High court sticks with conventional duty doctrine in relieving contractor of responsibility for roofer's fall

Jiminy Peak Mountain Resort
Jason Morrison via Flickr (edited) CC BY-NC 2.0

A general contractor without boots on the job site owes no duty of care to a subcontractor's employee on site, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held Monday.

The plaintiff was a roofing worker on the job at Jiminy Peak Mountain Resort in Hancock, Massachusetts. He sustained serious injuries falling from a roof when between safety-harness clips. 

Worker compensation law precluded the plaintiff from suing his own employer, a subcontractor. But as often happens in such cases, to supplement insufficient compensation from the worker compensation system, the plaintiff looks around for third parties who also might bear responsibility. Here, the plaintiff sued the general contractor for negligence and negligent hiring—or, more precisely, negligent contracting.

The litigation pattern is similar to a case I teach (Lulu, SSRN), first developed for 1L torts by the late Prof. Marshall S. Shapo, to introduce students to litigation patterns more complex than a simple one plaintiff versus one defendant, as well as the collateral implications of legislative policy, such as worker compensation. Like here, in Wrobel v Trapani (Ill. App. Ct. 1970), the plaintiff was a subcontractor employee who sued the general contractor in negligence. Sometimes I fret over the age of some of the cases I rely on to teach 1Ls, but, I suppose, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

Though a range of amici lined up on both sides, including the Suffolk Law Supreme Court Clinic for the plaintiff and the American Tort Reform Association for the defense, the instant case was straightforward, and the court's decision a workmanlike affirmance. 

Though the contract between general and sub had broad language about maintaining a safe site, all of the how-to was why the general hired the sub, thus within the sub's almost exclusive purview, the court reasoned. The general contractor had little more authority than to say stop or proceed with the work overall. The sub, and not the general, was involved at the detail level of how long and how many safety lines to have, the sort of stuff that would matter in the plaintiff's suit. So the plaintiff's legal maneuver was an ill-fated effort to subvert the exclusivity of worker comp. 

What's interesting about the case pedagogically is how the SJC framed its decision in terms of duty. The most ethereal of the fundamental elements of tort, duty is where the ghost in the machine gets its say, that is, that judges are permitted to put a thumb in the scale in favor of public policy. And the SJC did. 

"Whether a duty exists is a question of law informed by foreseeability, the relationship of the parties, existing social values, and public policy," the court wrote. Well said; hey, did the court crib my final exam answer key? Because that's an easy six points for the student who remembers.

Applying that standard, beyond the analysis of the facts, the court observed that the legislature frowns on third-party suits that might unfairly undermine worker comp as exclusive remedy. For uncertainty around liability could in turn put a damper on general contracting. The approach is classic economic-conservative, no doubt to the dismay of labor-friendly amici who supported the plaintiff, though not entirely unfairly, if one is suspicious of judicial policymaking.

All the same, the court's reliance on duty is curious in two respects. First, Wrobel v. Trapani was not decided on the basis of duty, rather on the common law doctrine of active-passive indemnity. In Wrobel, the court reached a different conclusion on potential liability in part, but that was because the general contractor in that case did have personnel on site, and the plaintiff alleged directly implicated negligence by one of the general's workers.

The heuristic of active-passive indemnity nevertheless works functionally the same as the court's duty analysis here: the general was not involved, so passive, and the sub was involved, so active, each relative to the alleged negligence. I urge my students to understand active-passive indemnity merely as the sort of hardening of common law logic that occurs through stare decisis when the same fact pattern, here a problem in duty, is presented over and over again in the courts.

Massachusetts does recognize active-passive indemnity, but it is disfavored relative to contractual terms. The instant case exhibits the same disfavor relative to the absence of contractual terms, which might otherwise have spelled out a more specific duty on the part of the general contractor.

Second, the court relies on the Second Restatement to bolster its duty analysis, apparently ignoring the SJC's adoption of the Third Restatement approach to duty, which I wrote about at length more than five years ago and won't unpack again here. Suffice to say the Third Restatement tries to purge policy from the common law duty analysis and might rather have decided the instant case on "scope of liability." That approach, in turn, might more closely reflect the operation of active-passive indemnity.

The dissenters in Doull v. Foster (Mass. 2021), two of five, warned that the Third Restatement approach tried to fix something that wasn't broken and so would not catch on. Their warning seems prescient, as the lower courts have been reluctant to modify their m.o. in duty and causation analysis, and even the SJC has seemed reluctant to double down on rocking the boat.

The instant case is Contento Suquilanda v. Skyway Roofing, Inc. (Mass. Aug. 17, 2026). Justice Serge Georges Jr. wrote the unanimous court opinion. A Suffolk Law alumnus, Justice Georges was sworn into the court in December 2020, so did not participate in the opinion in Doull v. Foster, issued in February 2021.

Collateral to drug-testing race discrimination suit, Boston wins chance to demand indemnity by lab

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Is hair-follicle drug testing racially discriminatory?

That was not the question before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Friday, but the Court's decision ancillary to that disparate-impact civil rights question is instructive on indemnity.

The civil rights claim in this case was filed in 2005 and still is in litigation in federal court.  Plaintiffs in that suit are eight police officers, a police cadet, and an applicant for a 911-operator job who suffered adverse action after testing positive in hair-follicle drug tests administered by the City of Boston.  Seven of the officers were fired for cocaine-positive results.

The plaintiffs, all African American, deny drug use.  They assert that the test is inaccurate and "disproportionately yielded false positives for people of color, resulting in disparate impact by race," the SJC wrote Friday.  "During the eight years for which the plaintiffs present data, black officers and cadets tested positive for cocaine approximately 1.3% of the time, while white officers and cadets tested positive just under 0.3% of the time," the First Circuit wrote in 2014.

The city won summary judgment twice in the trial court, yet the First Circuit twice found error, in 2014 and in 2016, and remanded for further proceedings.  The case, Jones v. City of Boston, remains in the district court, though the docket shows no activity on the merits since the latter remand, suggesting a resolution might have been reached.

The instant case is a dispute in state court between the city and the test provider, Psychemedics Corp.  In the city's contract with Psychemedics, the company promised "to 'assume the defense of' the city, and to 'hold [it] harmless' from all suits and claims arising from 'wrongful or negligent' acts by Psychemedics."  After suit was filed against the city, it went to Psychemedics to talk defense.  It's not clear that the two ever got on the same page.  Psychemedics seemed to regard the suit as outside the scope of the indemnity and regarded its obligations fulfilled by offering the city technical assistance on the science.

Then, as the SJC recounted flatly, "Ten years passed."  In 2017, the city started looking around for help with its long mounting legal expenses and set its sights on Psychemedics.  "What?!" Psychemedics said.  I paraphrase.  Psychemedics sued for declaratory relief, and the city counterclaimed for breach of contract and related theories.

The case boils down to an indemnitee's duty to notify an indemnitor of the need to defend.  An indemnitee, the Court held, "must give the indemnitor 'notice and an opportunity to defend.'  The indemnitee then must allow the indemnitor to take over the defense (if it attempts to do so), and must not later block the indemnitor from doing so."  Parties are free to contract specifics, but in the absence of other specification, "'no particular form of words is necessary' to present notice and the opportunity to assume the defense."  (Citations omitted throughout.)

Justice Lenk

The SJC vacated the trial court summary judgment for Psychemedics and remanded.  The trial judge had improperly decided questions of fact, inadvertently burdening the city with having to refute the company's assertions of fact.  The SJC rejected as unproved, as yet, a number of Psychemedics theories, such as that the city had declined the company's defense or had not litigated Jones in good faith as to protect Psychemedics from liability.

To my novice reading—I am no expert on insurance or indemnity—the city fairly invoked the company's duty to defend many times, and Psychemedics tried to weasel out.  Anyway, the SJC concluded that that was how the trial court should have looked at the case on summary judgment motion, because that was the position of the city, which was the non-moving party.

The case is Psychemedics Corp. v. City of Boston, No. SJC-12903 (Mass. Jan. 29, 2021).  Justice Barbara A. Lenk, since retired, authored the opinion of the unanimous Court.