pharmaceutical L. Rev. 1, 27 (2017). At the time, the article was behind a pay wall; it is now freely available.  Here is the abstract.

Some internet marketers offer for sale "vaccination substitutes" that can purportedly replace actual scientifically-tested and federally-approved vaccinations. Deceptive internet advertising for vaccine substitutes has dissuaded parents from vaccinating their children, resulting in a resurgence of vaccine-preventable childhood diseases. The Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission have the authority to address dangerously deceptive product claims, including those for homeopathic preparations that have thus far avoided safety and efficacy testing. This article presents the issues involved in deceptive advertising and proposes regulatory solutions.

When Dr. Arthur and I first discussed the project in the 2010s, he was thinking about a tort theory for liability for publishers of vaccine misinformation. The tort theory is fraught, but feasible. There are problems of proof, such as the attenuated causation linking the publication of misinformation with later disease, and the inevitable First Amendment defense, which at plaintiff's most fortunate still might require culpability in excess of ignorance.

Dr. Arthur split his research into two works. He published in 2016, I didn't mention in 2017, Negative Portrayal of Vaccines by Commercial Websites: Tortious Misrepresentation, 11:2 UMass L. Rev. 122 (2016), also freely available. Here is the abstract.

Commercial website publishers use false and misleading information to create distrust of vaccines by claiming vaccines are ineffective and contain contaminants that cause autism and other disorders. The misinformation has resulted in decreased childhood vaccination rates and imperiled the public by allowing resurgence of vaccine-preventable illnesses. This Article argues that tort liability attaches to publishers of commercial websites for foreseeable harm that results when websites dissuade parents from vaccinating their children in favor of purchasing alternative products offered for sale on the websites.

When Dr. Arthur wrote both these articles in 2016, it was before the first election of Donald Trump with attendant attempts to disarm and dismantle federal consumer protection systems. The tort theory looks better now. See Dorit Reiss & John Diamond, Tort Law: Liability for Anti-Vaccine Misinformation, 4 Judges Book 107 (2020) (not citing Arthur).

Dr. Arthur is an emergency medicine and preventive medicine physician.  He served 33 years in the U.S. Navy, culminating his career as Navy surgeon general and retiring at the rank of vice admiral. He served as chief executive officer of three hospitals, including the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland. Dr. Arthur teaches adjunct at UMass Law and for seven years practiced of counsel with the Law Offices of Beauregard, Burke and Franco.

HT @ Melissa Colten, UMass Law public interest fellow, whose curiosity reminded me of these articles.

Wednesday, December 6, 2023

FTC 'junk fees' proposal needs tightening

The CFPB is attacking junk fees in banking. The FTC rule
would govern consumer sales transactions. CFPB image.

Today I submitted the following comment to the Federal Trade Commission on the notice of proposed rule-making regarding "Trade Regulation Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees." These are the "junk fees" that the Biden Administration has pledged to combat.

The NPRM was published on November 9, 2023. You too can comment at the Federal Register website. You can bet that business will be crying loudly about the impracticality of simply telling customers what the price of a thing is.

I support the proposed rule, though I don't think it goes far enough. My comment focuses on select points of ambiguity on which already I foresee business intransigence.

Elsewhere in the world, even tax is part of a price. When my friends and family visit from abroad, they are flummoxed by the repeated experience of seeing a price and then having to pay more. For some reason we countenance this in America, as if in some kind of wild West approach to market regulation, it's OK for a seller to put a gun to the consumer's head at the point of sale. As I say in my comment, that is not what "free market" means.


December 6, 2023

I support the proposed rule because I support free-market transaction and regulatory policy. A free market requires transparency around the terms of transaction to both buyer and seller. When a buyer is surprised by junk fees, that is, fees that are applied to a transaction after the customer believes that she or he has concluded negotiation of the terms, the seller is able to conclude the transaction upon an unfair advantage. It is an appropriate role for government regulation to level the marketplace by ensuring transparency, and that means upfront total pricing.

I note [a] point of potential ambiguity, and, thus, potential abuse by sellers. In the proposed rule, “Government charges” are defined as

all fees or charges imposed on consumers by a Federal, State, or local government agency, unit, or department. This definition covers only fees or charges imposed by the government on consumers and does not encompass fees or charges that the government imposes on a business and that the business chooses to pass on to consumers.

I anticipate argument over two points.

First, I expect that quasi-governmental actors, such as a corporations created by statute, and government contractors, such as service concessionaires, are not agencies of government. Sellers might disagree.

Second, if a governmental actor compels a seller to report and pay a per consumer or per transaction fee, I expect that the fee is nonetheless a fee that the business “chooses to pass on to consumers.” Sellers might disagree.

By way of example, I have just made a car reservation with Avis at BWI. My upfront price was $104.82.

On the payment page, the following fees were added:

  • Concession Recovery Fee (11.11%): 12.27
  • Customer Facility Charge-3.75/day: 7.50
  • Transportation Facility Charge-2.25/day: 4.50
  • Vehicle License Fee-0.56/day: 1.12
  • Total Tax: 14.97

The additional fees sum $40.36, which is a 38.5% markup on the upfront price.

All of these fees are sanctioned by Maryland law. The former two fees are passed on by Avis to the Maryland Airport Authority (MAA), and the latter fee is, self-evidently, a tax. I do not know the beneficiary of the penultimate two fees, but I assume that the Transportation Facility Charge goes to an MAA shuttle contractor.

So first, is the MAA contractor a “government agency, unit, or department” under the proposed rule? I suggest no, because contractors and concessionaires, like quasi-governmental “sue or be sued” entities created by Congress, are expected to comply with the rules of the competitive marketplace when they act in a commercial capacity. However, Avis might disagree, arguing that the fee is set by the MAA. The MAA is a governmental unit of Maryland state government.

Second, are these fees “impose[d] on a business[,] and … the business chooses to pass [them] on to consumers”? I suggest yes, because Avis owes these fees to the MAA, et al., but is not obligated to pass them on to consumers. As long as Avis accounts for the fees with the government, Avis remains free to price its services as it pleases. Moreover, to calculate the state tax on the car rental, 11.5%, the tax basis includes the fees. Thus, it seems plain to me that the fees represent the price of service and are not akin to a tax that is imposed upon the transaction. However, Avis might disagree, arguing that the seller is a mere conduit for fees set by the MAA.

I suggest that the junk-fee rule is virtually impotent in a broad range of transactions if it does not address fees in a transaction such as this one. While I might like to see tax and all incorporated into upfront pricingas it is in countries the world overI understand that that is not the American custom. But any fee besides tax on sale or service should be disclosed to a customer as part of an upfront price. Otherwise, the proposed rule is completely undermined. I must go all the way to the payment page of the Avis transaction before I discover the actual price, a substantial markup, for the transaction I desire.

I hope you will clarify that government contractors and comparable quasi-governmental actors are not governmental actors within the meaning of the proposed rule. And I hope you will clarify that government-sanctioned fees that are incorporated into the tax basis of a transaction, even if imposed on a per customer or per transaction basis, are fees that a seller “chooses to pass on to consumers.”

Saturday, September 3, 2022

FTC finally notices abuse of customers, shady business practices by car rental industry

In an omnibus resolution late last week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) green-lighted investigation of the car rental industry.

Earlier this year, I wrote about the "new lows" of our car rental oligopoly in the United States, including my own experiences with the misleading Hertz "loyalty" program and the manipulation of pickup and drop-off times to draw overage fees.

The resolution broadly compels investigation "[t]o determine whether any persons, partnerships, corporations, or others have engaged or are engaging in deceptive or unfair acts or practices in or affecting commerce in the advertising, marketing, promotion, sale, tracking, or distribution of rental cars."

For context, Frankfurt Kurnit's Jeff Greenbaum wrote in Advertising Law Updates that commissioners ordered similar investigations in July 2021 into "areas such as COVID-19, healthcare, and technology platforms," and in September 2021 into services targeting veterans and children, "algorithmic and biometric bias, deceptive and manipulative conduct online, repair restrictions, and abuse of intellectual property."

The FTC didn't detail the buzz in its bonnet, but they likely heard lawmakers in the spring frowning on Hertz's misreporting of stolen cars. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) wrote Hertz a nasty-gram in March. Forty-seven customers filed suit for false arrest in July, CNN reported (via ABC 7 L.A.), and they're not the only ones.

I documented my rental return this summer in Thunder Bay, Ontario.
(RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)

I've started taking the advice of The Points Guy's Summer Hull to take pictures and videos of my rental cars when I pick them up and when I return them. One Mile at a Time advises the same

But I'm doubting the utility of it. I'm not sure you can see scratches or dents in the images, especially in dark garages. And, as Hull herself reported, she was called out for alleged damage to the roof, which she had not climbed up to photograph. I wonder whether I should crawl under the car to photograph the undercarriage.

Lately rental companies have presented me with an up-sell option for tire and window insurance, threatening that they're not covered even if a buy the CDW. And don't get me started on involuntary "upgrades" to fuel-inefficient trucks. Even the sedan pictured here, which I rented this summer in Thunder Bay, Ontario, was what I got when I reserved an SUV to tackle unpaved roads.

Meanwhile, my budding occupation as car portraitist is eating into my travel time and my hard drive space.

It seems to me that when customers start having systematically to video-record their interactions with industry to protect themselves against fraud, the problem might be with the industry and not with the customer.

Oh, FTC ... 🤙

Saturday, August 13, 2022

NBC resists TV free market, overcharges U.S. viewers: PL football costs $20 in Canada, $70 in United States

Each year, I become freshly enraged at the cost of seeing Premier League football in the United States, a ready example of antitrust non-enforcement in the communication sector.

The Sporting News had the audacity, or stupidity?, to describe NBC carriage of PL matches in the United States as a "luxury." I guess it is, a luxury only the rich can afford. To follow one's team, one must, at minimum, subscribe to NBC partner FuboTV for $70 per month. Access via FuboTV costs just US$20 per month in Canada.

The tangled cross-ownerships of what used to be broadcast TV are indicative of the dearth of consumer protection in the area. NBC "competitor" CBS (Viacom) owns a stake in FuboTV. The legacy broadcasters are using their weight in contracting power to lock down content in channel consolidators that emulate the old cable TV business model, by which consumers were compelled to overpay for a sliver of content in a library they didn't want. Hardly the free market promise of streaming.

But the FCC long ago left the helm unmanned on consumer protection when broadcasting gave way to cable. And the FTC and DOJ have had little interest in expanding their purview in times of corporate-captured governance. As usual, the United States purports to model free market capitalism in an oligopolized market that is anything but.

FuboTV in Canada at left, United States at right.
The package in Canada has fewer channels,
but if PL is all you want, that's not an option.

Monday, January 24, 2022

American Airlines resists transparency, sues 'Points Guy' for tortious interference, trademark infringement

Photo by RJ Peltz-Steele at O.R. Tambo International Airport, Johannesburg,
South Africa, 2020 (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)

The Points Guy (TPG) has become embroiled in litigation with American Airlines over how the TPG app lets users manage their frequent flyer miles, the airline charging the website with tortious interference and trademark infringement.

I read TPG every day.  The website is funded by product placements and advertising, especially by credit card companies.  One has to know that and take the content with heaps of salt.  But I find TPG incomparable and nonetheless worthwhile for keeping up with the travel industry.  And TPG advice has been especially helpful to me with advice on frequent flyer programs, for example, letting me know how much miles are worth on average in real dollars, so I know whether dynamic redemption tables are offering a good deal.

I also like some of the writers at TPG, because they set a tone that resonates with me, mixing a desire for industry accountability, especially for airlines, with a sense of humor and a lighthearted wonder of the world.  Baltimore-based senior editor Benét J. Wilson (LinkedIn, Muck Rack, Twitter; see also Poynter) is especially fabulous; check out her wider world at Aviation Queen.  I met Benét when she taught an outstanding program on advanced Google research tools for the National Freedom of Information Coalition (NFOIC), and thereby for my FOI Law students, who participated.

Last year, TPG launched an Apple app.  I haven't used it, because I'm an Android user.  I avoid Apple products because I've never been a fan of Apple intellectual property (IP) policies, which I mention because it's relevant here.  Apple's limited submission to a right of repair for Apple smartphones is a step in the right direction; more on that momentarily.  Anyway, TPG is working on the Android version of the app.

Among many features, the TPG app empowers users to manage their frequent flyer miles.  TPG deep-links to data from sites such as that of American Airlines (AA), within users' accounts there.  Obviously, this access improves the user's ability to maximize the value of their miles, recognizing good deals and, key, getting advance warning when miles are set to expire.

AA was not happy about that.  The company accused TPG of violating the terms and conditions of the website and frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, thus, allegedly, interfering with AA's contract with its customers and infringing on AA IP.  According to media reports, TPG sued AA in Delaware state court the week before last.  I assume TPG sought declaratory relief; at the time of this writing, the complaint is not yet available from Delaware courts.

Then on Tuesday last week, AA sued TPG in federal court, in AA's home Northern District of Texas.  The complaint alleged tortious interference with, inter alia, contract, unfair competition by misappropriation, (virtual) trespass, trademark infringement and dilution, copyright infringement, and violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

For Law360, Jasmin Jackson filled in some background last week (limited access without subscription).  Jackson reported that TPG initially sought AA's partnership in the app.  AA declined.  Since the app's launch, the two were discussing their differences.  AA claimed surprise at TPG's Delaware filing and accused TPG of leveraging its position with litigation costs and compelling, AA said, the suit in Texas.

I see the case as a high-tech relation of the right-to-repair problem.  AA is gaining a business advantage through obfuscation of customer data and control of information under the guise of IP protection.  The same strategy is why I have to pay a high-dollar technician to tell me what's wrong with my car when the check-engine light comes on, and it's why 11% of McDonald's Taylor-made McFlurry machines are broken.

Customer frustration with companies' resistance to transactional transparency to maximize profit margins is manifesting in a wave of state legislation to protect consumers (see N.Y. Times July, Oct. 2021; repair industry website; U.S. PIRG).  Massachusetts voters overwhelmingly approved a right-to-repair ballot initiative in 2020, despite a $25m no campaign by the auto industry (on this blog).  Industry promptly sued, principally claiming federal preemption.  The outcome of a 2021 trial in Alliance for Automotive Innovation v. Healy is still awaited, as the parties battle over a state motion to reopen trial evidence.

There is a Fair Repair Act bill in Congress, even if its odds of passage are dismal.  And the President last summer made overtures, however feeble, ordering the Federal Trade Commission to regulate to protect independent repair shops.  Industry claims it needs exclusive repair rights to protect consumers from incompetent independent technicians.  But a May 2021 FTC report located such industry claims somewhere between baseless and overstated.

The cause should be, and at least sometimes is, bipartisan.  As I have commented many times, free markets depend on transparency, the free flow of information between business and consumer.  So even economic conservatives should be able to get behind the right to repair.  That bipartisan impulse has fueled congressional appetite for now pending bills to enhance antitrust in the tech sector.  Apple's seemingly open-minded move to allow smartphone repair might have been calculated to head off antitrust enforcement.

Summons issued last week in the lawsuit filed by AA, which is American Airlines, Inc. v. Red Ventures LLC, No. 4:22-cv-00044 (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 18, 2022).

UPDATE, Nov. 10: The parties settled on undisclosed terms on November 4, 2022.

Friday, September 25, 2020

Boston Bar panel surveys landscape of privacy law, data protection policy, class action litigation

Attorneys Melanie Conroy, Marjan Hajibandeh, and Matthew M.K. Stein
We had great fun yesterday, as lawyer fun goes, talking about privacy law in the United States, from the impact of the Privacy Shield collapse to the latest litigation under California's groundbreaking consumer privacy protection law.  I was privileged to appear in a Boston Bar Association program on privacy class action litigation, led by attorney Melanie A. Conroy, CIPP/US, of Pierce Atwood LLP, alongside practicing-attorney panelists Matthew M.K. Stein, of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, and Marjan Hajibandeh of CarGurus, Inc. 

Our topical reach was a breathless sprint across a dramatic landscape.  We opened with our respective thoughts on developments in privacy law, Conroy observing that the fast-paced field has undergone seismic shifts again and again in recent years, from the implementation of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) to the $18m Equifax data breach settlement in Massachusetts.

I spoke to the impact of the European Court of Justice decision ("Schrems II" (ECJ July 16, 2020)) invalidating the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield as a motivator for U.S. reform.  Besides the significance of the case in Europe and our foreign relations, the decision signals that a quarter century after adoption of the first European Data Protection Directive, Europe's patience with American recalcitrance has finally run out.

Julie Brill (MS CC) and William Kovacic
Former Federal Trade Commissioner Julie Brill told the Senate Commerce Committee this week that in two years, 65% of the world will be living under data protection laws, most of them modeled after the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  As former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman William Kovacic put it, if we don't pass legislation in the United States, "we will get a national privacy policy: the GDPR."  As I tweeted this week, hearing testimony drove the usually cool and collected Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) to exclaim, "My God, this is clear, we need a strong privacy law." And Americans are ready; Brill said that nine out of ten Americans now believe that privacy is a human right.

Sen. Cantwell
Our panel ran down the latest developments in class action privacy litigation, loosely divided on the fronts of biometric data class actions, mostly arising under Illinois's pioneering Biometric Information Privacy Act; CCPA-related class actions in California; and data breach litigation.  I ran down cases in the latter vein and talked some about the present circuit split over Article III standing.  Federal courts have divided over whether "theft alone" can constitute concrete injury for constitutionally minimal standing, or plaintiffs must show some subsequent misuse of their data.  This issue is not limited to the data breach area, but has implications across a wide range of statutory enforcement systems, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

For my part, I predict that our dawning, if belated, understanding of the monetary value of personally identifiable information (PII) will lead us to the inevitable conclusion that theft alone suffices.  This is evidenced, for example, in Hogan v. NBCUniversal (D.R.I. filed Aug. 27, 2020), over the sale of Golf Channel subscriber identities, which subsequently were associated with other PII and resold.  Though for the time being, my favored conclusion is arguably not the inclination evidenced in the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, in 2016.  Senator Dick Blumenthal (D.-Conn.) mentioned this week, apropos of current events, that Justice Ginbsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented in Spokeo on just this point.

The late Justice Ginsburg; Sen. Blumenthal
Our next panel focus was developments in the First Circuit and Massachusetts.  In Massachusetts Superior Court in Boston, data breach litigation, filed in May 2019, against Massachusetts General Hospital, Brigham & Women's Hospital, and the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, over online patient-service communications occurring outside secure portals, raises the very question of concrete harm, which may be resolved differently at the state level than under the federal Constitution.  Meanwhile in federal court, the same issue in data breach litigation, filed in March 2020, in Hartigan v. Macy's, highlights the lack of First Circuit precedent on the question since Spokeo, while citing strong pre-Spokeo indications that the First Circuit would favor the misuse-required position.

In parting observations, I offered that we have a long road ahead.  Of all the bills pending in Congress (see EPIC's excellent April report), only some propose a private cause of action and none attacks the problem of government surveillance, both purported prerequisites to European restoration of authorized trans-Atlantic data flow.  Within the U.S Congress, there appears to be bipartisan support for some kind of nationwide privacy legislation.  But the questions of private or FTC enforcement, and whether preemption would mean a legislative floor or ceiling remain sticking points that could derail the process.

Tuesday, August 22, 2017

Abstract: Arthur on vaccination and consumer protection

Donald C. Arthur, M.D., J.D. UMass Law '17, has published Commercial Deception by Anti-Vaccine Homeopathic Websites: A Consumer Protection Approach, 10 Biotechnology & Pharmaceutical L. Rev. 1, 27 (2017).  Here is the abstract.

Abstract
Some internet marketers offer for sale “vaccination substitutes” that can purportedly replace actual scientifically-tested and federally-approved vaccinations. Deceptive internet advertising for vaccine substitutes has dissuaded parents from vaccinating their children, resulting in a resurgence of vaccine-preventable childhood diseases. The Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission have the authority to address dangerously deceptive product claims, including those for homeopathic preparations that have thus far avoided safety and efficacy testing. This article presents the issues involved in deceptive advertising and proposes regulatory solutions.
The article is available to Westlaw Next subscribers here.  The Review is published at North Carolina Central University School of Law.

Claiming Don as an alumnus is decidedly my privilege.  Dr. Arthur is an emergency medicine and preventive medicine physician.  He served 33 years in the U.S. Navy, culminating his career as Navy surgeon general and retiring at the rank of vice admiral. He served as chief executive officer of three hospitals, including the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland.