'The Shipbreakers' (2000) is classic Langewiesche; Hong Kong ship-breaking convention enters force

William Langewiesche, 2007
Internaz via Flickr CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Journalist William Langewiesche died at age 70 in June (N.Y. Times).

I came to know Langewiesche's work through his 16 years with The Atlantic. He wrote subsequently for Vanity Fair and The New York Times Magazine. His long-form journalism, including nine books, is legendary. He tackled big, complex, and notorious subjects, such as ocean piracy and nuclear proliferation, helping readers to make sense of the world through concise and compelling prose.

Upon his passing, commentators have rushed to recommend their favorite Langewiesche works. Mine has been little mentioned, so I want to put it on the record.

For a quarter century, I have been haunted by Langewiesche's remarkable cover story for the August 2000 Atlantic, "The Shipbreakers." As The Atlantic teased:

On a six-mile stretch of beach at a place called Alang, in India, some 200 ships stand side by side in progressive stages of dissection, spilling their black innards onto the tidal flats. Here is where half the world's ships come to die—ripped apart by hand into scrap metal. Alang is a foul, desperate, and dangerous place, and a wonder of the world.

Typical of Langewiesche's work, the story sits at the intersection of many important subjects: contemporary colonialism, social and economic development, environmental protection, labor regulation, and accountability, or lack thereof, for transnational corporations. I can't board an ocean-going vessel today without feeling haunted by Langewiesche's narrative and worrying that I'm contributing to an ongoing human rights tragedy.

Horrifying conditions Langewiesche described in 2000 unfortunately continue today, human rights abuses having been abated only modestly and more in some jurisdictions than in others. Langewiesche focused on India, and Indian enforcement only pushed the most hazardous and ill regulated ship-breaking practices further into Bangladesh and Pakistan. 

There have been much needed regulatory innovations in recent years that mean to effect reform. The European Union adopted a Ship Recycling Regulation in 2013. The NGO Shipbreaking Platform wrote:

From 31 December 2018, EU-flagged commercial vessels above 500 GT must be recycled in safe and environmentally sound ship recycling facilities that are included on the European List of approved ship recycling facilities. The List was first established on 19 December 2016 and is periodically updated to add additional compliant facilities, or, alternatively, to remove facilities which have ceased to comply. Currently, the List comprises facilities operating in the EU, Turkey and US. 

Ship-breakers, Chittagong, Bangladesh, 2005
Adam Cohn via Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

The EU adopted the regulation after accession to the 2009 Hong Kong Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (International Maritime Organization), which entered force just recently, on June 25, 2025. India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan also have signed on to the convention. At least, then, standards for proper ship-breaking are being articulated.

However, neither the EU regulation nor the overarching Hong Kong Convention solves the problem of jurisdictional reach to ships under flags of convenience. The shipping industry has long relied on re-flagging vessels to circumvent regulations of all kinds, and the problem remains intractable. Newly articulated standards will only work insofar as nations refuse to provide a haven for illicit ship-breaking and for its concealment by re-flagging.

Meanwhile, the cruise industry continues to burn through generations of ships in never-ending pursuit of size and extravagance.

"The Shipbreakers" was long posted in full text at Longform, but recently became unavailable there, apparently upon a change of ownership of an underlying ISP. (But archived at the time of this writing.)

Rest in peace, William Langewiesche.

Analog propaganda proves persuasive to some at 'Hanoi Hilton,' where exhibits selectively whitewash war

Hỏa Lò Prison, Hanoi
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

Media illiteracy is not just an affliction of the aged.

In June, I visited Hỏa Lò Prison, also known as "the Hanoi Hilton," in Vietnam, where captured American soldiers, including the late U.S. Senator John McCain in 1967, were imprisoned during the Vietnam War.

Hỏa Lò was a prison well before the Vietnam War. The prison museum today mostly memorializes the brutal torture and execution of political prisoners at the hands of French colonial forces since the prison's 1896 construction.

Guillotine used by the French
in colonial Vietnam,
now at Hỏa Lò Prison
RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

The museum exhibits largely whitewash the imprisonment of Americans during the Vietnam War. Exhibits skip over the interrogation and torture of American prisoners, which conditions they were forced to deny in statements in the 1960s, but later reported (U.S. Navy, CBS News). Under international pressure, the Viet Cong improved conditions in the prison late in 1969. The museum focuses on that time and a prisoner exchange in 1973, in which McCain went home after more than five years.

Following the timeline of the prison's history through the many exhibit rooms, I came upon a group of British tourists, circa 20 years old. They were looking at an image of American soldiers playing volleyball in the prison yard. The photograph is a rather well known piece of propaganda, but it's represented in the museum as just a day in the life of "the American pilots" held at the prison.

One young woman in the group turned to her cohort. "See?" she said. "After the French treated them so horribly, this is how well they treated the Americans."

I guess history is written by the victors. 

Sometimes I lament that persons of my parents' generation, reared on Walter Cronkite, too readily believe anything they hear from a purported "news" anchor on cable TV or the internet. I wonder whether a screen-reared generation is too ready to believe anything they see on a museum wall.

I'll have a longer photo-essay on Vietnam, and the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon, here at The Savory Tort on Friday, August 1.

Regulatory overhaul opens opportunity to build 'transparency by design' into federal contracting

Google Gemini CC0

Colleagues and I submitted a comment to the federal government yesterday urging recognition of the freedom of information, that is, "transparency by design," in government acquisition of information and communication technology. 

The White House has ordered the overhaul, or streamlining, of the federal procurement process, ideally through simplification of the voluminous and complex Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council is working over the regulations part by part with "deviation guidelines," allowing agencies room to depart from regulations until a proper regulatory rewrite can be accomplished—something that typically takes years—and inviting feedback on a rolling basis. Part 39, for which model deviation recently issued, covers the acquisition of information and communication technology.

The Administration's aim is a "Revolutionary FAR Overhaul" to "Restor[e] Common Sense to Federal Procurement." The government website Acquisition.gov explains (original emphasis):

Led by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council), this initiative will return the FAR to its statutory roots, rewritten in plain language, and remove most non-statutory rules.  In addition, non-regulatory buying guides will provide practical strategies grounded in common sense while remaining outside the FAR.

The goal is clear: faster acquisitions, greater competition, and better results.

Naturally, there is concern by skeptics of the Administration that the overhaul is only a smokescreen to loosen the reins on corporate contractors and grease the wheels of profit off the public fisc.

Regardless of the realpolitik, the Administration at least represents that it wants transparency, which should facilitate a free market and accountability in federal contracting. Like the "DOGE" initiative, the ends are laudable, even if the means are debatable.

Thus, in the shared spirit of efficient governance, colleagues and I sought to remind the FAR Council and OFPP that FOIA already provides for access to agency records in the hands of contractors. However, the reality, exaggerated in the information age, is that public and exempt data often are so commingled as practically to preclude disclosure. At best, efficiency is compromised, wasting public resources. At worst, malfeasance is let to fester.

The problem is not new; I wrote in 2006 (page 731) about a once well known 1993 case of access to contractor data under state freedom of information law in event of a public emergency. The European Union has had a regulation in place for more than 20 years to ensure that public access to records is preserved through "transparency by design" in EU record-keeping.

Transparency by design should be a bedrock principle of government contracting at every level, especially in the information age. Politicians might disagree about what to spend public money on, but transparency and accountability after the fact is a non-partisan imperative.

Below is the full text of the Comment of Freedom of Information Scholars on FAR Overhaul part 39 (submitted July 28, 2025). My interdisciplinary co-authors are Jason R. Baron, J.D., professor of the practice at the University of Maryland College of Information; David Cuillier, Ph.D., director of the Freedom of Information Project, Brechner Center for the Advancement of the First Amendment, at the University of Florida College of Journalism and Mass Communication; Shelley Kimball, Ph.D., associate program director and senior lecturer at the Johns Hopkins Krieger School of Arts and Sciences; and Margaret Kwoka, J.D., Lawrence “Larry” Herman Professor in Law at the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.

---

Comment of Scholars of Freedom of Information Law
on FAR Overhaul, Part 39
July 28, 2025

    We, the undersigned, are scholars of freedom of information law. We suggest that the federal acquisition process would benefit from recognition of agency responsibilities to comply with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, which would promote the use of technology to make fulfillment of agencies’ FOIA duties less costly and time-consuming, at a significant manpower savings to the taxpayer.

    Although the FAR, 48 C.F.R. ch. 1, provides for the inclusion of a clause in solicitations and contracts for the design, development, or operation of a system of records to accomplish an agency function subject to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (see 48 C.F.R. §§ 24.104 & 52.224-1), it appears that there is no comparable FAR provision addressing an agency’s obligation under FOIA to provide access to federal agency records. As the federal government has increased its reliance on electronic data systems, it is important, in the interest of transparency, to ensure that agencies have the means effectively and efficiently to pull information out of these systems in response to FOIA requests. One way to do that is to require federal agencies to consider their responsibilities under FOIA when they set out to acquire information technology, especially communication technology.

    In 2020, we understand that the National Archives and Record Administration (NARA) recommended to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that FAR part 39 be revised to recognize FOIA obligations. Specifically, NARA proposed, inter alia:

Agencies must ensure that contracts for designing, developing, purchasing, or operating information technology or systems, including cloud-based, and Federal or non-Federal information systems, contain requirements that facilitate FOIA processing in their system design specifications (5 U.S.C. § 552). Each agency must ensure that system design includes the following FOIA-related search and retrieval capabilities:

(1)    conduct robust searches of electronic records in response to FOIA requests;
(2)    document the search and search results; and
(3)    export the documents that result from the searches in the format the agency requires for responding to FOIA requests.

The NARA proposal was based on Recommendation 2018-03 of the FOIA Advisory Committee.  The Committee in 2018 recognized a need for “all agencies, when acquiring electronic records management software, electronic mail software, and other records related information technology, to consider features that will help facilitate the agencies’ responsibilities under FOIA to provide access to federal agency records.” Accordingly, the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) drafted a business case in FY 2019 that would modify the FAR to require access to federal agency records as a consideration in the procurement process. As stated above, NARA submitted the business case to OMB in early FY 2020 for consideration by the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council.

    Upon the occasion of the FAR overhaul process, as to part 39 and more generally, we suggest that government transparency and efficiency would be achieved by agency recognition of FOIA responsibilities at the time of acquisition of information and communication technology systems. “Transparency by design” in such systems obviates waste of government resources trying to comply with FOIA after the fact with systems ill designed to facilitate compliance. 

    We therefore recommend that the above specifications be included in the FAR revisions being contemplated, in the revised regulations themselves, in the newly contemplated Buyer’s Guides, or in both.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Richard J. Peltz-Steele

Richard J. Peltz-Steele, J.D.
Chancellor Professor, University of Massachusetts Law School

Jason R. Baron, J.D.
Professor of the Practice, University of Maryland College of Information

David Cuillier, Ph.D.
Director, The Freedom of Information Project, Brechner Center for the Advancement of the First Amendment, University of Florida College of Journalism and Mass Communication

Shelley Kimball, Ph.D.
Associate Program Director, Senior Lecturer, Johns Hopkins Krieger School of Arts and Sciences

Margaret Kwoka, J.D.
Lawrence “Larry” Herman Professor in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University

Affiliations are stated for identification only, not to represent any position of the named institutions. 

Might AI translation inadvertently shrink reality itself?

Google Gemini CC0

AI language translation is making communication easier around the world. But might it also shrink our very perception of reality?

That's the question I asked of a thought-provoking panel on language acquisition at the 17th Global Legal Skills Conference at the Faculty of Law at Masaryk University (MUNI) in Brno, Czechia, Thursday.

Panelists discussed the question whether foreign language acquisition will remain a virtue in a world in which artificial intelligence increasingly makes communication seamless across borders.

Karen Lundquist, University of Minnesota Law, answered aptly, in sum, "It depends." Certainly there are client interactions she can now have with AI translation tools, Lundquist said, that might not have been possible before. But those conversations do not perfectly replicate connection in a shared language. At least for now, MUNI linguist Kateřina Chudová said, there are non-verbal or near-verbal properties of communication that even AI cannot bridge, such as body language, cultural context, and irony.

Will AI get there? Probably, as fast as the technology is evolving. Attorney Luca Forgione observed that the world today looks ever more like the fictional Minority Report, a film that came out more than 20 years ago (2002). (I noted in the Q&A that Philip K. Dick published the story "The Minority Report" in Fantastic Universe in 1956!)

Disclaiming that I am no expert in linguistics, I asked in the Q&A that the panelists might reflect on the science showing that language and a person's very perception of reality are causally interactive, that is, something of a chicken-or-egg problem. For example, I said, it's almost self-evident that how a language uses tense is indicative of how a culture understands time.

In a world of AI translation, then, are we on the cusp of a global cultural convergence? More to the point: Will AI universalism cost humanity a multiplicity of realities? 

My answer to the central question on the panel, whether foreign language acquisition still has value, is an emphatic yes, for much the reasons the panelists posited. I'm no polyglot, but with just one other language and a smattering beyond, I understand the powerful link between speech and thought. Thinking about how I would conjugate a verb in Spanish sometimes helps me to rethink how best to say it in English. For example, the imperfect tense in Spanish evokes a sense of time with no precise English equivalent.

Forgione said in response that even not knowing all of the six languages his wife and children know, he can detect differences in tone that correlate to language, especially in emotionally laden contexts. Having various languages in my extended family, I understand that. Lundquist, who lived many years in Rome, suggested that Italian, for example, possesses a richer capacity than some other languages to communicate emotional intensity. That's a controverted proposition. Yet it does feel credible to me, remembering my Italian relatives and some of the language.

The differences might run deeper than the merely interpersonal. The question I asked the panel in Brno about the science of language was informed by a memorably haunting episode of Radiolab from more than a decade ago. "Colors" (2012) is widely regarded as a classic installment of the groundbreaking podcast.

To put criminally concise description to but one proposition of "Colors": Analysis of poetry suggests that ancient peoples might not have perceived the color "blue" before they acquired a word for it. With no concept of "blue," they didn't describe the sky that way. But it's not just a problem of description. With no human concept of blue, did blue even exist?

I know, you're thinking, well, there was still light at the shorter-wavelength end of the visible spectrum. But dig a little deeper. It's really a variation on the tree-falls-in-the-forest problem. And the answer is important, because in a world of intelligent—dare I say sentient?—machines, it's becoming less clear whose perception gets to define reality.

After the panel, I was fortunate to meet Lindsey Kurtz, a linguist and teacher at Penn State Dickinson Law. She taught me that the scientific concept I was after is called "the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis," or "linguistic relativity." Learn more at the History and Philosophy of the Language Sciences podcast (2023) or at the Lingthusiasm podcast (2025).

The idea, restated by anthropologist Edward Sapir in 1929, is that structures of language are interrelated with perception and thought themselves. There are weaker and stronger versions of the hypothesis to describe the depth and inextricability of the interrelationship. 

The implications quickly become surreal. Does something exist before the mind can describe or memorialize it? The answer might be no. That is, it's possible that words are not a consequence of reality. At least sometimes, words might cause reality, that is, bring it into existence. Language is literally creative.

So what happens if language differences go away? What if artificial intelligence causes a convergence of the human diversity expressed in language, leaving behind only monochromatic modules of machine-readable meaning for our consumption? 

Is it possible, then, that humans will lose the ability to create new concepts? that our creative well will run dry? Or worse, might we inadvertently and irrevocably transfer our creative power to AI? Will AI create new planes of reality beyond our comprehension and leave us behind to wallow in the blissful ignorance of "the matrix" (the "simulation hypothesis")? Are we in it already?

In Brno, or at least in the Brno matrix, there was nary an objection to the proposition that foreign language acquisition continues to have value for learners, including lawyers, professors, and law students. As yet, there is no perfect proxy for language to effect a meeting of human minds.

Yet Star Trek's "universal translator," or Doctor Who's "voice integrator," is every day less a fiction. And that appealing Utopian imagining might camouflage a grim threat to the infinitude of humanity.

The Global Legal Skills Conference is a project of the Global Legal Skills Institute. Conference and institute are passion projects of a long-time colleague I greatly admire, Mark Wojcik, Illinois Law, whom I first met in the Association of Legal Writing Directors (ALWD) in 1997; and others in his coterie, including the sharp-minded Lurene Contento, Chicago-Kent Law, who moderated the panel: "Is Language Acquisition Still a Valuable Global Legal Skill?"

Colleagues and I presented on another panel at the conference, which I wrote about on June 2.

Global collab promotes teaching law without borders

Peltz-Steele, Lewinbuk, Rott-Pietrzyk, Kim, Rigó
© Used with permission

Collaborators and I had the privilege of discussing the Global Law Classroom (GLC) at the 17th Global Legal Skills Conference (GLS 17), hosted by the Global Legal Skills Institute and the Faculty of Law at Masaryk University (MUNI Law) in Brno, Czechia, last week.

The GLC is a collaboration of faculty around the world to bring together students across borders, via Zoom, to study international and comparative law and learn from each other. I wrote about the GLC here at The Savory Tort about a year ago, after a 2022 pilot run and just before we executed the first official program over eight weeks in fall 2024. I used the GLC as a one-credit component of my Comparative Law class, and I will again in the upcoming fall 2025.

© Used with permission

© Used with permission

In presenting on the GLC to our GLS 17 colleagues in Brno on Thursday, we provided a demonstration hypothetical in data protection for attendees to discuss in small groups. I developed the fact pattern initially with Cristina Blasi Casagran, Autonomous University of Barcelona, and we used it in the fall 2024 GLC human rights module to demonstrate divergence in U.S. and EU approaches to privacy.

For GLS 17, I created a video narrative (below) and briefed the audience on the salient doctrine of the respective legal systems (inset below video) (both CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).

RJ Peltz-Steele CC BY-NC-SA 4.0

The GLC is the brainchild of Melanie Reid, Lincoln Memorial Law, who could not join us in Brno, but will lead a discussion of the project later this summer at the annual conference of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS).

The GLC faculty team in Brno was led by Rosa Kim, Suffolk Law, and also comprised Katerina Lewinbuk, South Texas College of Law; Balázs Rigó, Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) (Hungary), and Ewa Rott-Pietrzyk, University of Warsaw (Poland). It was great fun for the five us to be together IRL after so much labor together on Zoom.

I'll have another report from GLS 17 here at The Savory Tort on Wednesday, June 4.

Updated 'TORTZ' features latest on Amazon liability, Texas 2-step, DaBaby defamation foes, much more

New 2025 editions of TORTZ: A Study of American Tort Law, volumes 1 and 2 are posted and ready for academic year 2025-26.

Two-volume TORTZ is free to download at SSRN: volume 1 and volume 2.

The books can be purchased in well bound, paperback hardcopy, both volumes for about US$61 plus shipping, from Lulu.com. The price is cost in the United States and just a couple dollars more elsewhere in the world.

Revisions in the 2025 edition include:

Premises Liability

• Discussion of Varley v. Walther (Mass. App. Ct. 2025) on "open and obvious" dangers in premises liability.

Product Liability

• Discussion of Amazon's product liability exposure, including the 2025 order of the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
• Discussion of the Texas two-step, including its rejection In re LTL Mgmt., LLC (3d Cir. 2023), and Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse's (D-R.I.) bill, the Ending Corporate Bankruptcy Abuse Act.

Life and Death

• Revised explanation and distinction of "wrongful birth," "wrongful life," and "wrongful conception" actions.
• Discussion of the waning "suicide rule" in the context of the wrongful death suit by the family of Boeing whistleblower John M. Barnett in Stokes v. Boeing (D.S.C. 2025).
  

Government Immunity

• Discussion of Justice Clarence Thomas's displeasure with the Feres doctrine, dissenting from denial of certiorari in Carter v. United States (U.S. 2025).
• Discussion of 17 plaintiff families' victory in the bellwether Pearl Harbor-Hickam AFB water contamination trial, in Feindt v. United States (D. Haw. 2025).
  

Public Nuisance

• Note of Trumbull County v. Purdue Pharma (Ohio 2024), according with Okla. v. Johnson & Johnson (Okla. 2021), on opioids and product liability, excerpted in the book.
• Note of the Virgin Islands public nuisance lawsuit against Coca-Cola and Pepsico over single-use plastics, Commissioner v. Pepsico (V.I. Super. Ct. filed 2025).
• Note of Oklahoma's dismissal of a public nuisance claim over the Tulsa Race Massacre in Randle v. Tulsa (Okla. 2024).

Media Torts

• Discussion of the latest developments and Rule 11 sanctions in the battery and defamation litigation between promoters and rapper DaBaby, pending appeal from Carey v. Kirk (S.D. Fla. 2025).
• Update on impeached South African Judge John Hlophe's vendetta against former High Court colleague Judge Patricia Goliath, who innovated on anti-SLAPP in Mineral Sands Resources Ltd v. Reddell (High Ct. Wn. Cape Feb. 9, 2021) (upheld).
• Update on the enactment of revenge porn legislation in Massachusetts, the 49th state adopter, and the latest data protection bill in Massachusetts.

'DaBaby' Jonathan Kirk
HOTSPOTATL via Wikimedia CC BY 3.0

Business Torts

• Discussion of the expansion of civil RICO by the Supreme Court in Medical Marijuana v. Horn (U.S. 2025).

Civil Rights

• Discussion of the landmark decision in climate change litigation in Europe, VKSS v. Switzerland (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 2024), in contrast with the dismissal of Juliana v. United States (9th Cir. 2024).
• Note of the plaintiff victory in the Abu Grahib torture case, Al Shamari v. CACI (E.D. Va. 2024).
• Update on the real-life "Hotel Rwanda" protagonist's lawsuits against Rwanda and GainJet, the former defendant dismissed, Rusesabagina v. Rwanda (D.D.C. 2023), and the latter case, Rusesabagina v. GainJet (W.D. Tex. 2024), now pending appeal.

New Resources

• References to new audiovisual productions related to tort law and cases, such as "What Happened to Karen Silkwood?" on Impact x Nightline (2024); the latest on table saws from NPR: Planet Money (2024); Nicole Piasecki's "Dear Alice" from This American Life (2024); the documentaries Downfall: The Case Against Boeing (2022), and Youth v Gov (2020) (re Juliana v. United States), both now available on Netflix.
• References to recently published work on tort law and theory by Ken Abraham & Catherine Sharkey; Andrew Ackley; Christopher Ewell, Oona A. Hathaway, & Ellen Nohle; Dov Fox & Jill Wieber Lens; Kate Falconer, Kit Barker, & Andrew Fell; Jayden Houghton; Michael Law-Smith; Anatoliy Lytvynenko; Michael Pressman; Joseph Ranney; and Sarah Swan.

As in past editions, the coverage includes all of the fundamentals of common law tort, as well as full introductory treatments of  

• defamation, 
• privacy,  
• interference, and  
• private and public nuisance, 

and introductions to  

• business torts, 
• the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
• 'constitutional tort,' and  
• worker compensation and alternative compensation systems. 

Printed in color, Tortz is replete with

•   'RED BOX'   treatments of fundamental rules to help students prepare for the bar exam, 
•   'BLUE BOX'   bibliographies of suggested further readings,
•   'YELLOW BOX'   assignments to online readings and audiovisual materials, and
•   'GRAY BOX'   state differences for Massachusetts bar candidates, or as demonstrative.

'Take It Down' Act purports to redress revenge porn, but invites censorship by only incentivizing take-down

Derived from Google Gemini, RJ Peltz-Steele CC0

President Trump signed into law bipartisan federal revenge porn legislation Monday—alas, not in time for inclusion in 2 Tortz (2025 ed.)—but all is not sunshine and rainbows.    

First, it must be noted, and news media seem widely oblivious to the fact that, Congress, per the Commerce Clause, created a federal civil action for revenge porn already in 2022, in the quinquennial reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. The law is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6851.

The TAKE IT DOWN Act, signed into law Monday, ups the stakes by criminalizing revenge porn at the federal level. The law also is broader in scope than existing law. With the new act, the federal government joins the majority of states in tackling deepfake sexual images, besides authentic images. And as Sunny Gandhi and Adam Billen explained for Tech Policy Press, Take It Down extends to "nude images published with the intent to 'abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade' a minor rather than only 'sexually explicit' images."

The law's means, though, subordinate free speech to purported privacy rights. Right there in the name, Take It Down introduces a requirement that platforms remove non-consensual intimate imagery within 48 hours of a complaint. As Jason Kelley of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) observed, that's hardly enough time to investigate the context of an image or rights to it, even if a platform were so inclined. 

Rather, Take It Down emulates the notice-and-take-down regime of the intellectual property system, which has resulted in excessive removal of content upon complaint at the expense of fair, authorized, and otherwise protected uses. A poster is afforded little or no opportunity to object to take-down, or to remediate any perceived wrong; rather, the system errs on the side of censorship.

In Take It Down, the addition of criminal penalties further incentivizes prophylactic take-down, with no corresponding incentive to hear an objection or to exercise judgment. The penalties if wrongfully posted content remains online are severe, while there is no risk in excessive removal. As Kelley further observed, for large platforms such as Meta, that calculus incentivizes the blunt use of AI and automation to effect take-down, errors be damned.

Worse, an automated, prophylactic take-down process is susceptible of ill intentioned manipulation.

"President Trump himself has said that he would use the law to censor his critics," Kelley reminded readers.

Take It Down seeks to address a real problem, but takes the easy way out. The law panders to advocates for protective legislation, allowing legislators to take credit for "solving" the problem. Meanwhile, the law gives the corporatocracy a pass on meaningful responsibility and invites political opportunists to obliterate free speech and sow misinformation in its place. 

O Congress. "Bipartisanism ain't all it's cracked up to be."

Appeal in slip'n'fall points to deeper mysteries of historical 'open and obvious' danger doctrine

Google Gemini CC0

Rejecting the phrase "open and obvious" as magical incantation, the Massachusetts Appeals Court Friday affirmed a slip-and-fall jury award for an apartment dweller against her landlord.

The plaintiff injured her ankle when she left her apartment because, she alleged and the jury agreed, the landlord had removed a platform that usually stood outside the door, thus increasing the height of the step.

The defendant argued that the absence of the platform was an "open and obvious" condition, thus negating the duty a landlord usually owes to a renter. Maybe so, the court opined, but the proposition only raises a question of fact appropriate for resolution by the jury. And the jury here decided that the defendant should have foreseen the plaintiff's unawareness of the platform's absence.

"Open and obvious" is a term oft used in the law in different contexts, with seemingly magical effect, so it's important to specify first that the term arises here in the context of landowner negligence. Its use even in this vein is historically and persistently ambiguous.

The ambiguity arises in part from the fact that "landowner negligence" is often described in terms of the duty that a landowner owes to one who comes onto the land. But functionally, the rules of landowner negligence operate as rules of breach of the standard of conduct, or defendant's "negligence." The distinction is theoretical and often functionally insignificant. But it can be procedurally important, because the existence of a duty is—not exclusively, but let's gloss that over—a question of law for the court to decide, while breach presents a question of fact for the jury to decide.

The rules that American common law has evolved for landowner negligence sensibly require some degree of plaintiff's unawareness of the danger. Depending on the plaintiff-defendant relationship, the plaintiff's unawareness might be tested according to the defendant's reasonable anticipation, the plaintiff's reasonable anticipation, or the plaintiff's subjective knowledge. Whatever the test, bearing the burden of proof, the plaintiff alleges that unawareness. The defendant may declare in response that the danger was "open and obvious," thus making clear that the plaintiff's allegation cannot be believed.

What has not been clear in common law, historically, is the procedural impact of the declaration. Was the "open and obvious" declaration an affirmative defense, for which the burden of proof shifted to the defendant, or merely a refutation of the plaintiff's proof of unawareness? Was the "open and obvious" declaration equivalent to a "no duty" argument that the court must resolve expeditiously as a matter of law, or is the declaration a factual description that must be placed in the hands of the jury? Courts answered these questions variably, creating confusion.

In helping law students to understand the contemporary import of "open and obvious" in the multistate norms of American common law landowner negligence, my preference is to impress upon them that the term usually is not, or ought not be, a magical incantation. It's alliteration is alluring but deceptive. In contemporary doctrine, the declaration of "open and obvious" should be understood merely as a defense allegation of fact, and a refutation of the plaintiff's proof. The burden of proof does not shift, though it must be acknowledged that a credible declaration might obviate the need for a jury trial.

If the danger indeed is so open and obvious that ordinary minds could not differ on the question of plaintiff's unawareness, then the usual operation of civil procedure allows the court to decide the question of fact as a matter of law, in which case the court may do so pretrial and under the banner of duty or breach. If the answer is not so obvious as the defendant contends, then a motion to dismiss as a matter of law is properly denied, and the question is advanced to the jury as one of fact.

That's the approach that seems to have evolved in Massachusetts, though the appellate court has not always been clear about the mechanisms under the hood. In the instant case, the court wrote that the "open and obvious" declaration presented a question of fact that was properly referred to the jury for resolution. The court also described the "open and obvious" allegation as seeking to negate the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. That's not wrong, but it might be confusing, because the jury usually is charged with examining elements of breach, not duty. 

In an earlier case, Ward v. Schnurr (Mass. App. Ct. 2023) (The Savory Tort (Sept. 28, 2023)), the court affirmed dismissal of a negligence claim in favor of a landowner in part upon the defendant's allegation of "open and obvious," also referencing the duty owed, but without a jury ever having been impaneled. In that case, the plaintiff had been hired by the defendant specially to remediate the dangerous condition, so the plaintiff's assertion that it was unaware of the danger ran into trouble on the sniff test. The "open and obvious" allegation was therefore properly decided as a matter of law, even though it was a question of fact. The court did not, however, go out of its way to make that clear. 

In neither case did the court indicate that any burden shifting had occurred. I don't think it did. But there again, it would have been helpful if the court had said that.

Doctrinal confusion over "open and obvious" thus persists, in Massachusetts and elsewhere. It only makes matters worse that what I describe here as my understanding of Massachusetts law, as well as what I sell to students as multistate norms, is not the law everywhere in all circumstances. 

There is a deeper theoretical truth at work here, almost a philosophical question, one that I encourage first-year students in Torts to embrace and play with before the remainder of the "hands-on," widget-making law school curriculum beats out of them any appreciation for law as a worthwhile intellectual pursuit. The truth is that duty and breach are not really distinct things, rather, are more like two sides of the same coin. Thus, the tort scholar William Prosser once said, "Circumlocution is inevitable."

For now, to quote the scholar of popular culture Trevor Noah, "ain't nobody got time for that."

What I'd like to know more about, meanwhile, are the family dynamics behind the instant case. The defendant landowner was, the court revealed, the plaintiff renter's mom. I hope the case was motivated by access to insurance and not bad blood, though neither scenario speaks well of American civil dispute resolution.

The case is Varley v. Walther, No. 24-P-511 (Mass. App. Ct. May 16, 2025). Justice Gregory I. Massing wrote the opinion of the unanimous panel that also comprised Justices Hershfang and Tan.